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Abstract

While the recent publication of the Hannah Arendt–Martin Heidegger correspondence confirms that there existed a close personal tie between these two thinkers, the relation between their philosophies is far more problematic. This article argues that Arendt’s originality presents itself in its full light in her two major theoretical works of the 1950s, Between Past and Future and The Human Condition, when these works are considered to present a thinly veiled, implicit critique of Heidegger’s philosophy. Arendt’s critique becomes especially visible in the ‘existential’ role that she attributed to natality in its relation to political action and to remembrance, placing in question the central orientation of Heidegger’s existential ontology in terms of being-toward-death.

Keywords: political philosophy; existentialism; memory; ontology; natality

The publication of the correspondence between Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt in Germany in 1998 has led to new insight into the relations between these two twentieth-century thinkers. Arendt was Heidegger’s student in Marburg in the mid-1920s and this correspondence has confirmed the intimate character of their relationship during this period. Subsequently, Arendt moved to Heidelberg to work with Karl Jaspers. Following Heidegger’s support of the Hitler regime as rector of Freiburg University in 1933–4, communication ceased between Arendt and Heidegger and, during these years, Arendt emigrated, first to France and then to the United States. After the Second World War, the silence between them continued for a period of five years. During this period Arendt published an article highly critical of Heidegger’s writings, entitled ‘What is Existenz-philosophy?’ (1946), in which she argued that Heidegger’s thought belonged to the contemplative metaphysical tradition inaugurated by Plato that she saw it as her task to overcome. The Hannah Arendt–Martin Heidegger Briefwechsel has also documented the fact that in February 1950
Arendt and Heidegger resumed their friendship, which lasted for the remainder of their lives.

In the eyes of many, the intimate character of the relationship between Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger has only confirmed the assumption that Arendt's work is essentially tributary to Heidegger's thought and that she has more or less served as his disciple.¹

In this following paper I shall support the contrary argument: while the Arendt–Heidegger correspondence does indeed confirm the intimate nature of their relations, it is another matter to infer from their personal affairs the influence of the professor's thinking on that of his former student. According to the argument I shall advance in the pages that follow, the tendency to consider Arendt to be no more than Heidegger's disciple only obscures what is original in her work. When examined in this light, it is no accident that in Arendt's two major theoretical works of the 1950s—to my mind her most original writings—Heidegger's philosophy plays no explicit role. In Between Past and Future Heidegger is only incidentally mentioned in a footnote, whereas in The Human Condition his name never appears. Of course, the paucity of references to Heidegger in these works hardly proves that her former mentor did not exert an important tacit influence. However, I shall argue that Arendt's originality presents itself in its full light in these works when it is considered to be a thinly veiled, implicit critique of Heidegger's philosophy. How, then, might it be possible to place the originality elicited by this critique in relief?

My analysis will focus on an aspect of the philosophies of Heidegger and of Arendt which has heretofore received little attention: their respective interpretations of remembrance. If, for reasons related to the central orientation of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the theme of remembrance could play only a subsidiary role in the period of Sein und Zeit—the decisive period for Hannah Arendt—Hannah Arendt, on the contrary, accorded a central place to remembrance in the political theory of works such as Between Past and Future and The Human Condition. It is here, to my mind, in the importance attributed by Arendt to remembrance, that an implicit but very significant critique of the general orientation of Heidegger's Existenzphilosophie comes to light. Even more clearly than in Arendt's early explicit critique of Heidegger in her 1946 article 'What is Existenz-Philosophy?', this implicit critique in Arendt's works of the 1950s helps explain in what sense Heidegger's thinking for her belonged to a contemplative metaphysical tradition which she saw it as her task to overcome.

In a letter written to Hannah Arendt on 12 April 1950, several months after they decided to resume their long-interrupted friendship, Heidegger made a revealing comment concerning his conception of memory. In between the question, 'What is prettier, your image or your letter?' and the recollection of Arendt twenty-five years earlier, evoked by her brown dress, Heidegger made the following statement:
Perhaps planetary journalism is the first tremor in the coming devastation of all initiations and of their posterity. Is this therefore pessimism? Therefore despair? No! But it is thought which thinks to what extent merely historiographically represented history does not necessarily determine essentially human being; that duration and its length is no measure for the essential; that the half blink of a moment in its suddenness may ‘be’ more fully; that man must prepare himself for this being and learn another memory (ein anderes Gedächtnis lernen); that indeed with all of this what is highest stands before him; that the destiny of Jews and Germans possesses its own truth to which our historiographical calculations cannot attain.2

'Man must learn another memory (Gedächtnis)', Heidegger admonished Arendt. At the time of the composition of this letter Heidegger had already begun to modify his orientation in relation to the fundamental ontology elaborated in Sein und Zeit. Nonetheless, in its focus on being, as in its critical stance in regard to what Heidegger took to be the conventional representations of historical memory, this 'other' memory, termed Erinnerung,3 had been anticipated in works of the period of Sein und Zeit with which Hannah Arendt was then familiar. What was the role of memory in this period of Heidegger's work?

I

Whereas Heidegger's mentor Husserl and other contemporary phenomenologists such as Max Scheler placed the theory of memory at the centre of their respective philosophical investigations, it is at first glance surprising that in Sein und Zeit so little attention is devoted to this theme. However, as becomes clear from the first sentence of this work, the main inquiry of Sein und Zeit centres not on memory, but on forgetfulness: 'The so-called question [the question of being] has today fallen into forgetfulness.' And, under the aegis of the Seinsfrage, of ontology, memory is subordinated to forgetfulness, to Seinsvergessenheit, as Sein und Zeit's primary concern. Memory, indeed, can assume ontological significance only to the extent that it recalls what has fallen into forgetfulness. It would reach beyond the framework of this paper to analyse the full implications of this assumption and, for the purpose of my investigation, I will limit my analysis to three aspects of Heidegger's thought in the period of Sein und Zeit that are of particular importance for understanding what I take to be the critical position of Hannah Arendt.

1. In the only chapter of Sein und Zeit which deals explicitly with the theme of memory, with Erinnerung (chapter 4, part II of Sein und Zeit, entitled 'Zeitlichkeit und Alltätigkeit'), Heidegger explains that 'memory . . . is possible on the ground of forgetting and not the contrary' ('die
Erinnerung ... ist auf dem Grunde des Vergessens möglich und nicht umgekehrt’). Forgetfulness here prefigures Dasein’s everyday existence. Forgetfulness envelops the everyday preoccupations of Dasein through which it continually sets aside consideration of the finite character of its existence as being-toward-death. It is on the ground of this ontological forgetfulness, that is, of everyday forgetfulness of finitude characteristic of inauthentic existence, that Heidegger engages his analysis of memory in Sein und Zeit.5

By contrast, when it comes in Sein und Zeit to interpreting Dasein’s authentic existence, the authenticity of decision is designated, not in terms of memory (Erinnerung), but of repetition (Wiederholung). In the language of Sein und Zeit repetition recalls Dasein to the finite ground of its existence and to authentic choice in the light of finitude. This authentic possibility of decision, in disengaging itself from immersion in everyday forgetfulness, necessarily accords a privilege, not to the temporal past intended by memory, or even to the present in which action is engaged, but to Dasein’s anticipation of the future. Here it must be recalled that there exists a duality in Dasein’s modes of temporalization. The inauthentic mode, placing weight on presence, conceives time as a sequence in which the future, as a waiting for events, is configured on the model of present continuity in its uniform prolongation of the past.6 It is an inauthentic sequence in the sense that the model of temporal presence that engulfs existence overlays it with a semblance of continuity and permanence which masks the disquieting approach toward death which is to come. Authentic temporality, on the contrary, brings Dasein to grips with this most singular future. It reveals the future in its existential priority – as future being-toward-death. The ontological priority accorded to forgetfulness (which repetition strives to overcome), and not to memory, finds its justification in what might be termed Heidegger’s ‘existential futurism’: the primacy attributed in authentic existence to the temporal ekstasis of the future. As he concisely formulates this thought in Sein und Zeit: ‘Dasein can only authentically have been in so far as it exists toward the future’ (‘Dasein kann nur eigentlich gewesen sein, sofern es zukünftig ist’).8 It is a projection of Dasein toward the future capable of overcoming forgetfulness of being conceived as Dasein’s ownmost being toward death. But this weight placed upon future being-toward-death as the wellspring of existential authenticity and, in view of repetition, as the source of authentic interpretation of the past accounts for the paucity of attention accorded in Sein und Zeit to memory in its own right. And this tendency is perfectly consistent with Heidegger’s devaluation of traditional historiography, as of any theory of historical memory which, in insisting on the role of autonomous structures of remembrance in the orientation of human life, had to his mind overlooked the source of existential authenticity issuing from the repetition of past possibilities in view of the finite future.
2. Just as everyday inauthenticity is characterized by immersion in present preoccupations and by forgetfulness of Dasein’s ownmost being as being-toward-death, so forgetfulness also comes to expression in the predominant interpretations of being in the Western intellectual tradition. Since the early identification of being either with the Platonic idea or, in another light, with the Aristotelian substance, being — what truly is — has been conceived in the diverse articulations of this tradition as permanence in time, as everlasting presence; and it is this identification of being with temporal permanence which has served, according to the famous argument of Sein und Zeit, as the theoretical expression of Dasein’s tacit everyday quest to set its temporal finitude aside and forget its own temporal being as being-toward-death. The critique of the traditional interpretation of being as everlasting presence, as eternity, which neglects the condition of Dasein’s temporal finitude, is engaged by Heidegger in his proposed ontological destruction of Western intellectual traditions.

Given the traditional Platonic and neo-Platonic role of memory as reminiscence, as ἀνάμνησις, directed toward the recall of eternal being, it is significant that Heidegger in his 1921 Freiburg course lectures, Augustinus und der Neu-Platonismus, had previously focused his critique on the neo-Platonic foundations of St Augustine’s interpretation of memory, in book X of the Confessions, as reminiscence of the eternal. And, after hardly touching on the theme of memory in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger returned to this theme in the work Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, which was initially supposed to constitute part of Sein und Zeit. Here he briefly articulated a conception of authentic (echte) memory, referring to it not only, as in Sein und Zeit, in terms of Erinnerung, but also of Wiederrinnerung, a word which had traditionally translated the ancient Greek term ἀνάμνησις. In this context, however, far from directing human existence toward eternal being, it is intended, on the contrary, to reveal the ground of Dasein in temporal finitude. In Heidegger’s words:

“...The finitude of Dasein — understanding of being — lies in forgetfulness. This is not occasional and accidental but necessarily and continually constitutes all fundamental ontological construction aiming to lay bare the inner possibility of understanding of being. It must tear itself loose in projection from what in this projection has become prey to forgetfulness.

The basic fundamental ontological act of the metaphysics of Dasein as grounding of metaphysics is therefore ‘reminiscence’ (‘Wiederrinnerung’). Authentic remembrance (Erinnerung) must, however, at all times interiorize what has been remembered, that is, let it be encountered once again in its innermost possibility. Regarding the carrying out of fundamental ontology, that means: it places its main effort on the unique and continuous guidance by the question of being, letting
this question become effective without in any way diminishing its force in order to bring the analysis of Dasein assigned to it onto the right path.\textsuperscript{10}

This passage clearly shows the radicalism with which Heidegger sought to deconstruct all traditional attempts to equate being with temporal permanence. Moreover, this radical deconstruction encompassed not only Platonic and neo-Platonic reminiscence of eternal truth, but also, as he explained in the 1925 Marburg seminar, \textit{Plato: Sophistes}, the Aristotelian conception of ‘rendering immortal’ \textit{\( \text{\scriptsize{\text{	extquotesingle}}}	ext{\textendscriptquote\text{	extquotesingle}}\text{\scriptsize{\text{	extquotesingle}}}{\\kappa\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\eta\alpha\rho\iota\omicron\sigma\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\text{	extquotesingle}}\text{\scriptsize{\text{	extquotesingle}}}{\\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\sigma\nu\omicron\nu\tau\rho\iota\omicron\nu\text{	extquotesingle}}\)} through the contemplation of eternal truth.\textsuperscript{11} The radicalism of this deconstruction of all such notions of eternity and immortality is of particular interest since the young Hannah Arendt participated in this seminar and, as we shall see, without referring to Heidegger, interpreted these notions in an entirely different light thirty years later in \textit{The Human Condition}.

3. Heidegger’s aim to deconstruct all traditional ideas of temporal permanence had particularly deep implications for his interpretation of human political existence, and it is this aspect of his thinking, as I shall attempt to illustrate, which would prove particularly important for Hannah Arendt.

These implications come to light in the perspective of what I have termed Heidegger’s ‘existential futurism’: his foundation of ontology on the condition of mortality and, consequently, on future being-toward-death. In this perspective, Heidegger qualifies death as certain \textit{(gewiß)}, as unsurpassable \textit{(unüberholbar)} and, most important, as incapable of engendering relations with others \textit{(unbezüglich)}. Regarding the third of these conditions, Heidegger explicitly commented that death, as \textit{unbezüglich,\textit{ as a non engendering of relations with others, ‘singularizes Dasein unto itself’ (‘vereinzelt das Dasein auf sich selbst’).\textsuperscript{22}} The radical emphasis that Heidegger placed on the temporal ekstasis of the future, underlining the ontological significance of death in its ‘Unbezüglichkeit’, indicated the extreme difficulty, on the basis of arguments in \textit{Sein und Zeit}, of accounting for more than \textit{individual} authenticity. Moreover, this underlining of futurity of individual being-toward-death, to which historical memory is ontologically subordinated, could only place in question the authenticity of those aspects of past communal existence which draw their significance from a capacity to subsist beyond the existence of mortal individuals. The radicalism of this subordination of historical permanence to the singularity of temporal finitude only accentuates the problematic status in \textit{Sein und Zeit} of authentic communal existence. Indeed, whereas Heidegger devoted detailed passages in this work to the theme of \textit{inauthentic} communal existence through collective \textit{forgetfulness} of being in the guise of \textit{Das Man}, communal authenticity is barely mentioned. And, given Heidegger’s tendency to situate this inauthentic quest at the basis of the public sphere \textit{‘Die Öffentlichkeit}
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verdunkelt alles'), it is difficult to comprehend how political concern for the public sphere – for extension of past modes of existence into a future beyond the purview of individual temporal finitude – might be accorded more than an inauthentic status in the framework of fundamental ontology. Here the priority of ontological forgetfulness to memory and, in overcoming this forgetfulness, that of repetition in light of future being-toward-death to possibilities of remembrance, has particularly weighty implications for the interpretation of political action in the public sphere.

II

Hannah Arendt was keenly aware of this difficulty of accounting for political activity in the public sphere on the basis of the fundamental ontology of *Sein und Zeit*. In a speech presented to the American Society of Political Scientists in 1954, entitled ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’, she explicitly criticized Heidegger’s tendency to conceive of philosophical truth in isolation from the public realm. Indeed, in spite of his claim to have overcome the Western metaphysical tradition, it is precisely the idea of philosophical truth conceived in isolation from the public sphere that for Hannah Arendt illustrates Heidegger’s dependence on traditional metaphysics, and tacitly reaffirms the philosopher’s hostility to the *polis* initially manifested by Plato.  

More important for our purposes, however, than Arendt’s explicit critique of Heidegger in his 1954 address is the way in which she placed Heidegger’s philosophy in question, above all in *The Human Condition* (1958), without ever evoking his name. It is here that Arendt’s theory of memory in its implications for the public sphere sheds clear light on her fundamental opposition to the existential perspective of *Sein und Zeit*. Let us examine the place of remembrance in Arendt’s theory of the public sphere in this work in order to place in relief what I take to be her implicit critique of Heidegger.

The theme of remembrance is introduced in the very first section of *The Human Condition* where Hannah Arendt articulates her theory of the three fundamental human activities – labour, work, and action – at the heart of her interpretation of the human condition. According to this interpretation, labour provides those products of consumption necessary for the survival of the species; work assures those more permanent artifacts that, as she writes, ‘bestow a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time’; action engages in the founding and preserving of political bodies. Action, as she qualifies it, ‘creates the condition for remembrance, that is for history’.  

In characterizing the three fundamental human activities at the outset of *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt immediately related them to what she termed the most ‘general condition of human existence’.

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Although she evoked the conditions of ‘existence’, it is not in the ontological perspective of Heidegger’s philosophy — primordially founded in Dasein’s being-toward-death — but, rather, in terms of the dual conditions of birth and death, natality and mortality. Whereas all three of the fundamental human activities, labour, work, and action, are founded in this dual existential condition of natality and mortality, Arendt is careful to specify that of the three activities action has the closest connection with the human condition of natality, in which, in her words, action is ‘ontologically’ rooted. Indeed, action denotes the capacity to create something new and unique: in this sense political action, in its contingency and unpredictability, shares an essential affinity with the new beginning that birth engenders. And Arendt concludes this passage concerning the inner affinity of action and natality with the following remark, which is particularly significant for our analysis:

since action is the political activity par excellence, natality, and not mortality may be the central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical thought.

Because he had conceived of truth in isolation from the public sphere, Heidegger’s philosophy, as Arendt had claimed in her 1954 speech, ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’, remained tributary to the Western metaphysical tradition. The central assumption of Heidegger’s philosophy, which, as we have seen, placed the public sphere in a particularly dark light, lay in his interpretation of the being of Dasein as being-toward-death. By contrast, Arendt, to the extent that she deals not with metaphysical truth considered in isolation from the public sphere, but with politics, shifted her central focus from the existential condition of death to that of birth. And, indeed, if one follows the implications of her critique, in thus deflecting her focus it is she, Arendt, and not Heidegger, who has identified the way to overcome the Western metaphysical tradition. Here, it seems to me, Arendt’s opposition to Heidegger, even if it remains implicit, could not be clearer. The originality of Arendt’s thought in the articulation of this opposition comes into sharper focus if we recall the inner connection between her theory of political action and her interpretation of remembrance in The Human Condition.

We have noted that in the very first section of The Human Condition Hannah Arendt established an inner affinity between action and remembrance, since action ‘creates the condition for remembrance, that is for history’. This affinity, however, has to be qualified, since action is defined in terms of both deeds and words whose intrinsic character is to be unique and unpredictable and, therefore, ephemeral, if deeds and words are not reified in works. Only through reification in works can action pass into historical remembrance and become a source of plural identity for
generations to come. If natality shares with action its unpredictable and unique quality, it achieves stability within the context of a world only through the orientation provided by such works – as reified remembrance.

This is by no means to claim that Arendt sought to deny the existential significance of death. Like natality, mortality constitutes an existential limit for each of the three fundamental human activities of labour, work, and action. And the counterposition of natality to mortality by no means simply intends to complete a missing element in Heidegger’s philosophy. For, of themselves, birth and action cannot rise beyond the ephemerality of mortal being; only through the work of remembrance can they aspire to durability. Here the stabilizing presence of the work – work of history, work of political foundation, work of art – takes on a significance which cannot be accounted for in terms of metaphysical constructs such as the being-toward-death of existential ontology. For, in creating the conditions of remembrance in deed and word, the work through remembrance approaches earthly ‘immortality’. This was, according to Arendt’s interpretation, the ultimate sense of remembrance in its intrinsic affiliation with the political, as had best been comprehended by Greek antiquity. ‘Men’s life together in the form of the polis’, wrote Arendt in The Human Condition,

seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible and most ephemeral of man-made ‘products’, the deeds and stories which are their outcome, would become imperishable. The organization of the polis, physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically guaranteed by its laws – lest the succeeding generations change its identity beyond recognition – is a kind of organized remembrance. It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men.19

It is here that in The Human Condition Arendt, again without any explicit mention of Heidegger, subtly undercuts the fundamental perspective of Being and Time. In terms of being-toward-death no place could be accorded to natality as a fundamental condition, or to the political role of remembrance, establishing for the new arrivals a permanent cadre, beyond the singularity of finite existence, within which to engage future action. For Heidegger, indeed, memory, in the uniform metaphysical perspective of being-toward-death, could refer only to traditional metaphysical theories of memory which, as the reminiscence of the eternal, called for deconstructive critique or, in the perspective of fundamental ontology, intended to recall Dasein to its finite ground. Identified with the idea of eternity in traditional metaphysics, the quest for immortality (ἄθροιστηζωή) which
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Heidegger found in the Aristotelian ideal of contemplation of eternal truth could provide no alternative to the Platonic and neo-Platonic idea of eternity. Hence, Heidegger could make no fundamental distinction between the political quest for stability and permanence through remembrance of great deeds and words and the metaphysical idea of eternity beyond the purview of human finitude.

For her part, Hannah Arendt conceded that Plato and Aristotle no longer believed that mortal men could "immortalize" through great deeds and words. 20 However, her conception of the political significance of remembrance drew on a tradition older than the metaphysics of Plato and of Aristotle. She focused on the essentially political significance of 'immortality' (θανατοφαζομαι) which she discovered in the pre-Socratic world of Homer, Herodotus and Heraclitus. If immortality depends upon remembrance, it cannot be as reminiscence of the a-temporal and eternal in post-Socratic Platonic metaphysics, but as 'organized remembrance' in the political quest for temporal perdurability in the unpredictable and fluctuating world of human affairs. This is the common intention that motivated the work of the poet Homer and the historian Herodotus. 21

In a footnote allusion, Hannah Arendt refers to a fragment of Heraclitus which inspired the vision of immortality that she found in early Greek antiquity, to which, in Arendt's own perspective, the politics of remembrance aspires. I cite this pre-Socratic reference to immortality in conclusion:

(Since) there is one thing which the best prefer to all things: immortal fame to ephemeral things; clearly the many lie prostrate completely devoured like calves. 22

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Notes


2 "Vielleicht ist der planetarische Journalismus die erste Zuckung [der] kommen- den Verwüstung aller Anfänge und ihrer Überlieferung. Also Pessimismus? Also Verzweiflung? Nein! Aber ein Denken, das bedenkt inwiefern die nur historisch vorgestellte Geschichte nicht notwendig das wesentliche Menschen bemyttet, daß Dauer und ihr Länge kein Maß für das Wesende; daß ein halber Augenblick der Jahre 'seiender' sein kann; daß der Mensch auf dieses 'Seyn' sich vorbringen und ein anderes Geschächt lernen muß, daß ihm gar mit all dem ein Höchstes bevorsteht; daß das Schicksal der Juden und der
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3 Heidegger did not make a terminological distinction in his works of this period between Erinnerung and Gedächtnis.


5 Ibid., p. 339.

6 Hence the full passage reads as follows: 'Erinnerung . . . ist auf dem Grunde des Vergessens möglich und nicht umgekehrt; denn im Modus der Vergessenheit "erschläft" die Geweseneheit primär den Horizont, in den hinein als an die Äußerlichkeit des Besorgten verlorene Dasein sich erinnern kann. Das vergessene-gegenwärtigende-Gewärtige ist eine eigene ekstatische Einheit, gemäß der sich das ungentliche Verstehen hinsichtlich seiner Zeitlichkeit zeiget.' Sein und Zeit, p. 389: 'Remembering is possible only [on the basis] of forgetting, and not vice versa; for in the mode of having-forgotten, one's having been "discloses" primarily the horizon into which a Dasein lost in the "superficiality" of its object of concern can bring itself by remembering. The awaiting which forgets and makes present is an ecstatical unity in its own right, in accordance with which authentic understanding temporizes itself with regard to its temporality.'

7 Ibid., section 68, especially pp. 336–40.

8 Ibid., p. 326.


Der fundamentalontologische Grundakt der Metaphysik des Daseins als der Grundlegung der Metaphysik ist daher eine "Wiedererinnerung". Echte Erinnerung muß aber jederzeit das Erinnerte wahrnehmen, d.h. es sich mehr und mehr in seiner inneren Möglichkeit wieder entgegenkommen lassen. Mit Bezug auf die Durchführung einer Fundamentalontologie bedeutet das: sie legt ihre Hauptanstrengung darauf, die einzige und ständige Führung von Seiten der Seinsfrage ungeschmälert wirksam werden zu lassen, um so die ihr aufgegebene existenzielle Analytik des Daseins in der rechten Bahn zu halten.' Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann Verlag, 1991), pp. 226–7.


12 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 263.

13 A more detailed analysis of this problem is presented in my article, 'The Political Dimension of the Public World: On Hannah Arendt's Interpretation


16 Ibid., p. 9.

17 Ibid., p. 247.

18 Ibid., p. 9.

19 Ibid., pp. 197–8.


21 Ibid., p. 48.