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Contents

List of Tables, Figures and Maps vii
Notes on Contributors viii

Introduction 1

Bart Dessein

Part I Historical Consciousness

1 Early Chinese Nationalism: The Origins under Manchu Rule
   Julia Schneider 7

2 Radical Confucianism: The Critique of Imperial Orthodoxy in Guocui xuebao (1905–1911)
   Tze-ki Hon 30

3 History and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary China: Political Confucianism, Spiritual Confucianism, and the Politics of Spirit
   Ady Van den Stock 44

4 All under Heaven and the Chinese Nation-state
   Bart Dessein 64

Part II China and her Periphery

5 Subjective Knowledge Foundation of the Cross-Taiwan Straits International Peace Discourse
   Hung-jen Wang 83

6 Universal and Asian Values in East Asian Regionalism: Japan's 'New Asianism' after the Cold War
   Kristof Elsen 98

7 Diversifying Narratives: Perceptions of a Weak Japan Facing a Rising China
   Tine Walravens 120
Radical Confucianism: The Critique of Imperial Orthodoxy in Guocui xuebao (1905–1911)

Tze-ki Hon

1. Introduction

Despite its long history as an esteemed code of moral learning in China, Confucianism has been condemned since the 1920s as a relic of feudalism and a stumbling block to modernization. During the May Fourth New Culture Movement (1916–1923) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) when totalitarian iconoclasts was at its height, Confucianism was blamed for everything that had gone wrong in the country. From Lu Xun's sarcastic novels to the Red Guards' campaigns to 'smash the four olds', Confucianism was the prime target of cultural critique and a major symbol of national shame. In particular, it was identified as the source of three forms of injustice in imperial China: autocracy, elitism, and patriarchy. Although recently Confucianism has enjoyed a robust revival in the guise of 'culture craze' (wenhua re) and 'national learning craze' (guoxue re), it is still considered by many as a doctrine designed to support a stable political order, a hierarchical society, and a patrilinial family structure. This image of Confucianism has been reinforced in recent years by the campaigns to build a 'harmonious society' in China, where the term 'harmony' (hexie) is clearly drawn from the Confucian classics.

However, what is missing in this satanic image of Confucianism is recognition that from ancient antiquity to the end of the imperial period, Confucianism was always a moral learning of independent-minded thinkers who were critical of autocracy. For instance, Confucius and Mencius – the two founders of Confucianism in the classical period – were well known for advocating learning for one's own interest and the people's right to rebel against a tyrant. Similarly Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi, Lu Xiangshan, and Wang Yangming – the Neo-Confucian thinkers in the mid- and late imperial periods – were fierce critics of the power-sharing between imperial rulers and the literati. During dynastic changes in particular, Confucian moral teaching was frequently deployed to determine whether to support or resist a new government. For example, the renowned 'three great early Qing philosophers' (Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, and Wang Fuzhi) gained fame partly because of their determi nation to remain loyal to the defunct Ming dynasty after the Qing established control over China in 1644.

Certainly Confucianism was the official ruling ideology throughout the imperial period. Furthermore, select Confucian writings (such as the Five Classics and the Four Books) were canonized by imperial rulers as tools of indoctrination and candidates were tested on them in civil service examinations, maximizing the effect of cultural domination. Nevertheless, throughout the imperial period a distinction was often made between 'state Confucianism' and 'radical Confucianism'. In the former, Confucianism was used by the government to legitimize its rule and to perpetuate its domination. In the latter, Confucianism was a moral learning that nurtured a critical spirit to counter political and social injustice. This distinction between the two types of Confucianism is particularly important when examining the intellectual history of late Qing China, roughly from 1895 to 1911. During that time, while the Chinese were building a nation-state to ward off European powers, the two types of Confucianism not only existed side by side, but also competed with one another in the discourse of the Chinese nation.

In this chapter I elucidate the fundamental differences between these two types of Confucianism by examining the writings published in the late Qing journal Guocui xuebao (Journal of National Essence, 1905–1911). Recent research has shown that although often misinterpreted as a stronghold of cultural conservatism, the Guocui xuebao was actually a radical journal that opposed the monarchial system and imperial orthodoxy. Along with Minbao (The People's Tribute, 1905–1910), the Guocui xuebao served as a propaganda tool in the revolutionaries' efforts to mobilize the Han Chinese to topple the Qing (Manchu) dynasty. To highlight the political radicalism of Guocui xuebao, I examine the ways in which Guocui writers used the Confucian classics to garner support for radical change in the Chinese political and social systems.
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I explain why the writers of *Guoci xuebao* identified the Eastern Zhou period (770–221 BCE) as ‘the golden age’ of a diverse and pluralistic China. In the second part, I discuss how the writers of *Guoci xuebao* deployed the concept of the nation (guo) to counter the imperial orthodoxy of the Qing government. Taken together, these analyses show that at the beginning of the 20th century the writers of *Guoci xuebao* were already making a categorical distinction between radical Confucianism (or guoxue, national learning) and state Confucianism (or jiaoxue, learning for the emperor). For them, the true essence of Confucianism rested in its critical reflection of the injustice of the imperial system, rather than its compliance with imperial authority. It is ironic that a few years later, during the May Fourth New Culture Movement, Confucianism was condemned for its lack of a critical spirit, and national learning was denounced as a tool of political indoctrination. This change of interpretation reveals both a misunderstanding of the nature of Confucianism and the intended meaning of national learning (guoxue).

2. The revolutionary propaganda

There is no doubt that *Minbao* played a significant role in the 1911 Revolution. As the official propaganda arm of Tongmeng hui, the Tokyo-based journal was used by the revolutionaries in their ‘mobilization based on writing’ (wenxue guchui). Its goal was to advocate an anti-Manchu revolution, and its audience was those who opposed the Manchu government. From its inaugural issue in November 1905 to its final issue in February 1910, the writers of *Minbao* knew their writings were to serve partly, if not wholly, the six principles of the journal: (1) toppling the current regime in China, (2) establishing a republican government, (3) working toward the state ownership of land, (4) preserving peace in the world, (5) promoting cooperation between China and Japan, and (6) helping the world to see the need for a revolution in China. Individual articles might vary in tone or content, but they were consistent in condemning the brutality of the Manchu rulers against the Han people and in supporting an anti-Manchu revolution. The *Minbao* writers were particularly vocal in their anti-Manchusim when engaged in intense debate with the reformers of *Ximmin congbao* (New Citizen Journal). During the two years from 1905 to 1907 the two groups debated a wide range of issues, including the necessity of a radical change in China’s political structure and the need for land redistribution. The victory of *Minbao* writers in that debate is widely regarded as a crucial event in paving the way for the success of the 1911 Revolution.

Although it received less attention, *Guoci xuebao* was also a mouthpiece of the revolutionaries. Published in the foreign concessions of Shanghai from February 1905 to September 1911 (roughly the same time as *Minbao*), the journal advocated a political revolution to do away with the monarchical system and a nationalist revolution to topple the Manchu dynasty. Aimed at the educated elite steeped in classical learning, the journal carried a wide range of scholarly articles focusing on such topics as the Renaissance in Europe, the different schools of thought in pre-Qin China, and the continuous history of the Yellow Race since the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi). At a time when classical scholarship was still the dominant mode of learning among the educated elite and a symbol of social status for the scholar-gentry, the writers of *Guoci xuebao* reinterpreted ancient classics (especially Confucian classics) to challenge the legitimacy of the Manchu government and the effectiveness of the monarchical system. Their creative interpretations of ancient classics allowed them to present a picture of China’s past that called for radical changes in the country’s national polity.

Multiple links existed between *Minbao* and *Guoci xuebao*, the most obvious being the common pool of writers who contributed articles to both journals. These writers included Zhang Taiyan (1869–1935), Liu Shipei (1884–1919), and Chen Qingbing (1874–1933). Among these writers, Zhang Taiyan was the most important. An editor of *Minbao* since 1906, Zhang contributed essays to almost every issue of the journal. At the same time, he published a large number of writings in *Guoci xuebao*, including ‘Brief Discussion on Pre-Qin Schools of Thought’ (Zhuai xue lieshuo), ‘New Dialects’ (Xin fangyan), ‘A Commentary on Zhuangzi’ (Zhuangzi jiegao), and chapters that later became part of his ‘An Appraisal of the Nation’s Past’ (Guogu lunheng). Zhang usually kept his *Minbao* writings separate from his *Guoci xuebao* writings. In the former, he wrote like a revolutionary leader giving directions to the revolutionary movement. In the latter, he adopted the tone of a scholar injecting new meanings into the ancient classics. But on one occasion, perhaps pressed by the urgency of the event, he decided to publish in both *Minbao* and *Guoci xuebao* his objection to adopting Esperanto in China.

A controversial figure in the 1911 Revolution, Liu Shipei was first a supporter of the revolution and then later pledged his allegiance to the Qing court. But during his stay-in-Japan from 1907 to 1908 he regularly contributed articles to *Minbao*. Among his writings was an article in which he used historical documents to prove the Manchus
were considered a foreign race during the late Ming period.\textsuperscript{13} Despite the change in his political position around 1908, he continued to write for *Guoci xuebao* up to the 1911 Revolution. In fact, he was one of the few writers whose writings appeared in every issue of *Guoci xuebao* during its six years of publication.\textsuperscript{13} In 1911, the last year of the journal's existence, Liu became the key writer for the journal. His articles appeared more frequently, sometimes three or four in the same issue. For instance, issue number 75 of the journal (published in February of 1911) was practically Liu's special issue, with four long articles by him forming the bulk of the content.\textsuperscript{14}

A specialist in the history of the late Ming and early Qing periods, Chen Qubing also contributed articles to both *Minbao* and *Guoci xuebao*.\textsuperscript{15} He spent a year in Japan in 1903, but after returning to China in 1904 he never again left the country. Despite being hundreds of miles away, he found a way to pass his writings to the editors of *Minbao* in Tokyo, and many of them appeared in issues 18, 19, 22, and 23 of *Minbao*.\textsuperscript{16} In 1906 he became an editor of *Guoci xuebao* and was put in charge of the Society for Preserving National Learning (\textit{Guoxue bao-cun hui}). Part of his duty as the editor of *Guoci xuebao* was to collect and publish the writings of late Ming loyalists, highlighting the longstanding anti-Manchu sentiments among scholars in the lower Yangzi river valley.\textsuperscript{17}

The fact that Chen Qubing was able to publish his writings in Tokyo while living in Shanghai indicates that *Minbao* and *Guoci xuebao* shared a broad human network. This network spread from the lower Yangzi river valley, the foreign concessions in Shanghai to the congregations of Chinese residents in Tokyo and Yokohama. It not only moved people and resources around, but also shared ideas and writings. Two organizations were particularly influential in building this broad human network: the ‘Recovery Society’ (\textit{Guangfu hui}) led by Tao Chengzhang (1878–1912) and Zhang Taiyan, and the ‘Southern Society’ (\textit{Nanshe}) led by Liu Yazi (1887–1958) and Chen Qubing.\textsuperscript{18} The commemoration of Qiu Jin and Xu Xilin demonstrates how important this human network was. In 1907, as an editor of *Guoci xuebao*, Chen Qubing joined Liu Yazi in mourning the deaths of the two ‘Recovery Society’ members after their unsuccessful uprising in Anqing. At one point Chen planned to hold a public memorial in Shanghai, but had to drop the plan after the Qing government intervened.\textsuperscript{19} Although no public memorial was held in Shanghai, Chen managed to hold a sort of memorial on the pages of *Minbao*. In issue number 17 (October 1907) of the journal, three pieces of writing were published in honor of the two martyrs – one commemorating Xu Xilin, another commemorating Qiu Jin, and the third a collection of Qiu’s poems. In the following issue number 18 (December 1907), *Minbao* continued to commemorate the two martyrs by publishing a biography of Xu Xilin penned by Chen Qubing.\textsuperscript{20} No mention was made of this action to honor the martyrs, or of who supplied the commemorative materials to *Minbao*, but it is clear that Chen Qubing played an important role in putting together these commemorative writings.

3. The historical vision of *Guoci xuebao*

Despite their strong ties to *Minbao*, the writers of *Guoci xuebao* had a unique view of an anti-Manchu revolution. Most of the writers had received solid classical training, but had little exposure to Western learning beyond reading Chinese translations of Western works. Because of their cultural and geographical backgrounds, the writers of *Guoci xuebao* held a strong belief in making a revolution in China by returning to what they considered to be the essence of Chinese civilization, particularly the true spirit of radical Confucianism.\textsuperscript{21} Their emphasis on classical learning was due in part to their upbringing, having grown up at a time when classical learning was still the dominant mode of education, despite the fact that its importance had greatly diminished due to the abolition of the civil service examination system in 1905. At the same time, their interest in classical learning was rooted in a historical vision, namely, elucidating a past that would help to solve the problems of 20th-century China. In bringing a historical perspective to the study of ancient classics, they consciously or unconsciously transformed the nature of classical learning, particularly the study of Confucian classics. For them, classics were no longer the locus of eternal truth, but the site from which to recover the glorious past of the modern Chinese nation.

Thus a constant theme in the writings of *Guoci xuebao* was the need to identify a particular kind of Chinese cultural heritage that would usher the country into the 20th century. For the writers of *Guoci xuebao*, that particular kind of Chinese cultural heritage was specific in time and content. Temporally speaking, it was a cluster of cultural practices developed prior to the formation of bureaucratic empire under the First Emperor of Qin in 221 BCE. Viewing the feudalism of the Zhou period (1050–256 BCE) as the golden age of Chinese history, the writers of *Guoci xuebao* considered what had happened since then as the ‘Dark Age’.\textsuperscript{22} They identified two characteristics of this ‘Dark Age’: one was the
centralization of power in the hands of the emperor, who was assisted by bureaucrats trained in Confucian orthodoxy and certified by the civil service examinations. The other was the acceleration of this centralization of imperial power due to the domination of foreign ethnic groups such as the Mongols and the Manchus. By dividing Chinese history into two parts—one being the norm and the other the deviant—the writers of *Guocui xuebao* argued that the recovery of the pre-Qin cultural heritage involved both the abolition of the imperial dynastic system and the expulsion of the Manchus. Seemingly too broad and racially prejudicial from today’s perspective, their interpretation of Chinese history was designed to support their opposition to absolute monarchy and the Manchu dynasty.

Regarding pre-Qin cultural practices, the writers of *Guocui xuebao* had reason to consider Zhou feudalism as the golden age of Chinese history. As a time when leaders of feudal states enjoyed a wide range of local autonomy and men of letters were self-appointed custodians of truth, the writers of *Guocui xuebao* saw the period as a historical precedent in which local autonomy and independent thinking were valued and protected amidst efforts to unify China. To drive their point home they focused on the emergence of different schools of thought during the Eastern Zhou period (770–256 BCE), or simply the *xianqin zhouzi* (thinkers of the pre-Qin period). Their purpose in studying these pre-Qin schools of thought was not to question or undermine the authority of Confucianism. Although Confucius was now considered one of many philosophers to make their marks during that intellectually vibrant period, he remained the progenitor of the dominant school of thought that would shape Chinese culture in centuries to come. In studying the different schools of thought in the pre-Qin period, the goal of the *Guocui xuebao* writers was to show that a wide range of intellectual possibilities outside the control of the government had been available in ancient China. And this wide range of intellectual possibilities, they argued, formed the basis of radical Confucianism throughout the imperial period.

More importantly, the writers of *Guocui xuebao* argued that this wide range of intellectual possibilities was the result of an expansion of the scholarly elite during the Eastern Zhou period, when scholars in the imperial court passed on their knowledge to the ‘masses’ (*minjian*). Certainly, in the context of the early 1900s, the writers of *Guocui xuebao* did not take the ‘masses’ to mean people from all walks of life. What they had in mind were men of letters who were on the periphery of the Zhou government, either because they did not have official positions in the Zhou court or because they did not come from major aristocratic families. Eager to match events in Chinese history with those in European history, the writers of *Guocui xuebao* compared this expansion of the scholarly elite in the Eastern Zhou period with the socio-political changes in 15th-century Europe, when the church lost control of education to secular universities. The comparison may be far-fetched considering the tremendous differences in the histories of China and Europe. Nonetheless the point that the writers of *Guocui xuebao* wanted to make is clear. They believed themselves to be experiencing drastic social and political change similar to what the humanists had experienced during the Renaissance. Like the humanists, they thought they were witnessing the collapse of an orthodox ideology and the rise to power of the learned community.

4. The rebirth of ancient studies

Among the writers of *Guocui xuebao*, Deng Shi (1877–1951) was the most articulate in drawing a parallel between the revival of pre-Qin cultural practices in 20th-century China and the humanists’ recovery of Greek and Roman literature in 15th-century Europe. To make the parallel look indisputable, Deng stressed the theme of ‘rebirth’, the root meaning of renaissance. He called the revival of pre-Qin cultural practices ‘the rebirth of ancient studies’ (*guoxue fuxing*). Just as Europeans underwent their rebirth of ancient studies in the fifteenth century, he wrote, ‘the Chinese experienced their rebirth of ancient studies in the twentieth century.’ To make the comparison look compelling, he took pains to match events in Chinese history with those in European history. For example, he compared thinkers of the pre-Qin period with Greek philosophers, the burning of books by the First Emperor of Qin with the destruction of Roman libraries by the Arabs, and the rise of state Confucianism in the Han dynasty with the supremacy of Catholicism during the Middle Ages. This one-on-one correspondence between Chinese and European histories helped Deng make his point. If indeed so many parallels existed between Chinese and European histories, the Chinese should follow the example of the Europeans who, by bringing about a ‘rebirth of ancient studies’, successfully transformed their countries into the lands of modern science, technology, and industry.

Similarly, Liu Shipei also argued for a rebirth of ancient studies in 20th-century China. In 1905, in an article serialized for six months in *Guocui xuebao*, he gave an account of various types of learning in the Eastern Zhou period. He examined more than a dozen types of learning
that were supposed to have appeared in pre-Qin China including psychology, ethics, logic, sociology, religion, law, mathematics, military, education, natural science, and fine arts. Through a detailed study of these different types of learning, he expanded the scope of learning far beyond the conventional fourfold division of scholarship – jing, shi, zi, ji (classics, history, philosophy, and belles-lettres). He also made clear that there was not only a great variety of intellectual activities in the pre-Qin period, but also a close compatibility between those pre-Qin intellectual activities and modern scholarship.

This compatibility between pre-Qin intellectual activities and modern scholarship led Liu to conclude that China's modernization relied as much on learning from the West as on reviving pre-Qin cultural practices. To make this point he, like Deng Shi, reminded his readers of the Renaissance. But unlike Deng Shi, he emphasized a parallel between the Renaissance humanists and the pre-Qin thinkers rather than between the Renaissance humanists and the 20th-century Chinese. He wrote:

In comparing what had happened in Europe [in the 15th century] with what we find in Chinese documents, we gain a new perspective [on the Zhou learning]. During the [Western] Zhou period, officials monopolized learning. But after the capital of the Zhou had been moved to the east, the imperial court lost its authority, giving the talented individuals an opportunity to develop their own schools of thought.

Nevertheless, like Deng Shi, he valued the symbolism of the Renaissance as a rebirth of ancient studies triggered by an expansion of the educated elite. For him, the rebirth of ancient studies and an expansion of the educated elite were mutually reinforcing. To revive the wide range of intellectual possibilities that existed during the pre-Qin period, a drastic reduction in government control of education, social gatherings, and the expression of ideas was necessary. Not only would scholars decide what and how to teach, but more people would have the opportunity to receive education and to participate in government. Similar to the effect of the rise of secular universities in 15th-century Europe in displacing the Catholic Church in matters of scholastic learning, Liu anticipated that a similar socio-political change would take place in China in which learned persons would have the right to receive education, to express their views freely, and to assemble at their own initiative.

5. National learning versus learning for the emperor

As the chief editor of Guocui xuebao, Deng Shi had the opportunity to express his thoughts in 'The Editor’s View' (sheshua). His essays were full of historical references and classical imagery, but they were sharp and clear in their political message. For instance, in his essay 'On the True Meaning of National Learning' (guoxue zhenglun), he distinguished 'national learning' (guoxue) from 'learning for the emperor' (junxue).

With great pain and regret, I have discovered that there was no national learning in China. By national learning, I mean the kind of learning different from that sponsored by the emperor. Since the Qin and the Han, the goal of learning in our Divine Continent had been to serve the emperor. Neither was there a love of the nation, nor a learning to serve the nation. Why was that so? [The reason was that scholars] only knew to serve the emperor. They did not know that they needed to serve the nation.

Deng made a categorical distinction between nation and dynasty. For him, dynasty might come and go, but nation was always the basis upon which the Chinese built their collective identity. Whereas dynasty was the private possession of the imperial family, nation was the collective enterprise of all people living in the land. While dynasty made its presence known through the absolute power of the imperial throne, nation manifested itself in the loyalty and sacrifice of its citizens.

For Deng, the distinction between dynasty and nation was best shown in the difference between 'learning for the emperor' and 'national learning'. According to him, 'learning for the emperor' was to lend support to the imperial system, and its goal was to offer legitimacy to the absolute rule of the monarch. In contrast, 'national learning' was a crystallization of the critical thinking and creative imagination of public-minded scholars, or shi (the learners) in the Confucian tradition. According to Deng, since the establishment of the imperial system in the 2nd century BCE, men of letters had lost their desire to serve the public. Faithfully serving the emperor, they perpetuated the political hegemony of the absolute monarchy in return for wealth and power. As an attempt to call on the men of letters of his time to change their mode of thinking, Deng compiled the writings of those few lone souls in history who had made tremendous sacrifices for the collective interest. Beginning in 1906 and continuing for over two years, he serialized their writings in Guocui
6. Radical Confucianism in the early 20th century

By historicizing the classical texts and making key Confucian concepts relevant to the revolutionary discourse, the writers of *Guocui xuebao* helped to redefine the social and political roles of educated elites in early 20th-century China. As young members of the literati, the writers of *Guocui xuebao* received rigorous training in classical learning to prepare for the civil service examinations. Although their hopes for gaining entry to the officialdom and the community of letters were dashed with the abolition of the examination system in 1905, they found ways to use their cultural capital to create for themselves a new political and social identity. Steeped in classical learning, they positioned themselves as unyielding critics of the monarchical system and determined promoters of a pluralistic political order. As such, the writers of *Guocui xuebao* looked forward to a post-imperial China where, they hoped, there would be space for educated elites to participate in political discourse and local affairs. They envisioned that, instead of being the scholar-officials who administered the empire for the emperors, educated elites would assume a wide variety of roles, including serving as advisors to local and central government, shaping public discourse by publishing in journals and magazines, and teaching future citizens in primary and secondary schools. As things turned out, the reality of post-1911 China did not entirely match their expectations. Yet, consciously or not, they were part of the first generation of new Chinese educated elites who saw themselves not as scholar-officials but as social agents capable of assuming a number of roles. More significantly, they proved that Confucian learning could be an effective tool of political and social changes.

Notes


8. The term ‘wenzue guci’ was that of Wang Jingwei. See his essay ‘Xu kung ci’, Minbao, 25, 1-4. In ‘Minbao zhi liu da zhuji’ (The six principles of Minbao), Minbao, 3, 1-22, Hu Hanmin gave a clear exposition of what he considered to be Minbao’s role in popularizing an anti-Manchu revolution.


10. For a list of Zhang Taiyan’s publications in Minbao, see H. Zhu (1985) Tongmeng hui de gengli: Minbao gaoan yanjiu (The Revolutionary Theory of Tongmeng Hui: A Case Study of Minbao) (Taipei: Zhongyuan yu jianshi), pp.339-41. From his arrival in Tokyo in 1906 to the folding of the journal in 1910, Zhang’s essays appeared in every issue of Minbao except issue 18, which was published while he was ill.

11. See T. Zhang (1908), ‘Bo zhongguo yong wanguo xinyu shuo’ (A rebuttal to adopting world language in China), Minbao, 21, 49-72; Guocui xuebao, 41 (1908), 405-13; 42, 523-40.


14. The four articles that Liu wrote were on the Daoist canon, Tang documents in the Dunhuang library, and philological studies of two ancient texts. In volume 75, only portions of the articles were published. The remainder of the articles were serialized in the following volumes.


16. For a list of Chen Qubing’s publications in Minbao, see H. Zhu, Tongmeng hui de gengli, p.349.

17. See Chen Qubing, ‘Ming yichen lu’ (Records of the Ming loyalists) and ‘Wushi zhi’ (Five Stone Rouge), serialized in Guocui xuebao.


21. Zheng Shiqi reminds us that in the early 1900s guoci had a special meaning. The term might have been a loan word from the Japanese kokusai, but the term referred not only to ‘the preservation of national essence’ in general, but also to preserving a particular kind of Chinese cultural heritage that would help the 20th-century Chinese fully integrate into the modern world. As Zheng points out, the goal of the Guocui writers was not to turn the clock back to a bygone era, but to move China forward by reviving a selected Chinese cultural heritage. See S. Zheng (1997) Wangying guocui paiwenhua sixiang yanjiu (The National Essence Group of the late Qing: A Cultural and Intellectual Study) (Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe), pp.111-39.

22. Deng Sh (1905) ‘Guocui xuebao’ (A preliminary discussion of national learning), Guocui xuebao, 3, sheshuo, 1a-6b.

23. Deng Sh (1905) ‘Guocui tonglun’ (A general discussion of national learning), Guocui xuebao, 3, sheshuo, 1a-9b.

24. Huang Jie (1905) ‘Guocui xuebao xu’ (A preface to Journal of National Essence), Guocui xuebao, 1, 1a-4a.


26. Liu Guanghan [Liu Shipei] (1905) ‘Zhoumu xueshu shi zongxu’ (The preface to a study of the history of late Zhou learning), Guocui xuebao, 1, xuepian, 4b-12b; Liu Guanghan (1906) ‘Guxue chuyu guanshou lun’ (On ancient learning being originated from officials), Guocui xuebao, 14, xuepian, 5a-8b, 15, 1a-10b.

27. Deng Sh (1906) ‘Guocui xuebao disan zhounian zhudian xu’ (A preface to the celebration for the third anniversary of the Journal of National Essence), Guocui xuebao, 38, sheshuo, 1a-2b.

28. Xu Shouwei (1906) ‘Lun Guocui wuzu yu ouhua’ (National essence not a barrier to Europeanization), Guocui xuebao, 7, sheshuo, 1a-4b; Deng Sh (1905) ‘Guxue fuxing lun’ (On reviving the ancient learning), Guocui xuebao, 9, sheshuo, 1a-4b.

29. Deng Sh, ‘Guocui fuxing lun’.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Liu Guanghan [Liu Shipei], ‘Zhoumu xueshu shi zongxu’.

33. Ibid.

34. Deng Sh, ‘Guocui furen’ (A sincere comment on national learning), Guocui xuebao, 27, sheshuo, 1a-4a.


36. Huang Jie (1905) ‘Huang shi juaner’ (History of the Yellow Race: Section 2), Guocui xuebao, 3, 1a-7b.

37. Ibid.