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## Introduction: What is International History?

**Patrick Finney**

Delimiting the territory of academic tribes and explaining their customs and practices are ethnographic enterprises of formidable complexity.[1] Symptomatic of this in the case of international history is the lack of consensus not only over the proper subject matter of the field but even over the very name that it should bear. When the practice of history was professionalised and institutionalised in the nineteenth century, the study of political and diplomatic relations between states lay at its very heart, so dominant that it could simply be denominated as 'history' without any adjectival qualification. As the discipline expanded and diversified, the study of statecraft came to be the preserve of a discrete sub-field known as 'diplomatic history' which flourished in the era of two total wars because it seemed that the questions it tackled were 'of fundamental importance both to the recent history and … to the future of mankind'.[2] After the Second World War, however, diplomatic history found its privileged position within the broader discipline increasingly threatened. Perceived as unhealthily preoccupied with the arcane machinations of elite males, its explanatory strategies and concerns were deemed irrelevant and fusty compared to those of modish competitors like social and economic history. While some practitioners nonetheless continued to plough the traditional furrow, the broader field underwent a profound transformation in response to this challenge. Thus 'diplomatic history' mutated into 'international history': it remained centrally concerned with relations between states, but adopted a much more expansive view of what constituted 'international relations', paying systematic attention not only to diplomacy, but also to economics, strategy, the domestic sources of foreign policy, ideology and propaganda, and intelligence. International history has flourished ever since,

even if it has been continually beset by anxieties about marginalisation and decline, haunted by the spectre of its lost pre-eminence.

If the designation 'international history' has now become firmly established, it by no means commands universal assent. Many scholars, particularly in North America, still favour the term 'diplomatic history', a preference that may – though, confusingly, does not necessarily – betray an attachment to more traditional and restricted modes of inquiry. (The question of naming is, of course, as much a normative as an empirical one.) Other practitioners regard 'international history' as a descriptor so broad and imprecise as to be meaningless, and advocate an alternative such as 'foreign relations history'.[3] Yet others, conversely, are beginning to question the validity of the term because they find it too restrictive. The emergence of 'international history' was less a discrete event than an ongoing process, and its terrain has continued to expand in directions that lead ever further away from the original heartland of 'diplomatic history': witness, for example, increased focus on non-state actors and non-governmental organisations; attention to transnational concerns such as emigration or the environment; and most notably the pervasive rise of culture, especially in works concerned with processes of cultural transfer. These issues are sufficiently remote from the formal exercise of power between states that their salience raises the question of whether 'international history' is any longer an appropriate descriptor. Indeed, it may even be argued that the term is not only empirically limiting but also politically pernicious, in so far as its use tends to reinscribe norms of state sovereignty and the centrality of the nation that ought more properly to be deconstructed. For the time being, however, 'international history' remains the most generally recognised and least problematic term available to us. Hence this introduction and this volume adopt it, though with due recognition of its limitations and instability.[4]

## Locating International History

My purpose here is not to provide a single rigid definition or neat prescription, nor to attempt a comprehensive survey; rather, I hope simply to convey some sense of the wide plurality of practices that currently constitute the field. Even the preliminary question of where one should look to locate the essence of international history prior to

describing it is, in fact, rather problematic. Obvious points of departure would be the contents of book series and leading journals in the field (such as *Diplomatic History*, the *International History Review*, and *Diplomacy and Statecraft*), the activities of specialist academic institutions and programmes (such as the Department of International History at the London School of Economics, or the International and Global History cluster at Harvard University), and the membership rosters and conference programmes of relevant professional associations (such as the British International History Group and the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)). Yet while exploring these sites would yield helpful results, it would scarcely suffice for our purpose because much relevant activity takes place outside of these discrete locales. Important work is published elsewhere, either in general history outlets or in journals focusing on specific periods (for example, the *Journal of Cold War Studies*) or particular geographical areas (for example, *French Historical Studies*). Similarly, many practitioners are not employed in specialist institutions, but work within general history departments (where they may be primarily identified as Europeanists or modernists) or in interdisciplinary units bringing together diverse specialisms under the rubric of 'international studies' or 'international politics'. Moreover, many scholars today operate with multiple identities, and a member of SHAFR may equally be a participant in the activities of the American Studies Association or the Organization of American Historians.

Tracing the relationships of international history with cognate specialist fields is a further complex matter. In the first instance, we can identify interactions with scholars in contiguous disciplines who are concerned with similar subject matter but who bring to bear their own distinctive practices. Pre-eminent here would be the political science domain of International Relations (IR), but one could equally invoke political geography or area studies (of many different geographical realms).[5] Then there are disciplines – such as psychology - which do not necessarily deal with international subjects, but which nonetheless employ tools, techniques and models that international historians can appropriate.[6] The question of the relative advantage to be gained from reaching out in this way to scholars in other disciplines - as opposed to cherishing and refining entirely distinctive approaches - is one that has long exercised international historians. (Indeed, such debates are endemic in academia, a product of the necessity for disciplines both to broadly resemble others and yet still possess a 'unique selling point' if they are to acquire and preserve legitimacy.[7] In the modern university, intellectual awareness that disciplinary boundaries are both arbitrary and potentially inimical to creative thinking often clashes

with the bureaucratic exigencies and structural incentives that perpetuate them.) A minority of international historians have been inclined to 'walk the borders' between disciplines and for them these boundaries have always seemed porous, fluid and unstable.[8] More recently, the possibilities for such fruitful interchange have multiplied dramatically given the dissemination of postmodernist literary and cultural theories. These posed fundamental transdisciplinary questions about textuality, identity and culture; in so doing, they engendered new analytical approaches that had particular ramifications for historians of foreign policy-making and of international and transnational exchanges. Hence they stimulated a further series of (ongoing) conversations with scholars in literary studies, cultural studies and anthropology whose concerns might at first glance appear very distant from those of international history.[9]

In addition to such external connections, international historians also have relationships with other specialist fields within the broader domain of history. Most longstanding here are links with political and economic historians, but equally one could mention historians of imperialism, specialists in strategic history, or historians of propaganda and intelligence.[10] Some of these fields are almost as venerable as diplomatic history, and there has consequently been overlap and interchange between them for a long time. Others originated as sub-approaches within international history, but have subsequently grown to acquire autonomous status, with their own apparatus of journals, specialist posts and conferences; thus they occupy an ambiguous position, at once part of the broader enterprise of international history and yet also separate from it. To complicate matters even further, some of these specialisms have also forged their own links with scholars in disciplines beyond the borders of history, and are themselves interdisciplinary endeavours within which historical approaches are but a part (this is true, for example, of strategic, intelligence and communications studies). Typically international historians may conceive of themselves as members of several of these specialist fields, bringing one or other label to the fore depending on context and strategic purpose. Further layers of complexity could be added by bringing in the distinctive features of international history as it is practised and structured within different national contexts, or by tracing the interchange between academics and writers on military and international history who cater more squarely to the popular market. The point here, however, is simply to demonstrate that pinning down what international history is and where it is practised is no simple matter, since it involves analysing a thick tapestry of relationships and negotiations.

**Narrating International History**

Even if it were possible to locate a distinct 'black box' within which international history existed, this would not resolve the problem of identifying an essence or core practice. This is because the nature of the subject is at any given point contested along various axes. There are constant disputes amongst scholars about what the empirical focus of our endeavours should be, and even where this is not at issue there is debate over the merits of rival interpretations of any given episode or process. Underpinning these discussions are competing views of the relative virtues - even the validity - of different methodological, theoretical and philosophical assumptions, ultimately rooted in differences of worldview or ideology.[11] It is part of the distinctive, proudly empiricist, culture of international history that debate about these assumptions is usually sublimated within discussion of specific events, and positions are predominantly defended with reference to what the evidence will warrant rather than on more abstract grounds. But it is easy enough to detect when what is actually at stake is whether particular approaches should be deemed legitimate or worthy of acceptance within the precincts of international history.[12] This becomes even clearer at those relatively infrequent moments at which international historians do engage in explicit discussion of fundamental theoretical issues: for example, when debating their relationship with their most significant other, IR;[13] or, as in the later part of the 1990s, when the virtues of postmodernist inspired 'discourse analysis' approaches were being widely and sometimes polemically disputed.[14] Compounding the problem, of course, is the fact that these debates also have a diachronic dimension: the issue of what international history should and should not be is also debated and changes through time. Narrating the chronological development of international history offers one means of grappling with these related issues. The narrative outlined at the beginning of this piece, which traces the transformation of diplomatic history into international history through a process of thematic expansion that continues to this day, has considerable merits in providing an orientation in the history of the field, even if it cannot by itself tell the whole story.

Classical diplomatic history came into existence during the later nineteenth century, hallmarked by meticulous reliance upon the archival record and an interpretive

focus on the foreign policies of the great powers, the making and breaking of treaties, and the deliberations and actions of foreign office clerks, diplomats, and statesmen. Its popularity and potency rested on a number of inter-related factors. Developments in philosophy and politics combined to make the rise of the modern European nation-state (and nationalism) seem unquestionably the central drama of the age. Paul Schroeder has characterised the Rankean notion of the *Primat der Aussenpolitik* as presupposing that 'the formation of nation-states and their quest for power and independence was *the* central theme of history and the driving force behind it'; thus it was natural that statecraft and war should occupy centre stage in historical writing.[15] As D. C. Watt put it, 'to be a historian of nineteenth-century Europe and *not* a diplomatic historian was almost impossible'.[16] The growing inclination amongst governments to publish edited collections of diplomatic correspondence to justify their foreign policies to a broader (and newly enfranchised) public further facilitated such inquiry, fuelling the belief that by revealing 'the secret stratagems of monarchs and statesmen' it could uncover 'the pattern of the past which explained the present'.[17] The apparent relevance of diplomatic history only escalated in the aftermath of the First World War, when explaining that conflict's origins became a matter of enormous political significance through the interconnection of the issue of 'war guilt' with German demands for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles. This controversy was played out through the official publication of archival material and the propagation of conflicting interpretations based upon them, which were usually patriotic in cast even as they vaunted their objectivity.[18] All this ensured that diplomatic history occupied a place of unprecedented privilege in political and intellectual discourse.

After the Second World War, circumstances conspired to induce a malaise. Research and writing continued apace, but increasingly diplomatic history acquired a reputation as 'the most arid and sterile of all the sub-histories'.[19] The rise of social and economic history, the growing influence of Marxism in the academy, and the burgeoning of fertile social science approaches in a revitalised IR demonstrated that intellectual trends had turned against it. Its fixation on events, elites (almost exclusively male), and formal power, together with its predilection for narrative reconstruction, came to be regarded as both ideologically dubious and intellectually restricted. Simultaneously, changes in the structure of contemporary international relations cast doubt on the explanatory power of politics narrowly defined. The disruptive consequences of the ending of the post-war economic boom, the rise and growing influence of counter-cultural protest movements, and the increasing prominence of non-state actors such as

international organisations and multinational capitalist concerns all seemed to testify that approaches limited to the formal political and diplomatic exchanges between governments could no longer adequately capture the complexity of international relations. A further impetus for disciplinary transformation came from changes in the structure of the academy, as the 1960s saw a dramatic expansion in the higher education sector across most western societies. This entailed an influx of much new blood into an expanded historical profession that generated an internal revisionist disciplinary dynamic: in order to garner career-building *kudos*, scholars were compelled to generate innovative interpretations and approaches. The gradual opening of state archives pertaining to the pre-1914 and pre-1939 periods provided a final catalyst, since it made available a wealth of new materials that scholars hungrily devoured, precipitating a new international history of the origins of the First and the Second World Wars in which these new approaches were developed and deployed.

Thus emerged an international history attentive to profound structural forces, the formulation as well as the execution of policy, a wider range of actors and a host of new thematic concerns. The term 'international history' was by no means new. The Stevenson Chair in International History at the London School of Economics had first been filled in 1932, and the designation was intended by its founder Sir Daniel Stevenson to connote an idealist and internationalist form of knowledge that would counter-balance the predominance of national and nationalist historical writing. But this nuance was gradually lost after the Second World War: in his inaugural lecture on 'the scope and study of international history' in 1955, the new holder of the chair did indeed express the melancholic hope that exposing the 'follies of the past' might have salutary political effects, but he was primarily concerned to issue a call for the thematic expansion of the field.[20] Similarly in 1954 in his classic study of nineteenth century diplomatic manoeuvrings, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, A. J. P. Taylor had opined that the study of diplomacy did 'not exhaust international history', but that scholars had also to dissect the 'deep social and economic sources' of policy, the psychology and outlook of rulers and political parties, economic factors, strategy (hitherto 'strangely neglected'), and public opinion.[21] If Taylor was too often reluctant to practise what he here preached, other scholars took up the challenge. Certain portentous landmarks are readily discernible in the debates of the 1960s: witness, the controversy over Fritz Fischer's writings on German policy before 1914, which precipitated a new focus on the domestic sources of foreign policy;[22] the debate on the wellsprings of Nazi German foreign policy

precipitated by Taylor with *The Origins of the Second World War*, which was to develop into a sharply polarised confrontation between 'intentionalist' and 'functionalist' approaches;[23] or the revisionist challenge to orthodox understandings of the nature and morality of American foreign policy launched by William Appleman Williams and the radicals of the Wisconsin school, who prioritised economic determinants.[24] (These examples demonstrate, moreover, that even if overtly nationalistic history had declined, the debates of international historians still had definite if usually unavowed contemporary political inspirations and implications.[25]) By the 1970s, international history had clearly come of age as a mature intellectual practice, with the appropriate paraphernalia of journals, conferences, specialist programmes and professional associations.[26]

The terrain of the new field became complex and contested: new approaches proliferated without displacing more traditional practices and the volume of publications perceptibly increased. Naturally there were tensions between competing approaches and internal debate about the proper balance to be struck between different explanatory factors: for example, as Fischerite questions about domestic determinants of policy before 1914 were posed in the cases of all the major combatants;[27] as Paul Kennedy's masterly *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* was castigated by critics as demonstrating the follies of economic determinism;[28] or as, during the 1980s, new sub-specialisms such as propaganda – using modish source materials such as film that seemed to challenge Rankean principles - struggled to win acceptance within the field.[29] Equally, the external boundaries of the discipline continued to be policed. A scholar such as Christopher Thorne who advocated rapprochement with IR approaches would remain a somewhat isolated if influential figure;[30] more typical of the mainstream was D. C. Watt who used his own Stevenson inaugural to urge international historians to keep a safe distance from the 'mephitic unrealisms' and impersonal abstractions of social science.[31] A more nuanced example is provided by the debate amongst historians of Nazi Germany over whether 'intentionalist' or 'functionalist' explanations better accounted for its dynamic expansionism. International historians tended overwhelmingly to favour the former, prioritising agency, conscious intention, and the realisation of clearly formulated political and strategic goals. Ranged against them were the social and structural historians of the Bielefeld school, who stressed instead how policy was the outcome of structural and functional pressures in bureaucracy, economy and society, the unplanned outcome of a dynamic process of 'cumulative radicalization'. Close reading of these exchanges reveals

much about international historians' default beliefs concerning philosophical assumptions, explanatory strategies, and which types of evidence should be prioritised.[32]

If international history was thus rejuvenated, it must be admitted that many in the broader discipline failed to notice or to care. Indeed, it could be said that the emergence of a distinctive sub-field of international history in effect bracketed it off in isolation: the prevailing external attitude simply varied between 'condescension and antipathy'.[33] General surveys of the discipline often failed to make any mention of international history at all (a tendency that is still in evidence today[34]). For all its refurbishment, it continued to be regarded as a reactionary field, remote from the discipline's cutting edge, as much in the 1970s heyday of social history as during the 1990s vogue for cultural history. Even as the appearance of a 'new international history' was proclaimed, the reflective literature was hallmarked by self-flagellatory introspection and ruminations on decline.[35] International history, so it was argued, was 'marking time', too stubbornly attached to established categories of analysis and conventional modes of explanation, and lagging woefully behind theoretical advances elsewhere in the discipline. Some of the criticisms commonly advanced might be relatively easily remedied: witness, for example, the claim that too much scholarship was parochial and narrowly cast, drawing on source material from only one country's archives, even as it claimed the sobriquet 'international'. But other prescriptions entailed more fundamental change, such as the adoption of even broader and systemic approaches, a shift of attention away from 'Rankean exegesis' and towards larger and imponderable questions, and a greater interdisciplinary openness.[36] Many scholars believed that such critiques understated the sophisticated achievements of recent international history;[37] one might equally wonder whether – if underpinning all this was 'an aversion to writing about elites and the powerful' – the field could possibly meet the criticisms without abandoning its *raison d'être*.[38] Little wonder, perhaps, that international historians were gripped by a 'long crisis of confidence'.[39]

In the 1990s, this ambiguous condition persisted. On the one hand, there was a further renewal. The collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and beyond gave a general fillip to the field, in so far as they appeared to restate the self-evident importance of high politics; more significantly, the archival materials that began to become available from former communist states facilitated the emergence of a 'new Cold War history' of unprecedented depth and multinational reach.[40] Yet, on the other hand, a sense of crisis intensified. In the United States, particularly, acute anxiety arose at the

marginalisation of international history. Reports abounded of tenured posts and programmes being lost, and many scholars became thoroughly alienated from a wider profession apparently obsessed with the triptych of race, class and gender and which seemingly viewed international history's preoccupations and practitioners alike with disdain. Despair led some international historians to take a leading role in the establishment of the Historical Society as an alternative professional organisation to the irredeemably 'politically correct' American Historical Association (AHA).[41] Compounding all this was the theoretical turbulence generated by postmodernism. This was perceived, especially in the North American context, to pose a potentially fatal threat to international history: associated with votaries of gender, social and cultural history, it was judged inherently hostile to the study of politics and diplomacy and to the use of the traditional empiricist methodologies which many practitioners assumed were necessarily entailed therein. The logic behind this linkage was rather suspect, but it certainly was the case that through its various transformations, international history had never abandoned its fundamental realist epistemology and empiricist methodology. It was the combination of methodology and subject matter - the persisting disposition to prioritise the empathetic reconstruction of the thoughts and deeds of policymakers, rather than the focus on politics *per se* - that made international history such a target for criticism, because it rendered it intensely vulnerable to a critique of its complicity with political power. In any event, through the mid and later 1990s there were very fierce debates about these fundamental theoretical issues and about the validity of the 'discourse analysis' approaches exploring issues of race, class, and gender identity that they generated.[42]

**Contesting International History**

This narrative does not purport to offer a fully satisfactory account; indeed, it can be qualified and challenged on various grounds. A first is that this reading of disciplinary history posits an artificial and exaggerated distinction between a narrow 'diplomatic history' and the more sophisticated 'international history' that supplanted it.[43] Now, it is true that it is commonplace in the historiographical literature on earlier generations of diplomatic historians to encounter vociferous denials that they did no more than

reproduce the chatter of clerks: in his treatment of Gioacchino Volpe and his school in inter-war Italy, for example, Martin Clark is as keen to exonerate them from the charge of writing narrow diplomatic history as from that of being corrupted by their service to the fascist regime.[44] Similarly, D. C. Watt has argued that even if the classical diplomatic historians of the early twentieth century focused predominantly on 'the relations between states', 'rarely if ever did they ignore the legal, intellectual, social and political penumbrae of their subject matter'.[45] Certainly, the concepts and themes that were to become prominent after the emergence of international history – such as 'unspoken assumptions' or the *Primat der Innenpolitik* - had antecedents and roots in earlier practice.[46] This can be admitted, however, without the broader generalisation about the emergence of a more expansive practice being called into question; after all, the very fact of the protestation rather proves that such a beast as narrow diplomatic history did exist. Indeed, an alternative qualification of the generalisation might focus on the fact that in some respects it still does. There is arguably a thread of continuity in the practice of diplomatic history right up to the present day: it is still possible to find monographs and articles that deal very closely with the political and diplomatic aspects of the foreign policy of a single state, reconstructed through careful perusal of a limited range of archival materials (what one might call, in the case of British international history, the 'FO371 school').

A second and related criticism of the 'foundation myth' retailed above concerns the question of timing. Some would argue that it was actually in the inter-war period that 'the best traditions of diplomatic history' were incorporated into 'a new international history, the study of the relations between states and societies in all their aspects'. Credit is here given to those 'critics of the European social, political and economic order' who began to propagate new ideas about the social and economic origins of imperialism, the structure of the state system, arms races, and the morality of accepted modes of conducting politics and diplomacy.[47] The flourishing of such ideas in internationalist discourses on international relations in the inter-war years is undeniable, but it is a question of interpretation as to whether they fused with diplomatic history to form a new form of inquiry at this point, or remained somewhat semi-detached from it (even, indeed, opposed to it). In any event, it seems difficult to dispute the fact that a further transformation and expansion of the field occurred after the Second World War. (Similarly, the internationalist form of inquiry that Daniel Stevenson wanted to promote was hallmarked by interest in 'world politics conducted by non-State organizations' and 'movements of thought and action which are genuinely or predominantly universal or

non-national', but these issues were subsequently taken up in much more systematic fashion.[48]) There are certainly good grounds in the literature for dating the decisive transformation (though with the repeated caveat that this was a process rather than an event) at some point after the Second World War: witness D. C. Watt writing in 1984 of a 'metamorphosis over the last twenty-five years'.[49]

A further problem is that the rendering offered here might be somewhat Anglocentric. Institutional factors and intellectual preoccupations vary according to national context, and this can generate alternative ways of structuring a disciplinary history. In their important collection on the history of American foreign relations, Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson posit as an organising principle that the field has been split since its foundation after the First World War between two schools of thought. On the one hand, there was the 'nationalist perspective', originally associated with Samuel Flagg Bemis, that 'stressed the continuities in American diplomacy' and 'celebrated the growth of American power', and which tended to focus on 'state-to-state relations', placing American diplomacy in 'an international, usually European, setting'. On the other, there was the tradition founded by 'progressive historians' such as Charles Beard, that was primarily interested in 'the intellectual assumptions that guided American policymakers' and the 'domestic political, economic, and regional forces that shaped their diplomacy', and which tended to stress 'change rather than continuity, conflict rather than consensus'.

The history of writing on American foreign relations can be construed as a struggle between these two evolving schools of thought. Thus after the Second World War, the field was initially dominated by 'realist historians' such as George Kennan, 'concerned primarily with the state, with state policymaking elites, and with the use of state power to advance the national interest', and writing 'in prescriptive terms' about power, geopolitics and grand strategy in ways that 'made their work particularly appealing to official Washington'. In the 1960s, the revisionist school led by William Appleman Williams challenged the dominance of 'realism', by urging a new emphasis upon 'American ideas and on the American system of liberal capitalism': 'American leaders had embraced an ideology of expansionism founded on the principle of the Open Door', and in seeking foreign markets 'had forged in the process an overseas empire that violated the best principles of the nation'. This was a critical interpretation that usefully focused attention on American policy in the Third World and on the role of non-state actors such

as business and financial interests, even as it underlined the fundamental importance of ideas and ideology. This view in turn, however, inspired a counter-attack, and the rise of 'post-revisionism' from the 1970s saw a resurgence of interpretive priorities of 'realism' such as the state, the national interest and the balance of power. Although debates have moved on further since then, 'ongoing differences' between the interpretive concerns of 'realism' and 'revisionism' – geopolitics *versus* domestic origins; national interest *versus* ideology; the state *versus* non-state actors; the international *versus* the national - remain salient. Hogan and Paterson's treatment therefore suggests oppositions other than that between diplomatic and international history around which disciplinary histories could be constructed, and which from an American perspective might prove more illuminating. That said, of course, these would not necessarily be incompatible with a narrative that focuses on the gradual thematic expansion of international history's terrain.[50]

The argument about national peculiarities can be extended through further cases. In France, for example, international history developed in the shadow of the historiographically dominant *Annales* school with its near contempt for politics and the event; this had a significant impact on the tenor of debates around the field's very perceptible 'deepening and broadening' and affected its institutional location and relations with political science.[51] In Italy, where the field originated as 'the history of treaties and international relations', diplomatic historians have long enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the state – 'they are quite openly in state service' – presiding over government archives and supervising the publication of official documentary collections, whilst also teaching in universities, often to students who plan to enter the national diplomatic service. In consequence, Italian diplomatic historians tend to be politically conservative and disinclined 'to launch too many radical attacks against Italy's behaviour on the international stage'; hand in hand with this goes a relative distaste for interdisciplinary experimentation or departing too far from the careful Rankean redaction of political and diplomatic exchanges.[52] In Germany, historians of international relations had also long been distinguished within the discipline by their conservative methodology and historicist philosophical assumptions, and this – together, of course, with the political edge that the shadow of Nazism lent to all discussions of the German past - led them into very heated debates in the 1960s and 1970s with the Bielefeld school. The political climate following German unification has encouraged a revival of venerable traditions in the writing of political and diplomatic history; some of the resulting work advances rather dubious geopolitical interpretations for avowedly nationalist purposes,

whilst some of it resuscitates in far more scholarly fashion the notion of 'the primacy of foreign policy' in German history. Simultaneously, however, new generations of scholars are embarking on innovative work dealing with transnational issues, cultural transfer, the history of international systems, and the multiple intersections of the international with social history and sociology.[53] Once more, however, the undoubted specificities of different national traditions, and the fact that communication between them is too infrequent (partly, but not only, for linguistic reasons), cannot obscure fundamental commonalities. Indeed, Jessica Gienow-Hecht has recently dubbed international historians 'a global group of worriers', united by shared anxieties about theory, methodology, the proper subject matter of the field, and whether and how it should evolve to reflect the exigencies of globalisation.[54]

These competing descriptions are all examples of the kinds of stories that international historians like to tell about themselves. But such accounts by no means exhaust possible ways in which the field can be analysed, and they tend to occlude certain larger questions about international history as a political and intellectual practice. For example, although the field has lately made perceptible efforts to achieve a truly global reach, it still remains dominated by European and North American perspectives and subjects, by very traditional 'western' methodological approaches, and indeed by European and North American practitioners. Its more overt politics are also vulnerable to critique. Even though one of the purposes behind the establishment of international history was to transcend nationalist knowledge, this has only been partially achieved: thus Maurice Vaïsse's lament that French work remains 'very Franco-centric' in focus could be adapted to apply to most national cases.[55] Despite ongoing drives to produce 'supranational history', most contemporary work remains in thrall to the national paradigm, even if only through perpetuating the assumption that the nation state should be our prime unit of analysis.[56] Moreover, international history remains politically conservative in the broader sense that its preferred modes of analysis do not readily lend themselves to purveying radical interpretations: thus comparative study of the ways in which the history and the memory of the Second World War intertwined in the decades after 1945 suggests that international history writing always tended to be a vector of conservative messages.[57] Of course, this generalisation does scant justice to scholars such as those of the Wisconsin school who have attempted to advance oppositional interpretations, often through bringing structural and systemic perspectives to bear and drawing on various strands of Marxist and other critical thinking; but such interventions

have always found it difficult to establish a secure or enduring place for themselves at the heart of mainstream international history.[58]

Critical IR theorists approaching international history would likely find both these political issues and thematic expansion to be fairly insignificant; their concern would rather be with the theoretical underpinnings of the practice. Attempting to categorise international historians by their politico-theoretical positions does not, however, yield very fruitful results. True to its Rankean origins, the field still strongly privileges practice over theory, and adherence to a realist epistemology and empiricist methodologies is almost universal; this generalisation holds fairly true across all the thematic areas of concern into which the discipline has become split. In terms of theories about the nature of international relations, it is obviously possible to make some useful distinctions between, say, Marxists (for example, those formerly practising under state socialism), the corporatist inheritors of the revisionist tradition, feminists interested in gender, or liberal internationalists writing on global society.[59] But the mainstream is basically characterised by a commitment to a 'soft' variant of what IR scholars term 'Realism' (the 'hard' version being deemed too ahistorical and reductive[60]). International historians are not particularly prone to venture into print explicitly on such issues, so these commitments usually have to be read out of the texts in which they are sublimated. Doing this suggests that a great deal of international history rests upon an implicit acceptance of the verities of 'Realism', such as the self-evident virtues of *realpolitik*, the centrality of the state and the fact of international anarchy. For many critical IR theorists, this would by itself provide grounds for critiquing the field, but the situation is exacerbated by its dominant mode of empathetic reconstruction, which tends to lead, all too often, to the unreflective reinscription of the discourses of policymaking.[61] Constraints of space and the nature of the purpose of this volume preclude any extensive discussion of these issues here.[62] But for these theoretical reasons international history is a very problematic discourse in both political and ethical terms for those adhering to strands of post-positivist IR thinking which take seriously the constitutive role of theory and representation.[63]

## Mapping International History

A good deal can be gleaned about both the catholicity and the limits of contemporary mainstream practice from the prospectus for the 'International History' book series published by Praeger. This aims to promote 'historical writing that is genuinely international in scope and multiarchival in methodology' (works assuming a 'parochial perspective' by focusing upon the policy of a single state are unlikely to satisfy the editors' criteria for international history 'in the proper sense of the term'). It wishes to provide an outlet for scholarship both in 'traditional subfields' – 'military, diplomatic, and economic relations among states' – and in 'topics of nonstate history and of more recent interest' – such as non-governmental organizations and cultural relations. Thus it 'happily embraces traditional diplomatic history', but refuses to see the state and policymakers as autonomous actors; rather it is also necessary to probe 'the broader forces within society that influence the formulation and execution of foreign policies, social tensions, religious and ethnic conflict, economic competition, environmental concerns, scientific and technology issues, and international cultural relations'. It notes the recent overwhelming trend for international historians to focus on the post-Second World War period, but it also upholds the relevance and validity of 'scholarship dealing with much earlier, even classical, eras of world history'. Finally, it stresses a commitment 'to an interdisciplinary approach to international history' and an openness to appropriate contributions from the 'separate, but interrelated, disciplines' of history, political science and IR.

This tone of tolerant openness is tempered by the restatement of certain enduring core commitments, which demonstrate how the field retains its distinctiveness by guarding crucial elements of its Rankean inheritance. On the one hand, this means an insistence on making the 'careful, scrupulous, deeply scholarly examination of historical evidence' central to practice. Scholars from political science and IR are welcome if they research and write in 'the classical tradition of intellectual inquiry' which 'examines the historical antecedents of international conflict and cooperation in order to understand contemporary affairs'; but the series will be a cold house for them if they traffic in 'abstract, and abstruse, theoretical models that have little relation to historical reality' (and which, it is asserted, have no real power to illuminate the present).[64] On the other hand, it entails a fundamental faith in realist epistemology and what postmodernist critics would disparage as the naïve ideal of 'truth-at-the-end-of-enquiry'.[65] Thus the editors reject the alleged 'fashionable but ultimately intellectually and morally sterile assertion that historical truth is entirely relative and therefore that all interpretations of past events are equally valid, or equally squalid, as they merely reflect the whims and prejudices of

individual historians'. Rather, they reaffirm their belief that 'the principal obligation of scholarship' is 'to ferret out real and lasting truths'. It would be difficult to find a more succinct statement of the current 'eclectic, humanist' state of the art in mainstream international history.[66]

Of course, a repeated refrain of this introduction is that no single definition can be sufficient, and this prescription can be criticised from several sides. Some practitioners would find it too liberal, conceding that international history should deal with 'the entirety of inter-state relations', but limiting the list of thematic factors deemed relevant to the diplomatic, 'military, economic, ideological, and strategic'.[67] Others would contend that recent attention to structural forces has led to the neglect of the 'individual personalities', 'decisions and actions' 'of a decision-making elite, of politicians and civil servants', that should lie at the heart of inquiry.[68] Yet others would contend that it is doctrinaire to rule studies of the foreign policy-making process in single states out of court by definition, when they can be based on massive multi-archival research and profound knowledge. Conversely, other scholars will dispute the mainstream definition for its timidity. Those plying the farther waters of transnational global history might well decry its lingering state-centrism. Those interested in incorporating insights drawn from postmodern theory into practice might regret the continued attachment to 'modernist' historical representation; far from succumbing to the dreaded (but actually chimerical) relativistic nihilism, they urge experimentation with new forms of history writing 'breaking from the omniscient, single-narrative that served and was served by the [modernist] age of territoriality'.[69]

To illuminate the current contested and pluralistic condition of the field, three interlinked issues need to be discussed. The first is the phenomenal recent rise of culture as an object of study and explanatory variable.[70] This is most obvious with the emergence of a whole new sub-field devoted to 'cultural transfer', or the transmission of cultural values, ideas and products from region to region, from ally to ally, and from friends to former, or indeed current, enemies. The study of what was often previously denominated as 'cultural imperialism' has deep roots, and used to view culture primarily as a tool of foreign policy and cultural transfer as a state practice, consciously conducted for propagandistic purposes; recently, however, models of cultural 'transmission' have been heavily qualified by an emphasis upon resistance, negotiation, and appropriation. The field has also expanded to encompass a wider range of informal cultural relations among

nations and peoples, involving philanthropists, tourists, intellectuals, technical experts, and a range of other non-state and societal actors.[71] A further cluster of work brings culture to bear in the analysis of policy-making, specifically to explore how 'beliefs about national identity, ideology, race and ethnicity, gender, and class', together with other cultural attitudes, 'shaped the exercise of economic, political, or military power'. Typically, this involves tracing reciprocal processes and how cultural ideas – about say, the proper form of masculinity – could help to shape and were themselves simultaneously shaped by foreign policy.[72] What is at stake in this literature is identity in all its multivalent forms: those of both self and other were negotiated, contested and transformed through international encounters. Even mainstream work now also betrays the pervasive influence of culture: witness, for example, how commonly writing on western diplomatic relations with the Middle East is now framed through the lens of 'Orientalism'.[73] Across myriad empirical fields, scholars now freely deploy concepts such as perceptual lenses and stereotypes, simply assuming that the cultural ideological filters through which policy-makers view the world matter profoundly.

This work is extremely important. In not much more than a decade it has vastly expanded the horizons of international history, and through the deployment of new source materials and new methodologies has generated an enormously fertile literature. In the view of one partisan, it has 'introduced a degree of novelty and freshness to a professional milieu whose intellectual aura ha[d] come to resemble the stuffy, cigar-laden atmosphere of a conservative men's club'. The origins of the turn to culture are complicated and, as with most such shifts, lie both in perceived changes in real world international relations and in the realm of ideas. 'The post-Cold War *Zeitgeist*' is often invoked here, as is the failure of 'power and interest-based explanations' – with their tendency to 'treat culture and ideology as misperceptions of the way things really are' – adequately to explain a world in which 'a truly global society is just beginning to become visible as a practical project'; equally important has been the impact of postmodernism, with its stress on discourse and the constitutive role of the linguistic, which naturally encouraged taking ideas more seriously.[74] The promise of culture is similarly multifaceted. Writing on cultural exchange is accelerating existing tendencies to move beyond state-centrism and helping to fulfil the promise of writing international history on a truly global level. Work on culture and policy-making has equally radical potential to transcend the 'Realist' power political paradigms that have long dominated the field, and to replace them with more nuanced appreciations of the cultural construction of foreign policy. It

even perhaps promises to destabilise some of the central interpretive oppositions – such as that between 'inside' and 'outside', 'domestic' and 'foreign' – that have long structured our practice.[75] Whether this dramatic transformative potential is realised remains to be seen.

This is to assume, of course, that such a redimensioning of international history would be a positive development; but it is emphatically not the case that all scholars would agree with this proposition. Many regret the drift away from traditional modes of inquiry, and believe culturalist approaches to be a distraction from core concerns - such as national security or economic determinants – and capable of delivering only trivial insights.[76] This underlines once more that beneath the rhetoric of tolerant pluralism, fundamental politico-intellectual disagreement persists between advocates of competing incompatible approaches. There are also 'internal' problems with culturalist approaches. Frank Ninkovich, for example, has drawn attention to unanswered questions about how culture is to be related to more traditional explanatory variables, to a persistent problem of under-theorization, and to a need for more work at both micro and macro (as opposed to mid-range) levels.[77] Volker Depkat, similarly, has noted that the way culture is invoked in this work lacks precision: it is 'so broad and all-encompassing that it is no longer analytically meaningful'. Moreover, culturalist scholars 'tend to do away with foreign policy questions altogether', or at the very least fail to demonstrate 'whether there is some degree of correspondence between the interconnection of discourses that they see as important and the factual reality of decision making'.[78]

I would add one further and contrasting note of caution about the likelihood of cultural approaches realising their potential. When 'discourse analyses' first became an object of discussion, there was a very strong sense that they offered a means decisively to transcend 'Realism' and for the first time to transform international history into a truly critical practice. This mood of excitement was largely generated by their explicit grounding in the insights and promise of postmodernist theory.[79] Today, however, a focus on culture is far more often justified on empirical grounds, as if culture is just one more aspect of 'the real' of international relations, or one more 'cause' underlying foreign policy, that needs to be incorporated into our analyses. The irony here is that rather than challenging existing theoretical assumptions, the claim often seems to be that these approaches actually just offer us a fuller picture of how things actually were, in impeccably Rankean style. Some may regard this as welcome evidence of a field

maturing, as theoretical abstraction is compelled to reckon with evidential reality. But it should also be noted that something has been lost here, as cultural approaches have been shorn of their rigorous theoretical underpinning and bracing political edge. This is in line with a broader development across the discipline of history, where the turn to culture has been the means whereby the flesh wounds inflicted by postmodernism have been sutured and a return to business (more or less) as usual has been facilitated.[80] It must therefore be an open question whether culturalist approaches will fundamentally transform international history, or whether a resilient practice will succeed in absorbing and neutering them. If the only work that culture is doing is allowing us to continue to talk about 'great men' (albeit with a focus on their troubled masculinity) or the deeds of the most powerful nation on earth (albeit in the guise of charting processes of Americanisation), then there are unfortunately good grounds to doubt whether revolutionary transformation is in train.

A second key issue concerns the place of international history within the wider discipline, and even across a broader culture. Here, it is arguable that the situation is now far more positive than for some decades. There is no unanimity of view, of course, and the picture is mixed. The pessimistic continue to declare that 'in most American universities, international history has gone the way of the dinosaur';[81] yet even if there is still a sense that international historians are 'a beleaguered and besieged minority' in the profession, 'self doubt and status anxiety' co-exist with 'vitality and renewal'.[82] In January 2004, the 118th annual meeting of the AHA convened in Washington, DC, to discuss the theme of 'War and Peace: History and the Dynamics of Human Conflict and Cooperation'. This conference theme symbolised how the concerns of our field were once more returning to prominence within the broader discipline: many US international historians, scarred by the culture wars of the 1990s, would scarcely have believed that sessions entitled 'Coalitions and Alliances at War, 1900-1941' or 'Naval Blockades in Comparative and International Perspective' would ever again grace the AHA programme.[83] Not all the papers presented were recognisable as international history, but for this very reason the conference provided a welcome forum for fruitful interchange between international historians of various persuasions and scholars in the discipline at large with cognate concerns.

There are various causes of this development. Amongst the more mundane are a new willingness amongst both stalwarts of the AHA and leading international historians

to seek a *rapprochement*: thus the latter began once more to submit (properly formatted) panel proposals to the AHA instead of confining themselves to the SHAFR annual conference, and the AHA demonstrated an unwonted enthusiasm to accept them. The fact that many international historians had taken the turn to culture, and were thus able to speak in a language that the broader profession found intelligible and appealing, undoubtedly also helped. However, the key factor lay in the wider world, with the apparent tectonic shift in the structure of global international relations precipitated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The subsequent launch of the 'War on Terror' demonstrated beyond peradventure that the traditional concerns of our field – how states and societies interact; the nature, rationale and justification for the exercise of military power; when war can be avoided and when it should be fought – were once more of vital political, intellectual and moral relevance to the wider world.[84] Moreover, international historians of all complexions could contribute to these debates. Culturalists might dilate on how to achieve mutual comprehension between far-flung societies animated by contrasting core values, or grapple with the realisation that murderous terrorists were now the most salient non-state actors in international relations. Yet traditionalists could equally well address the existence, nature and legitimacy of American empire, whether in the past, present or future. At any event, international historians found themselves once more with a ready wider audience for their work.

If there is an opportunity here, however, there are also dangers. In a masterly analysis, Michael Hogan has recently warned that international historians have no patent over the concept of 'the international' and that its salience within the academy will not necessarily be to our benefit. Hogan notes initiatives of both intellectual and institutional kinds from the Organization of American Historians 'toward internationalising the study of American history and culture', in order to respond to the challenges of globalisation; similarly, he explores the transformation of the field of American studies which, largely under the influence of postmodern and postcolonial studies, has taken a 'transnational turn'. But if this meant that 'other historians are turning our way', it was also apparent that 'we have not done enough to hitch ourselves to this rising star': 'to a large extent, the internationalization of American history is happening without a substantial contribution from those who actually specialize in American international history'.

Too much of this new scholarship, Hogan argues, does not engage with the work done by international historians: indeed, it almost constitutes a parallel field in terms of

its concerns and its bibliographical hinterland, and is appearing in quite separate publication outlets. The real danger is that specialists in other fields might appropriate the history of US foreign relations 'while traditional diplomatic historians are losing ground, and relevance, in the academic community'. Hogan's prescriptions for remedying this problem involve further efforts 'to break down the disciplinary boundaries that separate diplomatic history from other fields of inquiry'. This would mean encouraging the decentring of 'the study of foreign relations' by looking beyond the American nation to write more truly international or comparative history; promoting further study of non-state actors and transnational forces; drawing insights from scholars of the postcolonial and the subaltern about the linkages of power and knowledge, on cultural difference, and on the significance of 'borderlands'; and structural and institutional changes to cement in place the reinvention of the field. Hogan's vision is ambitious and persuasive, but it essentially preaches the necessity of the triumph of culturalist approaches – already promising to effect 'a great renaissance' – in order to avert the marginalisation of the field. For all that he is keen to stress that 'more conventional or traditional diplomatic history' 'remains a valuable form of scholarship', his implication is that it is less vital than culturalism in the light of contemporary intellectual trends and the shifting realities of international relations; thus he can only intend that it will increasingly be a minority interest in the reconfigured discipline.[85] As someone who has previously argued that without taking an interdisciplinary turn international history 'risks ossification', I would contemplate this prospect with equanimity.[86] But partisans of more traditional approaches are surely entitled to wonder whether the cure will not be worse than the disease.

The third related issue here is the dramatic and continuing thematic expansion of the field. Comparing the contents of a recent volume of the SHAFR journal *Diplomatic History* with that of the first dramatizes this point. Founded in 1977 as 'a forum for discussion of many aspects of the diplomatic, economic, intellectual, and cultural relations of the United States', this journal was never despite its title the preserve of narrow diplomatic history.[87] Accordingly, the first volume contained pieces dealing with the intellectual foundations of American foreign policy, the influence of non-state actors, and American cultural diplomacy; but the balance was very much skewed towards essays on more traditional subjects such as 'The Impact of the Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations' and 'Containment in Iran, 1946'.[88] By 2004, such traditional topics remained very much in evidence, but alongside were a whole new vocabulary and array

of subjects: witness 'Race, Water, and Foreign Policy', 'Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights', 'Sport and American Cultural Expansion in the 1930s' and 'Negotiating National Identity on American Television'.[89] To an extent, the causes of this shadow those animating the turn to culture. Interest in themes such as women's rights, human rights, the environment, or religion may on one level simply result from scholars being sensitised to the potential significance of issues in the past by their pertinence in our present. There is also an internal disciplinary dynamic at work, as the escalating competitiveness of academic life and careers compels budding scholars to push the frontiers of the field ever further back. But a central motivation remains the perception that as processes of deterritorialisation and globalisation transform contemporary international relations, new forms of analysis are urgently required. In a world of 'mobile populations, flexible and sometimes even disorganized capital, global networks of electronic communications, a more image-based … culture, and transnational activists of all kinds', the centrality of the state inevitably declines: new types of explanation will be needed as 'the nation-state fades as the necessary organizing principle of all global relationships and their histories'.[90]

The empirical and conceptual richness of much of this new work can scarcely be denied. It is also striking how many practitioners here seem to be animated by an internationalist vision that harks back to the concerns of some of the idealist founders of international history and IR. For a scholar such as Akira Iriye, writing about intellectuals' promotion of cultural internationalism or the labours of non-governmental organisations is not simply a matter of expanding the thematic terrain of the field. Rather, he is animated by a coherent alternative vision of how global politics should be organised: transcending state-centrism will refocus our efforts onto 'human affairs, human aspirations, human values, and human tragedies' and thus promote the establishment of a global civil society.[91] These efforts to resuscitate the idealist strand within international history after long decades of dominance by 'Realist' pessimism are noteworthy, and confirm the truism that choices of subject matter always carry ideological freight. The proliferation of this work, which both implicitly and explicitly challenges the state-centrism of older practice, nonetheless presents difficulties for the field as a whole. In the first instance, there are practical issues here, connected to the maintenance of international history's niche within the academy (upon which funding opportunities, institutional autonomy and so on may continue to depend). Increasing fragmentation into incompatible approaches must surely threaten the coherence of 'international

history' as an institutional as well as an intellectual project. As pioneers of culturalism continue to redefine and even deconstruct the very concept of 'the international', the demarcated borders and distinctive core concerns - and therefore the legitimacy - of 'international history' within the academy may be imperilled.

Individual attitudes towards this prospect will obviously vary. But lurking behind these practical issues may be a larger intellectual shift. Underpinning the turn to the transnational is a belief that changes in the fabric of contemporary international relations are calling forth new forms of knowledge.[92] On this reading, diplomatic and international history with their state-centrism, Rankeanism and 'Realism' were essentially products of a nineteenth and twentieth century 'age of territoriality' that is now on the wane. (Territoriality here defined as 'the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which until recently at least created the framework for national and often ethnic identity'.)[93] International history was always implicated with the international system that it purported merely to describe because its modes of analysis led it ineluctably to reinforce the epistemological and political claims of the state, lending the appearance of permanence to a phenomenon that was in fact historically contingent (for example, by occluding the ways in which state foreign policies served to discipline particular social identities).[94] Thematic expansion provided a means to paper over the cracks that emerged as the assumptions of territoriality were increasingly challenged in the later part of the twentieth century, but over time both culturalist analyses of foreign policy and the drift away from state-centrism created ever more serious tensions. The claim here, then, is that the time for a further decisive mutation of the field has now come. For all one might share Anders Stephanson's sentiment that there is an enduring validity in 'the most exquisitely traditional investigations of those rarefied diplomatic moments when the future of huge tracts of land and matters of life and death are decided by a few men, very few men, in the highest of places', there is a sense that their time has passed.[95] New approaches and new forms of writing are required to help us make sense of the way we live now. Moreover, it is very doubtful that this writing could usefully bear the name of 'international history'. It may be time, in other words, to let go, and to innovate ourselves into extinction.

**Approaching International History**

This collection aims to provide an advanced level orientation to the field in all its current ferment and transition. Some years ago, Hayden White opined that it was enormously problematic for disciplines to take stock of themselves. Either those offering the accounts would themselves be devotees 'of one or another of its sects' and would therefore be biased; or they would be outsiders and thus 'unlikely to have the expertise necessary to distinguish between the significant and the insignificant events of the field's development'.[96] This volume assumes that this danger can be minimised by making the charting of the field a collective endeavour, in which practitioners speaking from different positions, espousing diverse, even conflicting, opinions, are brought together into conversation. To this end, I have tried to gather together a diverse group of contributors with expertise ranging from the traditional through to the more avant-garde. Despite their reputation as stubbornly unreflective empiricists, international historians of various stripes have shown themselves increasingly willing to debate the merits of various approaches within the field as well as its basic presuppositions. Hence there has emerged a still relatively small yet nonetheless respectable corpus of historiographical and methodological literature, to which this volume seeks to make a further contribution.

One limitation of the leading texts in this literature is that they restrict themselves to discussing the historiography of American foreign relations rather than international history *per se*.[97] This text aims for that broader coverage, and I have tried to amass contributors who have worked on international relations in all corners of the globe and have encouraged them to range as widely as possible with their illustrative examples. That said, the volume still has something of an Anglo-American flavour both in terms of the identities of the contributors and the material discussed in their contributions. (There is, for example, not a great deal of non-English language material mentioned in the references.) In some respects this is a matter of contingency but it also reflects the demands of the perceived market for the volume and the practical imperative to present a coherent picture in reasonable depth, even at the expense of greater breadth (pragmatic factors here, then, slightly undercut my grander ambitions of a global vision). By the same token, most of the material discussed here relates to the international history of the twentieth century, with some forays back into the nineteenth and beyond. It is certainly

regrettable to foreclose discussion of work on earlier periods, not least because there is excellent scholarship there. Moreover, this restricted focus elides crucial questions about how contemporary international history has been bound up with the modern states system, and about how that states system evolved and spread across the globe.[98] Here too, however, there were pragmatic considerations in play, because it is the twentieth century that lies at the heart of teaching of international history in universities today and it was again necessary to narrow the focus in order to provide a picture of sufficient depth, even at an introductory level. Introductory texts must perforce be limited in what they can achieve, but hopefully this one gestures sufficiently towards the greater complexity that lies beyond to encourage further exploration.

The tack taken in this introduction should have made clear why I have organised the volume around thematic issues. (Alternative possibilities such as chapters dealing with the historiography of specific subjects or scholarship in different countries were considered, and these have been executed with profit elsewhere.[99]) The question of which themes should be selected was problematic, given that they had to be limited in number. Any practitioner would probably come up with a different list of twelve, but the roster assembled here is eminently defensible as providing a broad coverage of leading approaches. Of course, the chapter boundaries are somewhat artificial since these themes overlap and most scholars do not deal with only a single one; equally there are certain issues – such as the rise of culture – that cut across them all. Undeniably important themes have had to be either neglected or subsumed within other categories: these include sport, the environment, race, human rights, nationalism and religion. Equally, none of the chapters can provide comprehensive coverage: thus Andrew Rotter deals with culture and policymaking, but not with cultural transfer; Bruce Cumings writes about political economy on a world systems level, and is not greatly concerned with the more mundane economic determinants of foreign policy or economic diplomacy. More could also have been said about practical matters such as evolving state policies on archival access; the impact of changes in information technology on the form of state records, our means of accessing them, and the dissemination of our findings; the diverse pressures facing new entrants into the field; and the general vicissitudes of international history's position within the academy. But even though this and much else is elided here, readers should find utility in what is present.

The ideal chapter that I sketched out for contributors was to combine historiographical and methodological/theoretical discussion. On the one hand, it would survey important recent specialist work on the thematic issue concerned and gauge its salience within international history as a whole. On the other, it would also explore the methodological and theoretical considerations that working in a particular area entailed (ranging from conceptual or epistemological problems through to source related matters), and the strengths and weaknesses of that approach to the historical study of international relations. I also encouraged contributors to argue for the virtues of one perspective over the others by explaining the particular light that it can shed. Perhaps inevitably, this brief proved somewhat difficult to fulfil in its entirety within the limited space allowed and in any event contributors interpreted it in different ways, some highlighting historiographical issues, and others offering substantive readings of particular periods in order to illustrate the contribution of their particular thematic concern. But the resulting essays are both pleasingly diverse and focused upon a common central concern to map out the terrain of the field.[100]

The collection begins with some staunch defences of traditional practice. Thomas Otte argues for the continued necessity of a focus on the state, diplomacy and decision-makers, albeit of a sophisticated kind. John Ferris then makes the case that international historians will neglect the study of power and war – the *ultima ratio* in international affairs – at their peril. Even though the subjects of both these chapters can in fact be studied using more modish, culturalist methods, the implication here is that traditional approaches are more suitable for exploring these enduring realities of the states system.[101] Bruce Cumings then defends a focus on political economy, drawing on the critical perspectives of world-systems theory first adumbrated in the 1970s; this clearly demonstrates the very stimulating perspectives that are opened up by long term systemic approaches that contrast with the dominant mode of close and detailed Rankean reconstruction. Nigel Gould-Davies next sheds light on the issue of ideology. Ideology has loomed very large in the recent literature, but has too often come to be simply reduced to culture. Gould-Davies attempts to rescue it from this fate, and to outline what a more rigorous approach to ideology and international history might offer. Miriam Fendius Elman then explores the intersection between international history and IR, sketching out the contrasting ways in which the two disciplines appropriate the past, defending the complexity of political science approaches, but ultimately welcoming the contrasting insights that different disciplinary perspectives purvey. Peter Jackson and Len

Scott then discuss the role of intelligence, a theme that has enjoyed a dramatically raised profile in international politics in recent times. They provide an exceptionally clear outline of the origins of the field, its different dimensions and the problems and opportunities encountered in its study.

These first six essays at times acknowledge the presence of postmodernism and the rise of culture, but it is really in the second half of the volume that these innovations are taken up systematically. The essay by Susan Carruthers on propaganda and opinion forms a pivot in the volume since it first provides a disciplinary history of the rise of the 'propaganda paradigm' but then explores why the legitimacy of that paradigm has been increasingly called into question with the rise of culture. Jeremi Suri then explores the role of non-governmental organisations and non-state actors, demonstrating how different a narrative of contemporary international history focusing upon them looks from traditional accounts. Next Mark Bradley explores the intersection between international history and imperial history, highlighting how the whole field has been transformed by the rise of postcolonial perspectives and a new attentiveness to discourse, language and culture. Andrew Rotter continues in a similar vein, offering a nuanced account of how culture came to prominence within the field and exploring some of the key ways in which it can transform our understanding of the nature of international relations. Glenda Sluga then discusses the issue of gender, celebrating past achievements but also expressing sharp dissatisfaction with some of the directions that work is taking today. Finally, Akira Iriye provides an elegant manifesto for the transformation of international history into transnational global history, and the intellectual and political benefits that such a further mutation of the field would deliver.

**Advancing International History**

The brief of the Palgrave Advances series requires that volumes should 'probe the boundaries of the discipline' and 'suggest the direction of future studies'. One possible future for the field has already been sketched out above, where I endorsed the ongoing march of culture (albeit with a preference for more rigorous and critical theorisation), greater openness towards interdisciplinarity, and continued expansion

beyond state-centrism to generate new forms of writing and knowledge. Whether this future comes to pass, of course, remains to be seen: most of the other contributors here offer their own prescriptions for the future which are by no means all compatible. But I would conclude by urging that, leaving that issue to one side, we can profit in the present by cultivating a greater awareness of the history of our discipline and the political and ideological work that international history has done, both in its imbrication with particular forms of international relations and in its implication with politics in a more quotidian sense. This is a call that has been made before and the sentiment has suffused this introduction;[102] moreover it is quite in tune with a broader intellectual climate where 'memory' is a key cultural buzzword and reflexivity is enjoined on all academics as a cardinal professional virtue. But though international historians have now begun to explore the significance of the memory of war as a phenomenon, they remain wary of forging interpretive connections between broader cultural and political discourses of memory and the work of themselves and their forebears.[103] Yet there are fascinating stories to narrate here about how international history has, for all its claims to objectivity, itself been shaped by these broader discourses and has simultaneously contributed to them. Whatever the broader future of the field, we will be richer and more self-aware if they begin to be told.

**Notes**

[1] The allusion is to the classic study, Tony Becher and Paul Trowler, *Academic Tribes and Territories. Intellectual Enquiry and the Culture of Disciplines*, 2nd edn (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001).

[2] Roger Bullen, 'What is Diplomatic History?', in Juliet Gardiner (ed.), *What is History Today?* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 137.

[3] Frank Costigliola and Thomas G. Paterson, 'Defining and Doing the History of United States Foreign Relations: A Primer', in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 10.

[4] This brief discussion does not exhaust the issue of naming. Others would reserve the term 'international history' for writing that is multi-national and multi-archival in scope (rather than focusing on the foreign policy of a single state), regardless of its thematic breadth. Others would only apply it to the supranational or transnational approaches that have more recently emerged. Yet others would argue that the history of the foreign relations of a given state must comprise both a 'national history' – focused on 'the internal constellation of forces' within state and society that shape foreign policy –and an 'international history' – 'focused on the external forces that influence and constrain' its encounter with the wider world: Robert J. McMahon, 'Toward a

Pluralist Vision: The Study of American Foreign Relations as International History and National History', in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, p. 37.

[5] On IR, a good introduction is Ole R. Holsti, 'Theories of International Relations', in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, pp. 51-90; on the interface with political (and cultural) geography, see, for example, Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds), *Rethinking Geopolitics* (London: Routledge, 1998); symptomatic of recent interactions with area – in this case American – studies is Christian G. Appy (ed.), *Cold War Constructions. The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).

[6] Richard H. Immerman, 'Psychology', in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, pp. 103-22.

[7] For a fascinating essay on the emergence of history as a discipline stressing this theme, see Stephen Bann, *The Inventions of History. Essays on the Representation of the Past* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 12-32 ('History and her Siblings: Law, Medicine and Theology').

[8] Emily S. Rosenberg, 'Walking the Borders', in Michael J Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 24-35.

[9] The whole substance of Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, testifies to these conversations.

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[10] A sense of these connections can be gleaned from historiographical surveys such as Gardiner (ed.), *What is History Today?*; Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood (eds), Imagined Histories. *American Historians Interpret the Past* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[11] This general point is now almost universally acknowledged in the history and theory literature: Ludmilla Jordanova, *History in Practice* (London: Arnold, 2000); Mary Fulbrook, *Historical Theory* (London: Routledge, 2002).

[12] The most obvious example of this might be the disputes about the legitimacy of the New Left 'revisionist' reading of the history of American foreign relations, especially in the Cold War. This debate began in earnest in the 1960s and was at times ferociously heated, not least because as Peter Novick has observed, for Americans this was a debate 'about who we *were*' (emphasis in original): Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream. The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 445. The literature on this is enormous: for an orientation, see Jerald A. Combs, *American Diplomatic History. Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 220ff.

[13] Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius-Elman (eds), *Bridges and Boundaries. Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

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[14] These debates were conducted, *inter alia*, on the H-DIPLO electronic discussion list that operates under the auspices of SHAFR. Contributions are archived on the website at: http://www.h-net.msu.edu/~diplo/ (accessed 20 September 2004) and can be searched by author, date, or subject. The discussion in April-May 1997 on 'gendered discourse' is particularly illuminating.

[15] Paul W. Schroeder, 'Does the History of International Politics Go Anywhere?', in David Wetzel and Theodore S. Hamerow (eds), *International Politics and German History. The Past Informs the Present* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 17.

[16] D. C. Watt, 'Some Aspects of A. J. P. Taylor's Work as Diplomatic Historian', *Journal of Modern History*, 49 (1) (1977) 22 (emphasis in original).

[17] Bullen, 'What is Diplomatic History?', p. 135. The indispensable work on the publication of documents is Keith Wilson (ed.), *Forging the Collective Memory. Government and International Historians through Two World Wars* (Providence: Berghahn, 1996).

[18] Annika Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War. Controversies and Consensus* (London: Longman, 2002), pp. 21-118.

[19] Arthur Marwick, *The Nature of History*, 3rd edn (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 94.

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[20] W. N. Medlicott, 'The Scope and Study of International History', *International Affairs*, 31 (4) (1955) 413-26, quote at 426. Medlicott also drew attention to the paradox that in a field supposedly hallmarked by internationalism scholars in fact enjoyed a peculiarly close relationship with the state; international history would have to emancipate itself from this in order 'finally to establish itself as a subject of academic study' (423).

[21] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 575.

[22] For a recent account, see Mombauer, *Origins of the First World War*, pp. 119-74.

[23] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961); on the early stages of the debate, see Esmonde M. Robertson (ed.), *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Macmillan, 1971).

[24] See note 12 above.

[25] See the pioneering R. J. B. Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War, 1945-1990* (London: Routledge, 1993).

[26] Zara Steiner, 'On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More', *International Affairs*, 73 (3) (1997) 531.

[27] Mombauer, *Origins of the First World War*, pp. 175-220.

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[28] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); cf. the symposium on 'The Decline of Great Britain', *International History Review*, 13 (4) (1991) 661-783.

[29] Philip M. Taylor, 'Back to the Future? Integrating the Press and Media into the History of International Relations', *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 14 (3) (1994) 321-9.

[30] Christopher Thorne, *Border Crossings. Studies in International History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).

[31] D. C. Watt, *What About the People? Abstraction and Reality in History and the Social Sciences* (London: London School of Economics, 1983), quote at p. 19.

[32] The best single essay on this debate remains Tim Mason, 'Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism', in Jane Caplan (ed.), *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class. Essays by Tim Mason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 212-30. The broader point made here is illustrated by the rancorous exchange between Mason and Richard Overy, reproduced in abridged form in Patrick Finney (ed.), *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 90-112. The quotation is from Hans Mommsen, 'National Socialism: Continuity and Change', in Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Fascism*, pb. edn (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 179.

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[33] Gordon Craig, 'The Historian and the Study of International Relations', *American Historical Review*, 88 (1) (1983) 2.

[34] David Cannadine (ed.), *What is History Now?* (London: Palgrave, 2002).

[35] Jon Jacobson, 'Is There a New International History of the 1920s?', *American Historical Review*, 88 (3) (1983) 617-45.

[36] Charles Maier, 'Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations', in Michael Kammen (ed.), *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 355-87, quote at p. 357.

[37] 'Symposium: Responses to Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations"', *Diplomatic History*, 5 (4) (1981) 353-82.

[38] Maier, 'Marking Time', p. 356.

[39] Michael H. Hunt, 'The Long Crisis in US Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure', in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 93.

[40] For overviews, see 'Symposium: Soviet Archives: Recent Revelations and Cold War Historiography', *Diplomatic History*, 21 (2) (1997) 215-305; Melvyn Leffler, 'The Cold War: What Do "We Now Know"?', *American Historical Review*, 104 (2) (1999) 501-24; Odd Arne Westad, 'The New International

History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms', *Diplomatic History*, 24 (4) (2000) 551-65. The publications and activities of the Cold War International History Project are central to this 'new international history': see http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.home (accessed 20 September 2004).

[41] Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn (eds), *Reconstructing History. The Emergence of a New Historical Society* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

[42] Patrick Finney, 'Still "Marking Time"? Text, Discourse and Truth in International History', *Review of International Studies*, 27 (3) (2001) 291-308.

[43] This point is made in Alexander DeConde, 'On the Nature of International History', *International History Review*, 10 (2) (1988) 282-301, though he eventually concedes that current practice is 'intrinsically deeper' than that of the past (301).

[44] Martin Clark, 'Gioacchino Volpe and Fascist Historiography in Italy', in Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore (eds), *Writing National Histories. Western Europe since 1800* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 189-201.

[45] D. C. Watt, *Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 2.

[46] R. J. B. Bosworth, *The Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism* (London: Arnold, 1998), p. 89,

discussing Federico Chabod, *Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896* (Milan: Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, 1951).

[47] Bullen, 'What is Diplomatic History?', p. 136-7. As Glenda Sluga points out in her chapter in this volume, these critics included many notable women whose contribution is usually marginalized in disciplinary histories.

[48] Medlicott, 'Scope and Study', 414.

[49] Watt, *Succeeding John Bull*, p. 1.

[50] Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, 'Introduction', in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, pp. 1-9; in the same volume, McMahon structures his account around the divide between 'international' and 'national' approaches ('Toward a Pluralist Vision', pp. 35-50), while elsewhere Hunt has divided contemporary practitioners into three camps: 'realists', those focusing on the domestic sphere, and those focusing on the international arena ('Long Crisis', pp. 93-126). Note that in each of these accounts, it is interpretive approaches towards American foreign relations that determine the categorisation.

[51] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and Maurice Vaïsse, 'L'histoire des relations internationales', in François Bédarida (ed.), *L'histoire et le métier d'historien en France, 1945-1995* (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1995), pp. 351-8, quote at p. 358; Georges-Henri Soutou, 'Die französische Schule der Geschichte internationaler Beziehungen', in Wilfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds), *Internationale Geschichte. Themen – Ergebnisse*

– *Aussichten* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2000), pp. 31-44. The absence of almost any trace of international history from an historiographical collection such as Jacques Revel and Lynn Hunt (eds), *Histories. French Constructions of the Past* (New York: New Press, 1995) is symptomatic.

[52] Bosworth, *Italian Dictatorship*, pp. 82-4; see also R. J. B. Bosworth, 'Italian Foreign Policy and its Historiography', in R. J. B. Bosworth and Gino Rizzo (eds), *Altro Polo. Intellectuals and their Ideas in Contemporary Italy* (Sydney: Frederick May Foundation, 1983), pp. 65-85.

[53] Loth and Osterhammel (eds), *Internationale Geschichte*; on the politics of German international history and its place within the broader discipline, see Stefan Berger, *The Search for Normality. National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany since 1800* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1997); for an introduction to the resurgence of 'the primacy of foreign policy', see Brendan Simms, 'The Return of the Primacy of Foreign Policy', *German History*, 21 (3) (2003) 275-91.

[54] Jessica Gienow-Hecht, 'A Global Group of Worriers', *Diplomatic History*, 26 (3) (2002) 481-91.

[55] Duroselle and Vaïsse, 'L'histoire des relations internationales', p. 358.

[56] This is true even of some 'global history': *David Reynolds, One World Divisible. A Global History since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000).

[57] This is suggested in Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima*; it is a point that I am pursuing further in my own project *Remembering the Road to*

*World War II: International History, National Identity, Collective Memory*, where many nuances are added to the generalisation.

[58] This point is made by Bruce Cumings in his chapter in this volume.

[59] See, for example, the diverse views expressed in Michael J. Hogan, 'Corporatism', Thomas J. McCormick, 'World Systems', Louis A. Pérez Jr, 'Dependency', Akira Iriye, Culture and International History', and Kristin Hoganson, 'What's Gender Got to Do with It? Gender History as Foreign Relations History', in Hogan and Paterson, *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, pp. 137-48, 149-61, 162-75, 241-56, 304-22 respectively.

[60] Paul W. Schroeder, 'Why Realism Does Not Work Well for International History (Whether or Not it Represents a Degenerate IR Research Strategy)', in John A Vasquez and Colin Elman (eds), *Realism and the Balancing of Power. A New Debate* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), pp. 114-27.

[61] Frank Costigliola, 'Reading for Meaning: Theory, Language, and Metaphor', in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, pp. 279-303.

[62] For some further thoughts, see Finney, 'Still "Marking Time"?'.

[63] Even beyond the issue of reinscribing 'Realism', there are larger arguments about the dubious ethical and political implications of conventional narrative historiography: see, for example, Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Dan Stone, *Constructing the Holocaust* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003).

[64] Erik Goldstein, William Keylor and Cathal Nolan, 'Series Foreword', in G. Bruce Strang, *On the Fiery March. Mussolini Prepares for War* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp. xiii-xv.

[65] Keith Jenkins, *Refiguring History. New Thoughts on an Old Discipline* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 3.

[66] Goldstein, Keylor and Nolan, 'Series Foreword', pp. xiv-xv.

[67] School of History, University of Leeds, 'International History and its Study: A Guide for Students' (1986), p. 1. This was one of the first definitions of the field that I encountered as an undergraduate at Leeds.

[68] T. G. Otte, 'Introduction: Personalities and Impersonal Forces in History', in T. G. Otte and Constantine A. Pagedas (eds), *Personalities, War and Diplomacy. Essays in International History* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 8-9.

[69] Emily S. Rosenberg, 'Considering Borders', in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, pp. 191-3.

[70] For overviews, see Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher (eds), *Culture and International History*; Robert David Johnson (ed.), *On Cultural Ground: Essays in International History* (Chicago: Imprint, 1994); Frank A. Ninkovich and Lipung Bu (eds), *The Cultural Turn. Essays in the History of US Foreign Relations* (Chicago: Imprint, 2001).

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[71] Jessica Gienow-Hecht, 'Cultural Transfer', in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, pp. 257-78.

[72] Susan Brewer, '"As Far As We Can": Culture and US Foreign Relations', in Robert D. Schulzinger (ed.), *A Companion to American Foreign Relations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 17.

[73] For example, Douglas Little, *American Orientalism. The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); see also, Andrew Rotter, 'Saidism Without Said: *Orientalism* and US Diplomatic History', *American Historical Review*, 105 (4) (2000) 1205-17.

[74] Frank A. Ninkovich, 'Introduction: The Cultural Turn', in Ninkovich and Bu (eds), *Cultural Turn*, pp. 1-3.

[75] Frank A. Ninkovich, 'No Post-Mortems for Postmodernism, Please', *Diplomatic History*, 22 (3) (1998) 451-66.

[76] Robert Buzzanco, 'Where's the Beef? Culture without Power in the Study of US Foreign Relations', *Diplomatic History*, 24 (4) (2000) 623-32.

[77] Ninkovich, 'Introduction', pp. 5-8.

[78] Volker Depkat, 'Cultural Approaches to International Relations: A Challenge?', in Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher (eds), *Culture and International History*, pp. 181-5.

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[79] For example, Emily S. Rosenberg, 'Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy: Narratives of Money and Manliness', *Diplomatic History*, 22 (2) (1998) 155-76; this point is somewhat disputed by Depkat, 'Cultural Approaches', pp. 186-9.

[80] Patrick Finney, 'Beyond the Postmodern Moment?', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40 (1) (2005) 149-65. It remains a moot point whether the rise of the new cultural history paradigm represents the defeat or victory of postmodernism.

[81] Stephen A. Schuker, 'Reflections on the Cold War: A Comment', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 12 (4) (2001) 1.

[82] McMahon, 'Toward a Pluralist Vision', pp. 36-7.

[83] Sharon Tune (ed.), *American Historical Association. Program of the 118th Annual Meeting* (Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 2003).

[84] Mark A. Stoler, 'Thoughts from SHAFR President', *Passport*, 35 (1) (2004) 4.

[85] Michael J. Hogan, 'The "Next Big Thing": The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age', *Diplomatic History*, 28 (1) (2004) 1-21, quotes at 3, 6, 8, 12, 13, 17. There is a profound irony at work if international historians are more in danger of marginalisation now that 'the international' is in fashion than they were in the 1990s when it was deemed of little relevance by postmodernists.

[86] Patrick Finney, 'International History, Theory and the origins of the Second World War', *Rethinking History*, 1 (3) (1997) 375.

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[87] Paul S. Holbo, 'Editor's Note', *Diplomatic History*, 1 (1) (1977) vi.

[88] Roger R. Trask, 'The Impact of the Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations, 1945-1949', *Diplomatic History*, 1 (3) (1977) 271-84; Richard Pfau, 'Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active Policy', *Diplomatic History*, 1 (4) (1977) 359-72.

[89] Robert Rook, 'Race, Water, and Foreign Policy: The Tennessee Valley Authority's Global Agenda Meets "Jim Crow"', *Diplomatic History*, 28 (1) (2004) 55-81; David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, 'Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy', *Diplomatic History*, 28 (1) (2004) 113-43; Barbara Keys, 'Spreading Peace, Democracy, and Coca-Cola®: Sport and American Cultural Expansion in the 1930s', *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2) (2004) 165-96; Andrew J. Falk, 'Reading Between the Lines: Negotiating National Identity on American Television, 1945-1960', *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2) (2004) 197-225.

[90] Rosenberg, 'Considering Borders', pp. 190-2.

[91] Akira Iriye, 'Internationalizing International History', in Thomas Bender (ed.), *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 60; see also Frank Ninkovich, 'Where Have all the Realists Gone?', *Diplomatic History*, 26 (1) (2002) 137-42.

[92] Rosenberg, 'Considering Borders', pp. 189-93.

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[93] Charles S. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *American Historical Review*, 105 (3) (2000) 807-31, quote at 808.

[94] On the implication of IR and international history with a historically contingent states system, with particular reference to 'Realism', see also Andreas Osiander, 'History and International Relations Theory', in Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser (eds), *War, Peace and World Orders in European History* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 14-24.

[95] Anders Stephanson, 'War and Diplomatic History', *Diplomatic History*, 25 (3) (2001) 403.

[96] Hayden White, 'The Historical Text as Literary Artifact', *Clio* (1974), reprinted in Geoffrey Roberts (ed.), *The History and Narrative Reader* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 221.

[97] For example, Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn; Schulzinger (ed.), *Companion to American Foreign Relations*.

[98] For a longer term perspective, see for example Hartmann and Heuser (eds), *War, Peace and World Orders*.

[99] There are, for example, excellent essays on geographical and chronological subject areas in Schulzinger (ed,), *Companion to American Foreign Relations*.

[100] Contributors were also instructed that whilst some bibliographical guidance should be given, there was no need for it to be particularly extensive, much less comprehensive.

[101] For an argument that military history could also profit by turning to culture, see John A. Lynn, 'The Embattled Future of Academic Military History', *Journal of Military History*, 61 (4) (1997) 777-89.

[102] In Finney, 'Still "Marking Time"', I suggested that international history should turn towards 'discourse analysis' and 'critical historiography'; the former has now been embraced, albeit perhaps in slightly diluted form, while engagement with the latter remains limited.

[103] Typical examples include Robert McMahon, 'Contested Memory: The Vietnam War and American Society, 1975-2001', *Diplomatic History*, 26 (2) (2002) 159-84; Robert D. Schulzinger, 'Memory and Understanding US Foreign Relations', in Hogan and Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History*, 2nd edn, pp. 336-52; the best work to date in this vein, which does encompass history-writing, is Emily S. Rosenberg, *A Date Which Will Live. Pearl Harbor in American Memory* (Durham: Duke University press, 2003).