CHAPTER 2

A 'Transnational' History of Society

Continuity or New Departure?

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The following text is a revised version of a contribution first published in the journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft *in 2001.*[1] *At that time, the editors were organizing a round table on the question of the desirability and possibility of a 'transnational' history of society. I was invited to provide a comment because of an academic background that is rather unusual for German historians. For a long time, my main fields of interest have been modern Chinese history and the history of the British Empire. In earlier articles, I had advocated historical comparisons occur not just between European countries or societies or even within the 'West', but across cultural borders and spanning wide spatial distances. What would a proponent of that kind of intercivilisational comparison have to say about the new catchphrase of 'transnational history'? The following text retains the gist of my arguments of 2001. It takes only selective account of the extensive debate that has taken place since then. Some of my earlier ideas would merit reconsideration in light of recent theoretical discussions, and, more importantly, of practical historiographical work that has been undertaken. My own basic convictions have remained the same: I am not persuaded that classical comparativism has been completely superseded and made obsolete by a programme of entangled history. Comparison and the analysis of intercultural and intersocietal transfers do not present a stark alternative. They complement one another, and there are numerous examples in recent historical scholarship for the successful combination of both approaches. Finally, I am not happy with a recent tendency to establish Transnational (with a capital T) History as a separate and perhaps even autonomous field. 'Transnational' refers to a particular perspective in the same way as 'national' does. It is always useful to ask whether new knowledge or insight can be gained from looking at a historical phenomenon in such a 'transnational' perspective. But this does not mean,*

as has sometimes been suggested in the German debate, that transnational history is generally superior and preferable to national history.

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Gesellschaftsgeschichte, the History of Society, has been one of the most successful paradigms in postwar German historiography. Its hallmark has been the infusion of social science theories into a tradition of social history that used to be basically descriptive. The original impetus behind *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* was not to demonstrate the usefulness of theory as such; it was more than just scholarly *l'art pour l'art.* The project was a political one: to develop a new interpretation of modern German history, carefully grounded in the fullest possible evidence, deploying the whole panoply of advanced research tools, and guided by a sense of tragic failure of German history with its 'special path' and ultimate, though ever fragile, democratic normality after 1945. Careful nurturing of these various elements allowed the mature achievements of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* to emerge: an enormous output of monographs on all possible aspects on the history of the German bourgeoisie or (a wider concept) *Bürgertum,* Jürgen Kocka's multi-volume history of labour and labour organization in nineteenth-century Germany, and, the towering monument of the school, Hans-Ulrich Wehler's *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte.*[2]

The core group of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* was surrounded by a larger group of pupils, sympathizers, and kindred spirits. Some of them, but not many, applied the basic approach of the History of Society to European countries other than Germany, especially France, Italy, and Russia. This is how far the school was prepared to go. Apart from an early interest of both Wehler and Kocka in the history of the United States, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* was hardly ever transplanted into non-European contexts. Some of the reasons are obvious—*Gesellschaftsgeschichte*'s idea of society was closely linked to mature industrialism and its antecedents. Agrarian societies only entered the picture when germs of modernity were already visible. They were of interest only as belonging to the pre-history of modernity. 'Traditional' peasant societies as well as colonized societies all over the world failed to provide the elementary features of that type of social complexity that alone merited the attention of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte.* It has, therefore, always been a project centred on modern Germany and, to a lesser extent, Western and Eastern Europe. If 'transnational history' is also meant to be trans-European history, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* will have to rethink its more or less unspoken assumptions.

However, it would be wrong to suppose that *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* has remained static. Once the foundations had been laid in the 1970s, the 1980s, as a period of 'extension', consolidated the initial achievement. This

is how the leaders of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* saw themselves, and *Erweiterung* became a favourite motto of the time. Extension of the basic paradigm was achieved by careful enlargement of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte's* scope of action. *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* grew and prospered less through colonizing the outer reaches of historical scholarship than by the intensification of research and by the careful incorporation of adjacent thematic fields. This was a wise strategy, which allowed the paradigm to be tested and improved. From a position of unassailed self-confidence, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* chose its own mode of extension. Some challenges, especially from *Alltagsgeschichte* or the history of material life and local experience, were fended off in an imperious manner. Elsewhere, concessions were made and new inspirations were welcomed and valued. Thus, a few new theorists were allowed to join the incomparable Max Weber in the pantheon of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte's* thinkers of reference, first among them was Pierre Bourdieu (while Michel Foucault met with resolute refusal).[3] 'Agency' was added to 'structure'; 'culture', even if defined quite conventionally and narrowly, was taken on board; the method of comparison, famously pioneered by the great Max Weber himself, was recommended as the best method possible for absorbing new evidence and, at the same time, enhancing the power and rigour of explicative models.

By and large, such cautious attempts to keep up-to-date met with success and led to the revitalization of the project of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte.* In its mature form, it was much more than traditional social history. It included material production, social stratification, political power, and the institutions (much less the practices) of cultural expression. Yet anthropologists tell us that 'boundary maintenance' requires not just inclusion, but also exclusion; in other words, it requires drawing a line. Therefore, a few hoary antagonisms were left intact and were even confirmed: the history of international relations, apart from a brief flirtation with the study of imperialism, was flatly rejected; contemporary history with a strong narrative flavour was left to others; and the history of ideas, even in as novel a shape as 'intellectual history' or 'history of discourse', continued to be looked at with a considerable amount of suspicion, and seen as a vestige of old-fashioned *Historismus* in the tradition of Friedrich Meinecke.

Yet another kind of extension that was avoided was the enlargement of the spatial or horizontal sphere of reference. A careful critic of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte's* house journal, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft,* has dubbed the whole tendency a 'nation-centred social history'.[4] This has been quite amazing from the point of view of the outside observer. A scholarly project that strongly opposed all forms of German (and any other) 'nationalism', that lost no opportunity to quote the great universalist thinker Max Weber, and that paid its respects to modern universalists such as Eric Hobsbawm,

Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly or Wolfgang Reinhard, felt surprisingly comfortable with its own provincialism.

In order to overcome such limits of vision, nothing seems to be easier than simply to add new geographic and cultural spaces. However, Hans-Ulrich Wehler has admitted that the guiding concepts of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* are difficult to transplant into a seemingly familiar context such as the North American one.[5] It would be even more difficult to apply terminologies of Weberian sociology and modernization theory to non-Western social configurations. The indigenous self-description of such societies usually offers a rich repertoire of concepts, and the science of anthropology or ethnology provides additional instruments of study. At the same time, it would be wrong to deny the pertinence of European concepts to the rest of the world. Simple dichotomies of the West and the 'rest' should be a thing of the past. *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* might easily avoid a responsibility to extend its scope by playing the well-known game of 'othering the Other'. Yet, anthropology is of limited use for understanding the literate traditions of Asia, and holistic concepts of societal otherness such as the 'oriental mode of production' (Karl Marx) or 'oriental society' (John Stuart Mill) are no longer considered adequate for describing the complex hierarchies of traditional Asian societies, let alone their processes of modernization.

An obvious way out seems to lie in the development, in Max Weber's footsteps, of an integrated social science that develops flexible concepts for dealing with social phenomena across cultural boundaries, rather than to leave the 'Others' to special academic disciplines whose results can, from the point of view of 'normal' historians, safely be disregarded. Ultimately, one should aim at a kind of analytical two-way traffic. Just as ethnology and anthropology have been extremely helpful in enriching our understanding of Western societies, so the tools of Western social and historical science ought to be, perhaps in a modified way, applied to non-European societies.[6]

Such two-way traffic implies a heightened awareness of the history of European expansion and of the cultural interactions between Europeans and non-Europeans—subjects not normally within the purview of German historians. The history of German colonialism begins no earlier than 1884, and this brief episode was over by the end of the First World War. This had the historiographical consequence of the continuous insensibility of German historians toward the global dimension of European history. Yet, a brief look at countries such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Portugal, and even France and Russia, should reveal that, throughout the post-Columbian period, expansion has been a fundamental mode of existence for many parts of Europe. It is not Eurocentric conceit to say that overseas expansion and empire building are defining features of Europe's history. In

many European countries, social processes transcended the boundaries of nation states. The spatial frame for solving social problems often extended the limits of the nation state. This may have been less so in Germany than elsewhere, although Germany could not escape the effects of earlier waves of globalization, and even became an active player in global games from the beginning of the *Kaiserreich* onward.[7] The best way to study those entanglements would be to take account of the most recent advances in migration history—a field strangely neglected by *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* proper.[8]

It has been suggested that border-transgressing relations and activities should generally come under the heading of a history of 'transfers'. The study of such transfers has already become a vibrant field of historical research. The crucial question is the reach of such an approach. A radical solution would be to abandon national history altogether in favour of a history of exchanges, networks, and hybridities. Suggestions of this kind are not entirely new. As early as 1967, the Swiss historian Herbert Lüthy pointed out that, up to the present, all history has been a history of colonisations and overlapping stratifications.[9] More than twenty years later, the sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck challenged the masters of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* by juxtaposing the History of Society and the History of the World. Although the school of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* rarely dodged a challenge, Tenbruck's critique went unanswered and unheeded.[10]

Tenbruck's article, nothing less than an intervention by one of Germany's leading sociologists, flatly contradicted the incremental model of slowly extending the scope of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte.* Tenbruck did not deny the relevance of the nation state as a unit of analysis, but he suggested that the most fruitful point of view for the historian to take was not inside the nation and the nation state; rather, it should be located at a higher level. External relations should not be secondary features of 'structures', whose principal dynamics were to be considered as internal and endogenous. Friedrich Tenbruck, completely untouched by 'postcolonial studies', suggested studying movements and transfers, migration and long-distance trade, along with conquests and the expansion of religions. Up to a point, this was Tenbruck's message—the 'structures' so beloved to *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* were crystallizations emerging from such a fluid reality. Published in 1989, these were prophetic proposals. Jürgen Kocka later arrived at similar, though less radical, conclusions, demanding 'the definition of problems within a global horizon'.[11] He went on to propose that historians should study 'the connections between local phenomena and global contexts'. The crux of the matter—radicalizing Kocka's point—is that one does not generally have to scale the ladder from the local to the global level. Instead, a historical analysis should begin from both ends at the same time. Joachim Radkau's global environmental history, written at the University of Biele-

feld under the shadow of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte,* but in explicit distance from it, is a good example for this kind of 'polycentric' analysis.[12]

How do we get from here to a history of *society*? Basically, there are two possible ways for those who are not prepared to drop the concept of 'society' altogether and replace it with a loose collection of discourses and practices, identities and lifestyles. First, the permeability of bounded national and regional societies ought to be acknowledged. Not all social life is quintessentially 'entangled', but some kind of entanglement, even if quite limited in a particular case, is to be expected everywhere in modern history. This augments, rather than invalidates, a national perspective on modern history. Second, the methodology of comparison, as explained in other chapters in this book, can and should be used to determine whether there has been a distinctly European or, perhaps, 'Western' model of civilization and social organization. As long as this question is considered of any importance, comparison is indispensable. Even those who go far to avoid any kind of 'essentialism' cannot deny the existence of certain European peculiarities, which, of course, have been evolving over time and have been strongly influenced by the impact of economic and cultural globalization. For good reasons, historians are somewhat reluctant to engage in this kind of macro-comparison of entire national societies or even 'civilizations'. They prefer partial and topical comparisons to the very grand generalizations favoured by historical sociologists.[13] Still, the question of a typology of basic social forms in the world keeps lurking in the background and cannot be avoided. It should be discussed without any European triumphalism and sense of self-congratulation. In societal terms as well as in many others, non-Western societies are not just deficient losers of historical competition, lacking the essential aspects of Western modernity. This cannot be emphasized too strongly, given the limited interest of German historians in non-occidental history.

Comparison is one of the methods used by practitioners of 'transnational history'. A growing number of authors seem to know what 'transnational history' is, but upon closer inspection, few of them care to offer a definition. What does the adjective 'transnational' really mean? The concept was first used in the social sciences, but even there its specific content has often been left unclear. 'Transnational' obviously is different from 'supranational', a word that refers to the political development of (Western) Europe since about 1950: the emergence, unprecedented in history, of a separate sphere of political and administrative action distinct from, and, in a growing number of fields, superior to the sovereignty of the individual nation states.[14] On the other hand, 'transnational' should be distinguished from 'international', a term first used in 1780 by Jeremy Bentham. Originally, it referred to the relations between state actors within a plural system of militarized great

powers.[15] Current usage is much wider than that—'International Relations' also includes economic and cultural contacts and exchanges of the most varied kind. This is reflected in the vast body of literature in International Relations theory—a field of theoretical construction and reflection almost unknown to the great majority of historians. The additional connotation of cosmopolitanism, already present in Bentham's use of the word, has gained importance in recent decades. Since the establishment, in 1864, of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the world knows what today is called International Nongovernmental Organizations. Just one year later, the First International, as a transnational organization of militant European socialists, came into being. When historians speak today of 'internationalization', they do not mean horizontal relations between states, but the impact of higher levels on national societies. They use the term 'internationalism' to describe the rise of collective identities transcending the nation state, and, at the same time, they study the processes of internationalizing cultural, political, and economic practices that went hand in hand with the formation of national states during the nineteenth century.[16] In respect to traffic, trade, and migration, such a process transgressed the boundaries of the European continent at an early point in time. In cultural terms, it mainly assumed the form of Westernization, and in the twentieth century, more specifically of Americanization. When Jürgen Kocka expects an imminent 'internationalization of the historical social sciences', he seems to indicate that these sciences will deal with transnational phenomena and, at the same time, that they will find a resonance all over the world. Both meanings can safely been accommodated within the word 'international'.

Yet, what is the advantage of introducing the special semantics of the 'transnational' alongside the established meanings of the 'international'? Sometimes, shifts in emphasis have been slow and almost imperceptible: multinational companies, for example, gradually came to be known as 'transnational corporations'. In the theory of International Relations, the term 'transnational politics' was introduced in the late 1960s.[17] Initially, it encompassed all sorts of interdependent relationships in 'world politics', with the exception of the official relations between national governments. This later turned out to be impractically vague. Recent attempts at definition put an emphasis on 'clearly identifiable actors or groups of actors ... linking at least two societies'.[18] This kind of formalism, typical for International Relations theory, however, is of little help for social historians.

Other approaches seem to be much more interesting. To give just two examples: sociological and ethnological studies of migrants in the present-day world have shown how it is possible to lead a life in a kind of permanent transgression of boundaries between persisting national cultures. People and communities 'in between' do not necessarily live in the rarefied world

of a rootless cosmopolitanism, nor are they lost in a no-man's-land. Both options have, of course, existed in the past. But there is also the possibility of multiple identities, bilingualism, and the flexible enacting of roles. For this third type of cases, the concept of 'transnational social space' seems to offer an adequate solution. Spatial metaphors have the general advantage of addressing the problem of the 'framing' of social relations. They also open up the large fields of a history on the impact of political borders on social configurations.[19] In this sense, 'transnationalism' refers to a special category of social relations that unfold in tension with and in contradiction to the assertion of national sovereignties.

Secondly, it becomes more and more obvious that the social influence of religions is not contained within political boundaries. After a period when religion, in the sense of individual experience and piety, became one of the favourite subjects of *microstoria*, it is now being discovered as a factor of transnational cultural ordering. The old concept of 'ecumene' in the sense of large-scale communities of shared meaning assumes new importance. More and more, the nationalization of creeds and churches in post-Reformation Europe (much later in Catholicism than in Protestantism) is revealed as a very special case in the world history of religion.

It would not be difficult to continue like this. New developments in the contemporary world prompt us to take a new view of the past, and new theories help to detect or even 'constitute' new fields of inquiry. Both forces shaping the agenda of historians, the empirical and the theoretical one, have to be situated within larger historical contexts. Those who now advocate 'transnational history' should ask themselves what it is that motivates them to champion such a new 'turn'. It should also encourage them not to establish their new direction in an exclusive and sectarian way. Transnational history does not have to take sides in the long-term quarrel, so typical of German historical scholarship, between social historians and historians of international relations. On the contrary, transnational history could be an ideal bridge to bring together those 'two cultures' in historical studies.[20]

Finally, a small number of general points must suffice to outline the contours of a future transnational social history:

1. *Nationalgeschichtsschreibung*, the history of nations and nation states, has not been the 'normal' mode of historical writing. It emerged as a by-product of the formation of nation states in the mid-eighteenth century. David Hume, the Scottish-born historian of England, was the inventor of that genre. The call for a social history in a transnational perspective (abbreviated: TSH) responds to: (a) a new definition of problems and priorities in an age of continuing globalization; (b) a certain kind of exhaustion of the paradigm of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* after three decades of specialized research; and, (c) the demand by major theorists in the social sciences that 'notions' of society with a regionalist or national colouring are no longer acceptable from a theoretical point of view.[21]

2. TSH builds upon a program of social history in terms of structures and configurations, but supplements it with the idea of exchanges, flows, and streams. A central concept is that of the network.[22]

3. TSH takes leave of the scant regard for space in the German historiographical tradition of all schools and tendencies. While it would be an exaggeration to speak of a 'spatial turn', transnational history is much more sensitive to topics such as borders and boundaries, territoriality and the ordering of space, the natural environment of social and political processes, etc. The classical authors of sociology, with the exception of Georg Simmel, have, by and large, avoided such questions. Recent social science has taken them up again, and geography once again has to be taken seriously, as it was in the eighteenth century as a sister discipline of historiography.[23]

4. To praise the virtues of TSH does not imply a general denigration of the nation state as a unit of analysis. The nation state continues to be the most important institutional framework for the lives of most people in the world. National governments still have a decisive impact upon individual lives through legislation, law enforcement, taxation, public welfare, etc. Even the prototypical diaspora nationalities are striving for their own nation state—and have achieved it in cases such as Israel and Armenia. If a homogeneous European society slowly may be emerging, 'world society' is little more than a useful fiction, mainly limited to networks of elite communication.[24] It is not a sociological fact in the sense of Emile Durkheim's 'crystallized life'. A primacy of transnational or cosmopolitan norms and values is still limited to minorities and other small groups. There is, thus, no basis for transnationality in major social structures. On the other hand, conventional ideas of a *Gesamtgesellschaft*, with clearly demarcated boundaries and a high level of cultural uniformity, rapidly lose their attraction. Many societies in the world are heterogeneous societies constituted by immigrants, colonial, and ex-colonial 'plural societies' or simply 'multicultural' urban spaces. This needs no special mention for the United States, but in the case of Europe, closer inspection will help to discover the enormous importance of ethnic and cultural plurality, with all its concomitant tensions and conflicts.

5. For practical reasons, TSH will initially be mainly restricted to European history. However, such a limitation cannot be defended on systematic grounds. The old dichotomies Orient/Occident, Europe/non-Europe,

West/rest, civilization/barbarism, etc., are increasingly hard to maintain. Many arguments have been marshalled against them: from the critique of 'orientalism' to the latest theories of 'plural modernities'.[25]

6. There are numerous instances where not only those historians of Europe who are interested in overseas expansion and colonialism are well-advised to look beyond the confines of the continent, be it only to put Europe's alleged uniqueness into perspective. Thus, crucial features of 'European civil society' were, in fact, pioneered in other parts of the world. In 1893, the women of New Zealand, including the native Maori, received the vote. Australia's women followed in 1902, but female citizens of the United Kingdom had to wait until 1928. When, in 1935, property-owning women were enfranchised in India, the general vote for women in France was still nine years away. In all of these cases, local factors combined with 'transfers' from outside to achieve a specific outcome.[26] Europe did not always take the lead. This is also true for the development of the welfare state or for the modernization of urban space, where, again, some noteworthy innovations originated in Australia, a pioneer of suburbanization.

7. Is TSH identical with 'the history of transfers'? Of course, many transfers are transnational, but not all of these transnational transfers should be classed as social history. TSH does not include the disembodied movement of ideas or even some kind of abstract interaction of 'cultural codes'. In order to come to the attention of social history, transfers have to be connected to identifiable actors and institutions. It should be possible to study intentions, interests, and functions related to the transfers. Social historians are also interested in the effects of such transfers, and they want to explain where and why a specific transfer occurred and for what reasons it assumed the form that it did.

8. Does transnational history make a conventional history of society obsolete? Certainly not. A *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, at least of the late modern period with its enormous importance of the nation state, cannot be based on networks, flows, and transfers alone. At the same time, some of the changes suggested by proponents of transnational history cannot be accommodated just by making minor adjustments to the given framework of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*. The very concept of 'society' employed by its practitioners requires a fundamental overhaul. Hans-Ulrich Wehler's 'four dimensions'—the economy, social inequality, political domination, and culture (a residual category including religion, education, and the public sphere)—should perhaps be augmented by other central aspects of social life. In addition, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*

might reconsider its narrow fixation on the rise of industry and industrial society. Industrialization took place in many different parts of the world, not just in Europe and North America. It failed to take root in many other quarters of the planet, some of which are unlikely ever to 'catch up' in the familiar sense of European development. And where industrialization happened, it did not necessarily result in fully articulated industrial societies. Therefore, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* should broaden its range of types of society considered, and it should reflect once again on its ideas about the forms and temporal structures of social change. To look beyond Germany or even beyond Europe does not necessarily mean forfeiting one's own scholarly integrity and entering the extremely ambitious world of universal synthesis. Fortunately, there are many different ways of doing transnational history.

Notes

1. J. Osterhammel, 'Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative?', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27 (2001): 464–79; for a broader treatment of the subject cf. Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen, 2001). Since the purpose of the present volume is to introduce the German debate, the following references will focus on German contributions. This should not mean that the international discussions are not being followed in Germany.
2. See P. Lundgreen, ed., *Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des Bürgertums. Eine Bilanz des Bielefelder Sonderforschungsbereichs (1986–1997)* (Göttingen, 2000); J. Kocka, *Weder Stand noch Klasse. Unterschichten um 1800* (Bonn, 1990); J. Kocka, *Arbeitsverhältnisse und Arbeiterexistenzen. Grundlagen der Klassenbildung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bonn, 1990); H.-U Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 5 vols. (Munich, 1987–2008).
3. The high watermark of this kind of 'extension' was a collection of articles: W. Hardtwig and H.-U. Wehler, eds., *Kulturgeschichte heute* (Göttingen, 1996).
4. L. Raphael, 'Nationalzentrierte Sozialgeschichte in programmatischer Absicht. Die Zeitschrift 'Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft' in den ersten 25 Jahren ihres Bestehens', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 25 (1999): 524–25.
5. H.-U. Wehler, 'What is the "History of Society?"', in *Conceptions of National History: Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 78*, eds. E. Lönnroth et al. (Berlin/New York, 1994), 277.
6. Important articles advocating the usefulness of anthropological approaches for the social history of Europe were published in *Gesellschaftsgeschichte's* main journal, e.g., U. Daniel, '"Kultur" und "Gesellschaft". Überlegungen zum Gegenstandsbereich der Sozialgeschichte', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 19 (1993): 69–99. For an attempt to apply categories of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* to

an Asian country see J. Osterhammel, 'Gesellschaftsgeschichtliche Parameter chinesischer Modernität', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002): 71–108.

7. See S. Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914* (Göttingen, 2004); J. Osterhammel, 'Europamodelle und imperiale Kontexte', *Journal of Modern European History* 2 (2004): 157–81.
8. See D. Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migration in the Second Millenium* (Durham, NC, 2002); K.J. Bade, *Migration in European History* (Oxford, 2003).
9. H. Lüthy, 'Die Epoche der Kolonisation und die Erschließung der Erde' (1967), in *Universalgeschichte*, ed. E. Schulin (Cologne, 1974), 240.
10. F.H. Tenbruck, 'Gesellschaftsgeschichte oder Weltgeschichte?' *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 41 (1989): 417–39.
11. J. Kocka, 'Historische Sozialwissenschaft heute', in *Perspektiven der Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, eds. P. Nolte et al. (Munich, 2000), 21.
12. J. Radkau, *Natur und Macht. Eine Weltgeschichte der Umwelt* (Munich, 2000).
13. The main themes of current historical sociology are surveyed in G. Delanty and E.F. Isin, eds., *Handbook of Historical Sociology* (London 2003); J. Adams, E.S. Clemens, and A.S. Orloff, eds., *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology* (Durham, NC, 2005).
14. G. Thiemeyer, 'Supranationalität als Novum in der Geschichte der internationalen Politik der fünfziger Jahre', *Journal of European Integration History* 4 (1998): 5–21.
15. See P. Friedemann and L. Hölscher, 'Internationale, International, Internationalismus', in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, eds. O. Brunner, W. Conze, and R. Koselleck, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1982), 367–97.
16. See M.H. Geyer and J. Paulmann, eds., *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001).
17. See K. Kaiser, 'Transnationale Politik', in *Die anachronistische Souveränität*, ed. E.-O. Czempiel (Cologne/Opladen, 1969), 80–109; R.O. Keohane, ed., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA, 1972).
18. T. Risse-Kappen, 'Introduction', in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, ed. T. Risse-Kappen (Cambridge, 1995), 8.
19. From among a huge literature, see T.M. Wilson and H. Donnan, eds., *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge, 1998).
20. See W. Loth and J. Osterhammel, eds., *Internationale Geschichte. Themen—Ergebnisse—Aussichten* (Munich, 2000).
21. N. Luhmann, *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt a.M, 1997), 31.
22. For a brief sketch of such an approach see J. Osterhammel and N.P. Petersson, *Globalization: A Short History*, trans. D. Geyer (Princeton, 2005).
23. J. Osterhammel, 'Die Wiederkehr des Raumes. Geopolitik, Geohistorie und historische Geographie', *Neue Politische Literatur* 43 (1998): 374–97; an impressive plea for a spatially informed look at history is K. Schlögel, *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit. Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik* (Munich, 2003).
24. For Europe see H. Kaelble, ed., *The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 2004); for the German debate on 'world society' see B. Heintz, R. Münch, and H. Tyrell, eds., *Weltgesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 2005).
25. See J. Osterhammel, '"Weltgeschichte". Ein Propädeutikum', *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 56 (2005): 452–79.
26. I.C. Fletcher, L.E.N. Mayhall, and P. Levine, eds., *Women's Suffrage in the British Empire: Citizenship, Nation, and Race* (London/New York, 2000).

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