The Birth of the Pariah: Jews, Christian Dualism, and Social Science*

DAVID NIRENBERG

WE SHOULD be surprised to discover Jews embraced by the word "pariah." A term plucked from the caste systems of the Asian subcontinent, its application to a Western and Near Eastern minority might seem to imply that all oppressed are oppressed in the same way. In what sense are the Jews of Christendom like the eponymous low-caste hereditary drumbeaters of southern India? So far as I know, none of the many writers who have called the Jew "pariah" have taken this question seriously, and neither will I. Since its first applications to Jews (in the 1820s?), the word has always served as a metaphor meant to trigger comparisons more polemical than analytic.[1] Nevertheless, the heat of these polemics has provided energy for the pursuit of many questions surrounding the role of the Jew within Christian societies. Here it will nourish a particularly torturous interrogation. To what extent are the analytic concepts by which the modern social sciences approach the study of "included outcasts" (concepts such as "pariah") themselves recapitulations of early Christian thinking about the Jews? To what extent, in other words, is the sociological a secularized form of the theological?

Although Hannah Arendt made the "Jew as pariah" fashionable (1978; 1997 [1957]), it was Max Weber who made him scientifically respectable. Thanks in part to Nietzsche's influence, Jews

*For Philippe Buc and Daniel Heller-Roazen, kindred spirits.

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played an important role in Weber's historical sociology. They "stimulated Weber's concept formation in the sociology of religion, resulting in such concepts as ethical prophecy, salvation religiosity and rational ethical religiosity, as well as resentment, the religiosity of retribution, the situation of a pariah people, pariah intellectualism, and pariah religiosity" (Schluchter, 1989: 164). Weber's serious engagement with the history of Judaism began in early versions of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (published in 1904-5).[2] That work sought to explain the emergence of capitalism not in terms of a victory of avarice or materialism over Christian asceticism and spirituality, but as a Hegelian synthesis of seeming opposites. Luther and Calvin had attained what no religion had heretofore achieved: a union of a spiritualized and transcendent religiosity with a disenchanted and rationalist ethics. The result, according to Weber, was a Protestant (and specifically Puritan) "worldly asceticism," a faith capable of reading the divine in the material, possessing a soteriology of prosperity, a "capitalist spirit."

Through familiarity that famous phrase has lost its paradox, but this was not the case in 1905. To a society trained by Marxist and reactionary alike to associate capitalism with the "Jewish" world of matter and not the Christian world of spirit, Weber's thesis (or rather, synthesis) was an invitation to polemic.[3] That invitation was most famously accepted by Werner Sombart in his *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (1911; translated as *The Jews and Modern Capitalism,* 1951). His argument was straightforward. The history of capitalism was driven by the migrations of the Jewish people, and had nothing to do with Christian theology. Whenever in the world's history economies flourished and profit grew, there could be found the Jew. "Israel passes over Europe like the sun: at its coming new life bursts forth; at its going all falls into decay" (1951: 13). Capitalism developed, not from Christian synthesis, but through the progressive colonization of the world by the Jew.

Sombart trotted through the history of Europe and its colonies in search of evidence for his thesis, but it was the United States that

served him as chief witness. Weber had invoked Benjamin Franklin's ethics of profit to argue that the purest example of the power of the Protestant synthesis could be seen among the Puritan settlers of North America. For Sombart, American capitalism was instead the product of heavy initial settlement by Jews and crypto-Jews (by which he meant Marranos, Huguenots, Puritans . . .). "America in all its borders is a land of Jews." "[T]he United States (perhaps more than any other land) are filled to the brim with the Jewish Spirit." "In the face of this fact, is there not some justification for the opinion that the United States owe their very existence to the Jews? . . . For what we call Americanism is nothing else, if we may say so, than the Jewish spirit distilled" (30, 38, 44).

Stripped of its historical garb, the argument seems to us an embarrassingly conventional polemic. Association with a negative stereotype of Judaism indicts Americanism, capitalism, and Protestantism. The antiquity of the strategy will become apparent in the following pages, but here it is enough to stress its insistence on an extreme antagonism between "Jewish" materialism and "Christian" spirituality. The Jewish "attitude of Mammon was as opposed to [the Christian] as pole to pole" (121). Despite the sharpness of the polarity, Sombart imagined "Jewish" materialism as highly mobile and highly infectious. Wherever it emerges among Christians, that capitalism should be understood as a form of Judaizing. "All that Weber ascribes to Puritanism might . . . with equal justice be ascribed to Judaism, and probably in greater degree; nay, it might well be suggested that that which is called Puritanism is in reality Judaism" (192). Or, as he put it less tentatively later in the book, in a lapidary sentence set off as a paragraph of its own: "Puritanism *is* Judaism" (249; emphasis in original).[4]

For all its conventionality (or indeed because of it), Weber took the charge of capitalism's and Protestantism's "Jewishness" seriously, and his elaboration of a Jewish history and sociology should be seen as a response to it. In *Ancient Judaism* (1917-1919, trans. 1952) and *The Sociology of Religion* (1922, trans. 1964) he grappled

again and again with the role of Jews and the Old Testament in the genealogy of capitalism, incorporating his results into the much-revised final version of *The Protestant Ethic* (1920-21, trans. 1930). Throughout these works Weber deployed a number of solutions to the problem. One was to delimit the impact of Judaism on Christianity through historical periodization. Thus Weber emphasized that it was the ancient Israelite religious ethic of worldly action "free of magic and all forms of irrational quest for salvation" (1952: 4) that mattered for the future of ascetic Protestantism, and that this ethic had been transmitted, not through contact with rabbinic Jews, but through Christian textual engagement with the Old Testament. Further, points of seeming commonality between rabbinic Judaism and Protestantism, such as "formal legality as a sign of conduct pleasing to God" masked fundamental differences. Observance of the law was not the same as inner conviction; Talmudic legalism differed from Protestant morality (1985 [1930]: 165-6, 270-1).[5]

In short, according to Weber nothing of importance to the development of capitalism came from the long history of rabbinic Judaism lived among Christian nations. Christian economic history required only the Old Testament, and even that vital text was stripped of its Jewish chains before it mounted the stage of world history:

> The world-historical importance of Jewish religious development rests above all in the creation of the Old Testament, for one of the most significant intellectual achievements of the Pauline mission was that it preserved and transferred this sacred book of the Jews to Christianity. . . . Yet in so doing it eliminated all those aspects of the ethic enjoined by the Old Testament which ritually characterize the special position of Jewry as a pariah people (1952: 4).

The similarities between Weber's "historical" argument and the Christian theology of supercession will become more obvious as we proceed, but they were probably not lost on Weber himself.

Thus in his lectures of 1919-1920, entitled "Universal Social and Economic History," Weber stressed as key moments in the economic history of the West "the miracle of Pentecost, the fraternization in the Christian Spirit," and "the day of Antioch (Galatians 2.11) where Paul (in contrast to Peter) fostered a cultic community with the uncircumcised" (Weber, 1961 [1927]: 238, 264).

Weber adopted the sociological concept of the "Jew as pariah" under the sign of this same polemic in order to quarantine the "spirit of capitalism" from those who would infect it with Jewish influence. The model was asserted in the opening paragraph of *Ancient Judaism:* "The problem of ancient Jewry . . . can best be understood in comparison with the problem of the Indian caste order. Sociologically speaking the Jews were a pariah people [ein Pariavolk], which means, as we know from India, that they were a guest people who were ritually separated, formally or *de facto,* from their surroundings" (1952: 3). In *The Sociology of Religion,* Weber expanded the definition. "In our usage, 'pariah people' denotes a distinctive hereditary social group lacking autonomous political organization and characterized by prohibitions against commensality and intermarriage originally founded upon magical, tabooistic, and ritual injunctions" (1964: 108).[6] The self-imposed marginality of a "pariah people" meant that, as a recent defender of Weber's argument has put it, diaspora Judaism had "a high capacity for innovation" but "a low capacity for diffusion" (Schluchter, 1989: 199). Therefore, even if the Jewish ethic had been truly capitalist (recall that for Weber it was not), it could not have been a source for the economic and cultural transformation of Christendom. It was in order to establish this point that Weber insisted, first, that the "Jews segregated of their own free will, and not under the pressure of external rejection," and second, that this self-creation of a pariah religiosity had occurred early, at the very origins of the Israelite peoples.[7] The pariah status of the Jews served as a cordon sanitaire, keeping Christian rationalism and materialism free of Jewish influence. Adjusting the metaphor, the

exceptional status of the Jews was the tie that allowed Weber to bind together worldliness and spirituality into a specifically Christian synthesis.[8]

The analogy of Jew and pariah has been criticized as often as it has been embraced. Weber himself was aware that in asserting it he was ignoring important attributes of the Indian system not present in the European case (caste for example). He was less conscious of the violence he was doing to the particularities of Israelite and Jewish history, religion, and culture, though a number of scholars have since pointed that violence out (e.g., Baron, 1937; Taubes, 1966; Momigliano, 1980). Within sociology the debate was transformed by the publication of *Homo Hierarchicus,* Louis Dumont's study of the caste system in India. Dumont claimed that Weber's emphasis on the particularism of pariah peoples (Jews and Gypsies, among others) had introduced tension into his broader models of social formation (1980 [1961], appendix A: 249-50). He specifically criticized the tendency to treat the pariah as radically separate from the privileged, and his own exposition of the caste system began with a concept of "fundamental opposition" derived from a structuralist reading of Hegel. "Hegel saw the principle of the system in abstract *difference* . . . [which] culminates in the universal." "*The whole is founded on the necessary and hierarchical coexistence of the two opposites.*" (Dumont, 1980: 42-45; emphasis in original). He therefore suggested a different relationship between Brahman and Untouchable, and implied a different etiology for pariah status than Weber's:

> It is clear that the impurity of the Untouchable is conceptually inseparable from the purity of the Brahman. They must have been established together, or in any case have mutually reinforced each other, and we must get used to thinking of them together. In particular, untouchability will not truly disappear until the purity of the Brahmin is itself radically devalued. . . (Dumont, 1980: 54).

Writing in a field seemingly untouched by Jewish questions, Dumont could be more radical in his dialectics than Weber had been. In Dumont's model the pariah is not an alien but a founding member of society; there is a dialogic relationship between the polluted and the pure; the outcast is at the center of a culture's symbolic order. But before we can endorse Dumont's solution we need to take seriously the test he proposes. How were the pure and the impure, the spiritual and the material, established together in the case of Christian and Jew? How did they reinforce each other? A backward glance will remind us why Weber insisted on the exceptional alienation of the Jewish pariah, and temper our confidence in any Hegelian resolution.

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Of course, Judaism and Christianity were not established together; there was already a long prehistory of Israelite particularism before the rise of Christianity. With the eclipse of the Israelite kingdoms and the slow migration of their populations into other polities (Babylonian, Persian, Hellenistic, Roman), a number of ancient anti-Jewish authors began to translate these distinctive practices into charges of Jewish exclusivism and misanthropy. But in none of these ancient societies (with the possible exception of Hellenistic Egypt at certain points in time) did distance from the Jew play an important role in the self-representation of the dominant. For the emergence of the Jew as a sociologically significant pariah in the "Dumontian" sense, we must turn to Christianity.

Even the most innocent of readers will recognize controversy in this statement. Historians and theologians of the Jews' status within Christendom have long been divided about the role of Christianity in the creation of anti-Judaism. The publication in 1948 of Jules Isaac's *Jesus and Israel,* written while its author was fleeing the fascist forces that had killed his wife and daughter,

reinvigorated the debate. Isaac's argument in this and other works was that anti-Semitism was a product of the Christian tradition; that the Jews were innocent of the crimes with which that tradition charged them; and that anti-Judaism of the Christian sort had been marginal to ancient paganism. The Protestant theologian Rosemary Ruether (1974) took the argument further. Jews became the focus of an ideology of hatred only with the establishment of Christianity. This hatred was not marginal to Christianity, but rather root and branch of a new faith that was from its earliest moments founded on the notion of a spiritual superiority and an irreconcilable enmity toward the Jews. Its foundational texts expressed their truths always in opposition to Jewish untruth, and could scarcely mention Christ without invoking the anti-Judaic theses. Structural anti-Judaism and Christianity originated together and could only disappear together, either through secularization or by purging Christianity (as Ruether advocated) of its foundational anti-Judaism.

There have been many respondents to Ruether's theses. Some have stressed (to my mind unconvincingly) the importance of anti-Judaism in pre-Christian societies.[9] Others have focused on individual apostolic texts and authors (especially St. Paul) to argue that anti-Judaism was not a foundational, essential, wide-ranging, or inevitable aspect of their logic.[10] Rather, these scholars posit, it arose as a secondary response to specific conflicts with the Jews, or as a solution to particular problems in the Christian community: in short, it was the contingent product of complex historical circumstance. The grim stakes in these arguments lurk very near their surface. Was the New Testament responsible for the Holocaust? For Ruether, the answer was a resounding yes. For her critics, the fault lies less with Christianity's founding texts than with their later readers. Neither position is mine. The discussion that follows does not attempt to lay foundations for blame, but to describe how a negative figure of Jewish carnality and contamination became "conceptually inseparable," as Dumont would put it, from the representation of Christian spiri-

tuality. Ruether's claim that Christian theology articulated itself through the creation of a fictive Jew as the type of the "anti-Christian" will prove useful in this task, but so will the insistence of her critics that such an opposition was neither necessary nor easy. Let us turn, then, to our question: How did the Jews become Christianity's pariah?

A decisive step in that direction occurred with Saul's fall on the road from Jerusalem to Damascus. His subsequent recovery as Paul transformed the meaning of Jews and Judaism forever. As soon as he was healed he began to preach, first to the Jews and then to the Gentiles, about the relationship of Jews to Jesus. We will never know as much as we would like about the nature of that preaching, partly because none of it survives. Paul's extant writings are not sermons but epistles, generally written to address specific problems that had arisen in communities he had earlier visited. They were pitched to a very particular context, virtually none of which is available to us. Nor, given the manuscript tradition, is it always easy to know whether it is Paul that we are reading. Such was the prestige of Paul's name that within a generation or two of his death a small army of pseudepigraphers was sheltered beneath it, while an equally industrious group raised the hue and cry for forgeries.[11] But perhaps the greatest obstacle to our understanding of Paul's writings is our confidence that we already know what they mean. For 2,000 years Christians have approached Paul's letters through a thick hedge of prior readings that have produced more conviction than wonder, above all in matters concerning Jews.

Because our concern is with the epistles as a staging ground for later visions of the Jews' role in a Christian world order rather than with Paul's original intent, these difficulties need not inhibit us too much. Let us generalize, and say that Paul, like other early Christians, confronted two important "Jewish questions." The first had to do with the past. How was the ancient covenant given to Abraham, and its textual expression in the form of the Hebrew Bible, related to the new promise of Jesus? Could it be appropri-

ated? Rejected? The second was a subquestion of the first. How should followers of Jesus act in the present? Should they, or should they not, observe Jewish practices and rituals as he had done?

Any reader of the New Testament knows that these questions were not Paul's alone. Peter, for example, remained troubled by scruples about dietary laws even after a vision urging him to eat "every kind of animal, reptile, and bird" (compare Acts 10.10-16 and Gal. 2.11-13). Jesus himself did not make the decision easy: "Do not imagine that I have come to abolish the Law or the prophets. . . . In truth I tell you, till heaven and earth disappear, not one dot, not one little stroke, is to disappear from the Law until its purpose is achieved" (Matt. 5.17-18). There were any number of Gospel passages that could be posed on one or other (or even both) sides of the argument. But it was Paul, in his letters to the Galatians and the Romans, who provided the first explicit and extended meditation on these questions. His answers, although obscure, proved systematic, or at least systematizable, to the generations that followed, and the constant application of their logic carved out the exceptional space occupied by Jews and Judaism in Christendom.

It is Paul's universalism that provided the impetus for this process, a universalism fiercely articulated against all the particular identities that his society held most sacred. "God shows no partiality" (Gal. 2.6). "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus." (Gal. 3.28) Such universalism would not have shocked Paul's Greek-speaking audience, whether Gentile or Jewish, as much as we sometimes think. It was underwritten by a widespread philosophical dualism (often called "neo-Platonic") that stressed the existence of an idealized brotherhood in the spirit, and emphasized the superiority of that spiritual state over the many differences of body and of circumstance that marked the flesh of living beings.

Much more surprising was the fact that Paul (or at least his later readers) came to define his universalism against one particular status that had previously been almost entirely ignored by the Greek philosophical tradition. Not gender or condition of liberty but Judaism alone served as the constant target of Paul's eloquence. This is clear even in the structure of Galatian's celebrated chapter 3, verse 28, cited earlier, which concludes in pointed fashion: "And if you are Christ's then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to promise." Paul's universalism was articulated in the context and the terms of a struggle for control over the Jewish past. Of all the antinomies of identity from which it was constructed, it was only the category of Jew, of descendent of Abraham, not the categories of Greek, slave, female, or male, that needed to be expanded to make room for all humanity. To the extent that Jews refused to surrender their ancestors, their lineage, and their identity, they became emblematic of the particular, of stubborn adherence to the conditions of the flesh, enemies of universalism, of the spirit, and of God.

Paul's position was motivated in part by the tension between two desires: the desire to maintain the ongoing relevance of God's promise to Abraham (and hence the ongoing relevance of the Hebrew Bible), and the desire to extend that promise beyond Abraham's descendents in the flesh. Had he been willing to abandon the Old Testament or condemn it as false (as the Marcionites and Gnostic Christians would soon do), Jewish particularism might have become no more important to ancient Christians than any other of the myriad ethnic identities they were capable of ignoring as spiritually insignificant. But since he did not, the "Jewish question" became the key issue in Christian hermeneutics, and in the elaboration of Christian theology, ontology, and sociology.

Paul was a pedagogue, his letters primers for a practice of reading that would transform the meaning of Abraham's biography. One example suffices to make his method clear:

> For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by a slave and one by a free woman. But the son of the slave was born according to the flesh, the son of the free woman through promise. Now this is an allegory: these women are two covenants. One is from Mount Sinai, bearing children for slavery: she is Hagar . . . she corresponds to the present Jerusalem, for she is in slavery with her children. But the Jerusalem above is free, and she is our mother. . . . Now we, brethren, like Isaac are children of promise. . . . But what does scripture say? "Cast out the slave and her son; for the son of the slave shall not inherit with the son of the free woman" (Gal. 4:21-31).

Abraham's families—one slave, one free—here unleash a chain of allegorical significations. Hagar and Ishmael represent flesh and slavery, Sarah and Isaac spirit and freedom. Thus far the reading would not have surprised its audience. But next comes an earthquake. Hagar and Ishmael, flesh and slavery, are associated with the law given on Mt. Sinai and historical Jerusalem. Sarah and Isaac, spirit and freedom, are a new covenant and a heavenly city. One bold allegorical stroke reverses the traditional readings of this story. The Mosaic law and the people and polity that observe it are not the heirs of God's promise to Abraham but are condemned as "of the flesh," sentenced to slavery and exile. This terrestrial Jerusalem is replaced by the spiritual Jerusalem set free by faith in Jesus. The same technique Paul applies here to the covenant with Abraham he applies elsewhere to the specific practices through which that covenant was announced. Abraham's circumcision, for example, emerged from under the pressure of Paul's stylus as merely a "sign or seal of the righteousness which he had by faith while he was still uncircumcised" (Rom. 4.11).

The theory and practice of reading through which Paul achieved this translation from promise in the flesh to promise in the spirit was not a novel one. Word and meaning were arrayed against each other in a hierarchy explicitly similar to that of flesh

and spirit. The task of a reader was to penetrate beyond the "letter," the sign, the outer or literal meaning of a text, and into its inner or spiritual meaning. Such reading practices were standard among both Jews and Gentiles familiar with Hellenistic philosophy (Wedderburn, 1987: 127). Writing at the same time as Paul, for example, the Jew Philo of Alexandria stressed the need to read for "the hidden and inward meaning which appeals to the few who study soul characteristics, rather than bodily forms," and discussed the signification of circumcision in terms very similar to Paul's (*On Abraham,* 147; see Philo, 1975, vol. 6: 75). But for Philo, circumcision's spiritual meaning increased, rather than lessened, the necessity of the outer practice. Again what was surprising about Paul were not his methods but his conclusions: once the inner meaning was understood, the literal meaning could be dispensed with. As he put it in Romans 7.5-6, "For when we were still in the flesh, our sinful passions, stirred up by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death. But now we are fully freed from the law, dead to that in which we lay captive. We can thus serve in the new being of the Spirit and not the old one of the letter." It is not just the law that is left behind by the spiritual believer, but also the companions that Paul everywhere associates with it: the letter, and even flesh itself.

We should not exaggerate this rejection of letter and flesh. Paul was a dualist, but not a radical one. He valued the spiritual world much more highly than the phenomenal one through which it was perceived, but he did not represent the material world as evil (Boyarin, 1994: 57-85). In his letters to the Corinthians, for example, the body appears not as the "tomb" favored by so many dualist authors (including Philo: Winston, 1988: 212), but as a sheltering tent (2 Cor. 5.1-4). And although Christians "look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen" (2 Cor. 4.18), nevertheless the spiritual still requires the physical: "If there is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body. . . . But it is not the spiritual which is first, but the physical, and then the spiritual" (1 Cor. 15.42-50).[12]

Yet even as we recognize Paul's moderation, we should also recognize that it is precisely on the topic of Judaism that his dualism was most systematic, his condemnation of flesh most severe. The first of two difficulties that pushed him toward the extreme has already been mentioned: the need to distinguish between the fleshly and the spiritual heirs of Abraham. To this end Paul characterized the many Jews who did not believe in Jesus as pure flesh. This "carnal Israel" could not even be said to be truly alive. A branch cut from the vine (Rom. 11.17-24), she was an inanimate form, a body without spirit, her people slaves, a type of living dead. Into this vessel of carnal Israel Paul repeatedly poured all the dangers of reading and believing "after the flesh."

He did so, at least in part, because the flesh threatened to overflow its container. It is no coincidence that the carnality of Israel comes into sharpest polemical focus only when Paul confronts a second difficulty, the question of Christian adherence to the mandates of Jewish law. Among Jewish believers in Christ, such adherence was for Paul an understandable and tolerable product of habit and tradition, spiritually a matter of indifference. Among Gentile converts, however, it was a horrifying symptom of literalism, evidence that they had not understood His message, nor the practice of reading that conveyed it: "Now I, Paul, say to you," he wrote to the Gentiles of Galatia, "that if you receive circumcision, Christ will be of no advantage to you" (Gal. 5.2). When non-Jews circumcised themselves they placed significance in the sign rather than in what it signified, and thereby revealed themselves as "severed from Christ" and spirit by the "desires of the flesh" (Gal. 5.4, 16-18). Gentiles, Paul insisted, ought to become heirs of Abraham in the spirit without becoming Jews in the flesh. "To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace. For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God . . . and those who are in the flesh cannot please God" (Rom. 8.6-8).

It is important to remember what subsequent generations of Christians promptly forgot: Paul's attitude toward Mosaic law was ambivalent, toward flesh even more so. But at the same time that

we insist on that ambivalence, we should also notice that it is when law and flesh tempt the Gentile that Paul's rhetoric against them grows more polarized, as he attempts to quarantine their dangers in the body of the Jew. In those moments Judaism emerges most clearly as the antipode of spirit, as dead letter, killing flesh. This project of containment would have fateful consequences for the history of the Jews. But equally significant was the theory of corruption that motivated it. Paul, unlike Weber, did not see Judaism as a culture with a "low capacity for diffusion." Quite the opposite: his concern was that "Jewishness" could spread all too easily to the non-Jew. In Galatians 2.14 he coined a new word when he demanded of Peter: "[H]ow do you compel the Gentiles to Judaize?"[13] Already in Paul, Judaism has become the site at which the body and all that it stands for (the material world, the Old Testament, the literal meaning of texts) appears in its most dangerous, most infectious, and most explicitly stigmatized guise.

The debate over the proper relationship between the Old Israel and the New murmurs throughout early Christianity. Like Paul's letters, all the books of the New Testament reveal a wide range of attitudes toward Jews and Jewish law, but are also marked by a tendency to distill into Judaism the purest properties of the anti-Christian. The Book of Acts, for example, is riven by the tension of narrating the apostles' struggle over the question of Judaizing. (As we shall see, the incoherence of its account of the confrontation in Jerusalem between Peter and Paul over the question of Christian obligations toward Jewish ritual would occasion debate between exegetes for centuries to come.) Its author presents the early church as persecuted by Pharisees who accuse Paul and his colleagues of advocating the overthrow of Jewish ritual practice. His defense of Paul is twofold: on the one hand he exonerates the disciples from such a charge, and insists on Paul's continuing adherence to Judaism. On the other, he characterizes the Jews as enemies not only of Paul, but also of God: "You stubborn people . . . you are always resisting the Holy Spirit. . . . Can you name a single prophet your ancestors never persecuted? They

killed those who foretold the coming of the Upright One, and now you have become his betrayers, his murderers" (Acts 7.51-53; cf. Acts 28.28). The Jewish people are here separated from the Jewish prophets, the truth of the latter confirmed always by the former's falsity. Thus Jewish hatred becomes proof of the truth of Jesus' message, and Jewish persecution defines the Christian community as one of spirit.

Like Stephen in Acts, John in his Gospel treats Jews and Judaism throughout as the antonym of spirit and the divine. "You are from your father, the devil, and you prefer to do what your father wants. He was a murderer from the start; he was never grounded in truth, there is no truth in him at all. . . . He is a liar, and the father of lies. . . . The reason why you do not listen is that you are not from God" (John 8.44-47). Even the Jesus of Matthew, who declared the Mosaic law inviolate, simultaneously condemned the rabbis, scribes, and Pharisees who "occupy the chair of Moses" as "fools and blind," "hypocrites," "whitewashed tombs that look handsome on the outside, but inside are full of the bones of the dead and every kind of corruption," "children of those who murdered the prophets" (Matt. 23). A similar ambivalence marks all the Gospels, resolving always in the direction of the empty carnality, the living death, of the Jews.

Scholars have adduced any number of reasons for the anti-Judaism of these texts. For Rosemary Ruether, it was a logical necessity. How, in the face of Jesus' death and the Jews' indifference, could his Messiahship be maintained unless it was by transforming the "chosen" into the "rejected" people? "Anti-Judaism is the left hand of the Christological hermeneutic" (1974: 64-5, 116, 121). Others, echoing strands of the New Testament itself, have argued for more sociological causes, emphasizing competition between the two religions. John's anti-Judaism, for example, is often said to be the product of the Johannine community's traumatic expulsion from a local synagogue (Townsend, 1979; Meeks, 1975; Ehrman, 1993: 182; see similar arguments for Matthew in Simm, 1998). Alternatively, it was a defensive posture

meant to counter Judaism's appeal to many gentile Christians. No doubt there are local truths in all these positions. But to my mind the general utility of the idea of the killing carnality of the Jews derived less from any concerns of the apostolic generations than from those of the second century's exegetic communities. These later communities compiled and edited the Christian scriptures we now know as canonical, and they did so in the midst of a struggle over the relationship between matter and spirit sharper than anything we have seen in Paul or his contemporaries. The fleshy figure of the Jew came to play a crucial role in this struggle and in the debates over the proper contents of scripture that it precipitated.

The conflicts of the second through the fourth centuries were not primarily over Jews or Judaizing, though they expressed themselves in those terms; they were over the nature of the Messiah. Was Jesus Christ a man or a God? At one extreme were the various groups who held that Jesus was a human being of flesh and blood, not born of a virgin, who was chosen (or adopted) by God to carry out His will on earth. At the other were those who believed Christ to be entirely a God, incapable of suffering or death, only appearing human for the sake of His audience. In between were many communities holding a variety of positions, including some that seemed to many contemporaries paradoxical and incoherent but that we now think of in retrospect as orthodox, namely, that He was both fully man and fully God.[14]

Perhaps the most influential opponent of such paradox was a second-century Christian named Marcion (fl. 139-156). If we can believe his enemies (for it is only through them that his views are preserved), Marcion's dualism was thorough. The opposition he saw between flesh and spirit was so radical that it called for complete separation. A salvific God could not assume a corruptible body, nor could he even produce one. An evil "creator" God must therefore be the author of the flesh and everything material. The savior God was a "stranger" to the world, concerned only with soul and spirit. And just as there were two creations there

were also two scriptures. The God of matter's scripture was the Hebrew Bible. The stranger's scripture was a gospel (lost, but probably a form of Luke) and ten Pauline epistles, all purged of any "Jewish" traits (such as quotations from the Hebrew Bible) that might lessen the starkness of the oppositions Marcion understood them to contain (Harnack, 1924; Knox, 1942; Blackman, 1948; Wilson, 1986).

Even this hasty glance at Marcion's theology tells us a great deal. First, like many Gnostic Christians, Marcion read Paul as an extreme dualist. What we today may characterize as Paul's ambivalence toward flesh, he and many others saw as utter condemnation.[15] Second, Marcion systematically expressed his rejection of material creation in terms of a rejection of letter, law (meaning Jewish scripture), and above all, Judaism. In this again he believed he was following Paul, whose clear opinions Marcion claimed had been obscured by the textual tampering of Judaizing Christians intent on concealing the message of the savior God. So far as we know, Marcion's predilection for distilling the evils of flesh into Judaism had nothing to do with his experiences of, or competition with, real Jews. Rather, it was driven by his readings of those Pauline passages, especially in Galatians and Romans, which described the existence of a "law of the flesh" and expressed the dangers of that law in terms of Judaizing. The importance of this reading cannot be overemphasized, for it turned Jews and Judaism into a popular arena for contests over the relationship between matter and spirit, man and God, and over the texts and sacraments that mediate between them.

One of the most important of these contests was over the content and the meaning of scripture. Marcion entirely rejected the books of the Jews, attributed their authorship to the evil creator of the material world, and purged his own collection of any references that obscured the sharp distinctions he saw between the scriptures of spirit and the scriptures of flesh. His was, in fact, the first systematic attempt to delineate the form and boundaries of a Christian scriptural canon, and it precipitated an explosion of

debate and activity, ranging from forgery to philology, out of which the canonical "New Testament" was born. "[T]he idea and the reality of a Christian bible were the work of Marcion, and the Church which rejected his work, far from being ahead of him in this field, . . . simply followed his example" (Campenhausen, 1972: 148; cf. Metzger, 1987: 90-99). The battle for exclusion or inclusion of specific texts was part of this process, as was the content of the texts themselves, which as we have them are the product of a good deal of orthodox "emendation" or "corruption" (Ehrman, 1993).

The largest questions Marcion raised about the shape of the Christian canon was over the status of the Hebrew Bible. As Tertullian put it in his *Adversus Marcionem* I.19 (written in 207 C.E.):

> The separation of Law and Gospel is the primary and principal exploit of Marcion. . . . For such are Marcion's *Antitheses,* or Contrary Oppositions, which are designed to show the conflict and disagreement of the Gospel and the Law, so that from the diversity of principles between those two documents they may argue further for a diversity of gods (Tertullian, 1972, vol. 1: 49).

It was in its response to this separation, and in defense of the unity of scripture, both old and new, that Christianity elaborated its most fateful attitudes toward the Jew. Justin Martyr, a contemporary and outspoken opponent of Marcion's, is exemplary in this regard. His rebuttal of the dualists, an inspiration to like-minded polemicists for centuries to come, was staged in the form of a "Dialogue with Trypho the Jew" (circa 150 C.E.). According to Justin, the dualists reject the Hebrew Bible and its God because they do not know how to read it. Understood literally, the law is indeed carnal. God gave it in this literal form because of the Jews' hardness of heart, but meant it to be read allegorically, and its true meaning was always spiritual. The circumcision of the heart, the Sabbath in Christ; these were the true messages revealed through the ancient prophets. The Jews themselves had

never grasped this. Because they read literally and believed carnally, they failed to see that the pre-incarnate Christ had authored their scriptures (or "rather not yours, but ours") to proclaim His truth, and failed as well to recognize their God when He walked among them in the flesh. The dualists, in their literal reading of the law, simply repeat this error. Tertullian's later formulation was characteristically pithy: "Let the heretic now give up borrowing poison from the Jew" ("Against Marcion" III.viii in Tertullian, 1972, vol. 1: 191).

The Jewish focus of these antidualist polemics was not the product of conflict with real Jews or Judaizing Christians. It was rather a strategy to defend "orthodox" Christian reading of the Old Testament from the dualists' charge of Judaizing and demonic carnality, and to return that same charge to the dualists themselves. For Justin, Tertullian, Origen, and others, the law understood literally was indeed a curse, but allegorically a blessing. God had never intended its literal observance by the Hebrews. Even the chronicles of their kingdoms were heuristic rather than historical. Because the Jews had never understood this, they had never been the true Israel. But the law's spirituality was concealed only by the blindness of its readers. If the Marcionites could not see it, this was because they were like the Jews, creatures of pure carnality.

In short, these theologians saved the prophets from the dualists' attack by using allegory to deprive the Jews of their scriptures, and the scriptures of their Jews. Such thoroughgoing allegorization had two great, if somewhat contradictory, virtues. First, it countered dualist readings of the law's carnality, casting such readings as themselves "Jewish." Second, it widened the gap between literal meaning and spiritual truth, and therefore served as a powerful antidote to the concern with Judaizing that preoccupied Christian exegetes of the law since the days of Paul. But the reader who would hold these virtues together in one hand had to fend off irony with the other. For insofar as they radically

devalued the literal, historical, and carnal meanings of scripture, the allegorists themselves risked becoming dualists.

That this risk was keenly felt is evident in the controversy over the biblical interpretations of Origen. Origen's position was straightforward. Biblical texts, he claimed, often did not make sense, or even proved false, on a literal level. This was especially true of large parts of the Old Testament, but also of bits of the New. Their divine author clearly meant us to understand that these texts had only an allegorical—not a literal—sense or truth, and these truths Origen set out to provide. His allegories, first in Greek and then in Latin translation, crashed like waves over the fourth century Church (see Clark, 1992). It is upon their crests, for example, that Saint Jerome, author of the standard Latin Bible, rode to prominence. Others, however, emphasized the danger rather than the sport inherent in such allegorizations. Chief among these was a young North African bishop, a fervent debater of heretics and himself a recovering Manichean dualist, the future Saint Augustine. The letters produced in his exchange (395-404) with Jerome are remarkable distillations of their respective authors' rhetorical and intellectual predilections: sometimes pedantic and peevish, always polemical and piercing. Above all they reveal with blinding clarity the explosive potential of the fleshy Jew lurking in the Christian text.

Augustine's letters to Jerome articulate three distinct but thematically unified concerns. First, Augustine objected that Jerome, in his project to produce a standard version of the Latin Bible, had drawn on Hebrew manuscripts of the Torah, rather than relying entirely on the Greek translation, known as the Septuagint. To Augustine's mind this produced an unfamiliar translation that would unsettle the faithful. Moreover, it gave the Jews too much opportunity for philological mischief, for if any dispute should arise about the quality of Jerome's translation, Christians would need to ask Jews to judge the true meaning of the Hebrew. Augustine recounts one such occasion in which the Jews of the town of Oea confirmed the Christian congregation's suspicion of

Jerome's "Job," sparking a small revolt against the bishop (Letter 71, III.5). Second, Augustine asks Jerome to justify his use of Origen, "whose name you seem to have singular pleasure in sounding forth" (Letter 28.2), and insists that passages of divine scripture can never be accounted false or literally untrue, lest "nowhere in the sacred books shall the authority of pure truth stand sure" (Letter 28.4). "If he wrote what was false here, when did he say what was true?" (Letter 40, 3.3). Augustine's concern is that the allegorist opens the door for heretics like the Manichees, "perverse men" who dismiss Pauline passages awkward to their cause as falsehoods uttered for some strategic or heuristic purposes rather than literal truths. "For my part, I would devote all the strength which the Lord grants me, to show that every one of those texts which are wont to be quoted in defense of the expediency of falsehood ought to be otherwise understood, in order that everywhere the sure truth of these passages themselves may be consistently maintained" (Letter 28, 3.5).[16]

Augustine's third critique, and the one that came to dominate this saintly correspondence, focused on the proper interpretation of a specific text "wont to be quoted in defense . . . of falsehood" in the Bible, a text often cited by the allegorists precisely because it synthesized the problem of Judaizing and the problem of reading into one conflict both potent and apostolic. The text was Paul's exhortation to Peter in Galatians 2.11-14 (recall Weber's designation of this speech as a key moment in the history of the West): "If you, though a Jew, live like a Gentile and not like a Jew, how can you compel the Gentiles to live like Jews [Latin *judaizare*]?" Following Origen, Jerome denied that Peter could ever have forced Gentile Christians to live according to Jewish law. Had not Peter's first mission to the Gentiles been preceded by a dream instructing him to eat "every kind of animal, reptile, and bird"? (Letter 75, III.7; cf. Acts 10.10-16). It was absurd to believe, both Jerome and Origen agreed, that either Paul or Peter would have recognized the ongoing validity of the law and its practice, either for Jewish Christians or for Gentile ones. Paul had not

meant his reproach of Peter sincerely, but had merely said these things to "soothe troublesome opponents," just as he sometimes pretended to observe Jewish law, not out of principle but to escape persecution (Letter 28, 3.4; Letter 40, 3.3).

Augustine's position was radically different. "Paul was indeed a Jew; and when he had become a Christian he had not abandoned those Jewish sacraments which that people had received in the right way, and for a certain appointed time" (Letter 40, 4.4). Paul, like Peter, observed Jewish laws, "but with this view, that he might show that they were in no wise hurtful to those who, even after they had believed in Christ, desired to retain the ceremonies which by the law they had learned from their fathers." Far from being too absurd to be true, for Augustine the debate between Peter and Paul was not only historical—it was the key to a proper understanding of history. On his exegetical stage both apostles performed the point that the Jewish law had been truly salvific, the Jewish people rightly chosen, "for a certain appointed time." Both observed the law from a studied care to mark its passing with reverence and respect. Their Jewishness served as widow's weeds, to remind their audience of the law's place in sacred history, and to reproach those who would deny that it had ever been beloved. Peter's error consisted only in this: that out of fear he had agreed to compel Gentile converts to observe Jewish ceremonies, and in so doing gave the false impression that these were "still necessary for salvation" (Letter 40, 4.5). For this Paul had rightly upbraided him.

Perhaps the best evidence for the sting of Augustine's argument was the grace with which it was met. For a number of years Jerome did not answer Augustine's letters, at least partly because he judged them to be "tainted with heresy" (Letter 72, I.2). When, in 404, he finally replied, it was ungenerously. Augustine was insisting, Jerome claimed, that Jewish law remained binding on all Jews, even after they converted to Christ. In this he was "reintroducing within the Church the pestilential heresy" of the Ebionites and other Judaizing sects. If such opinions were countenanced,

Jerome warned, the ongoing conversion of Jews to Christianity would destroy the Church: "If . . . it shall be declared lawful for them to continue in the Churches of Christ what they have been accustomed to practice in the Synagogues of Satan, I will tell you my opinion in the matter: they will not become Christian, but will make us Jews" (Letter 75, IV.13).

Jerome's fierce deployment of the language of Judaizing against Augustine is the more meaningful in that it seems unwarranted. Augustine had never claimed that observance of the law was binding on the apostolic or any other generation of converts from Judaism. What he did say, most clearly in the treatise "Against Faustus the Manichee" (*Contra Faustum*) of 398, as well as in his correspondence with Jerome, was that such observance was not prohibited (non prohiberentur); that it was understandable as the product of habit and custom; and that the apostles had favored it as a theologically advisable approach toward the Torah, "lest by compulsory abandonment it should seem to be condemned rather than closed" (*Contra Faustum* XIX.17) This was a thoroughly historical response to the dualist problem, one that articulated the legitimacy of literal interpretation, legal observance, and Judaism in generational terms. The synagogue was Christ's mother, just as the Church was his bride (*Contra Faustum* XII.8). As mother she was beloved of God and worthy of reverence. Her passing needed to be marked and mourned, and this is what the apostolic generation had done through its ritual observance. But such behavior was acceptable only among the first generations of Jewish converts. After the burial of the synagogue, Torah observance was for all Jews (and Christians) a type of necrophilia, the fruitless loving of an empty letter.

Augustine makes the point memorable in "Against Faustus the Manichean" by juxtaposing the Jews of Christendom onto the biblical figure of Cain who prefigured them (*Contra Faustum* XII.9-13). Like Cain, the Jews were carnal, tillers of the earth. Like Cain they were unsatisfied with their lot and became the servants of murderous sin, killing the very flesh that they had been meant to

cultivate. By "flesh" Augustine here meant several things, including the "flesh of Christ" and also the Torah in which that flesh was prophesied. In punishment for this killing the Jews became, like Cain, both hypercarnal and alienated from all flesh: "you are cursed from the earth . . . , for you shall till the earth, and it shall no longer yield onto you its strength. A mourner and an abject shall you be upon the earth." Not even their Law would give them fruit any longer: "they continue to till the ground of an earthly circumcision, . . . while the hidden strength or virtue of making known Christ, which this tilling contains, is not yielded to the Jews. . . . The veil which is on their minds in reading the Old Testament is not taken away." Carnal as they are, the Jews are in the end alienated even from their own mortal flesh, as Cain had been:

> So Cain . . . said: . . . "I shall be a mourner and an outcast on the earth, and it shall be that everyone who finds me shall slay me." . . . "Not so," [God] says; "but whosoever shall kill Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold." That is . . . not by bodily death shall the ungodly race of carnal Jews perish. . . . So to the end of the seven days of time the continued preservation of the Jews will be a proof to believing Christians of the subjection merited by those who . . . put the Lord to death.[17]

One of the often noted and rather startling results of these passages was the survival of the Jews in Christendom. "No emperor or monarch who finds under his government the people with this mark [of Cain] kills them, that is makes them cease to be Jews, and as Jews to be separate in their observance, and unlike the rest of the world." With these remarkably Weberian words, Augustine established the theological terms for the Jews' protection in a "pariah" status. He did so as a reproach to dualists past, present, and future. The Jews were preserved as proof and warning: proof of the antiquity of God's prophecies, warning to all those (like the Manichees) who would repeat their error by denying His prophecies and killing His flesh. But they were preserved in an excep-

tional state. "Like milestones along the route the Jews inform the traveler, while they themselves remain senseless and immobile" (Sermon 199.I.2, *Patrologia Latina,* vol. 38, col. 1027). Metaphor after metaphor drove home the point. The Jews were "living letters of the law," "desks" of the Christians. They adhered faithfully but fruitlessly to a "Jewish form" (*forma Iudaeorum*), knowing as little of its content as a blind man knows of his face in the mirror. Completely alienated from their own texts, their own flesh, and their own history, they were as close to pure carnality as Augustine could come without lapsing into dualism himself.

Augustine's theology was entirely driven by the exegetical demands of his confrontations with dualist and Gnostic preachers and polemicists in Rome and North Africa.[18] His concern was not with Jews in the flesh, but with the textual Jews that emerged from the furious looms of Christological debate. The Marcionites, Manicheans, and other dualists had excised the Torah in the interest of a docetist Christology. Their "Catholic" opponents (Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Origen, Jerome) had responded with a docetist historiography, retaining the Old Testament but stripping its citizens (though not its prophets) of spirit, its words of literal and historical meaning. Against both of these Augustine posed a historical realism, one that restored a literal and spiritual value to the Torah and its people (Fredriksen, 1996: 48). Given the strength of the contemporary association of literal Old Testament interpretation with carnality, Judaism, and the satanic, it is not surprising that some initially resisted his position as Judaizing. But Jerome, like many others, soon recognized in Augustine a bulwark against heresy. His arguments tamed (though they could not entirely domesticate) the tendency of letter and meaning, flesh and spirit, Old Testament Jew and New Testament Christian, to fly toward opposite poles. More than any other Church father, Augustine was master of the paradoxical union of material and divine. Yet we must not forget that he achieved this alchemy using the same techniques and in the same alembic as Paul, Marcion,

Jerome, and even Weber, distilling the danger of flesh and letter into a condensate of the Jew.

Everywhere in our reckless gallop through 400 years of Christian theology this condensation has hovered like a thick fog along our path. We can now agree with Dumont, if a bit breathlessly, that the Jew and his law of flesh are "conceptually inseparable" from the Christian and his law of spirit. We can be even bolder, and suggest that the Jew serves as shorthand for the negative pole of a structuring antagonism whose overcoming creates Christian freedom. At the beginning of our journey Paul had put the struggle in broad and martial terms that became favorites of the dualists: "For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members" (Rom. 7.22-23; cf. Gal. 5.17). By its end, Augustine had sharply delimited the nature of the enemy, synthesizing principles of mediation that succeeded in spiritualizing seeming antinomies of the godly: the letter, the law, and the body.

But it is also true (and this Dumont does not help us to understand) that in this Christian chemistry Jewish people (as opposed to prophets) were treated as an inert catalyst, unaffected by the synthesis they made possible. After the blinding union of the mortal and the divine in the person of Jesus Christ, there still remained present the Jew in his stubborn negativity. There remained as well the sense that the claims of matter and "bare life" (animation without spirit, mimesis without logos) had not been entirely overcome. Nature, Man, and God could still appear disjoined: an anxious possibility for a Christian faith that staked its victory on their dialectical fusion.[19] Christian hermeneutics poured this anxious possibility into the Jew, who stood as an exception to the messianic power of dialectic, a symbol of substance resisting subjectivity, of form rejecting meaning. Through this Jew Christianity both articulated and defeated its dualism, finally immuring it, like the Furies under Aeschylus' Athens, in the stones at the foundations of Christian society.

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Here then, buried some 1,500 years beneath our feet, we can find the pious roots of "pariah" sociology. Weber's dialectical messianism, his fusion of godliness and worldliness in the form of an economic spirituality, was the product of a historiography much like Augustine's. To protect his Christian synthesis from the charge of "Jewish materialism," Weber exempted the living Jew from dialectic, banishing him to the status of exceptional alien. Sociology here recapitulates soteriology, and draws its tools from the same kit. We cannot use these tools to produce a "scientific" historical sociology of Jewish communities or of Jewish-Christian interaction. They can, however, open the door to another set of questions concerning the role of Christian theologies of Judaism in the formation of the modern social sciences.

The same could be said, albeit more obscurely, of Dumont's "fundamental oppositions," or indeed of any Hegelian description of the place of Jews in Christian society and history. "Stripping off the forms of dualism from its extremes, rendering the opposition in the element of Universality fluid, and bringing it to reconciliation," was for Hegel the end point of both religion and philosophy (Hegel, 1895, I: 23) Christianity's messianic mediation was both the climax and the paradigmatic example of such dialectical synthesis:

> For the true consciousness of Spirit the finitude of Man is slain in the death of Christ. This death of the natural gets in this way a universal signification, the finite, evil, in fact, is destroyed. The world is thus reconciled, and through this death . . . implicitly freed from evil. It is in connection with a true understanding of the death of Christ that the relation of the subject as such in this way comes into view. . . . The highest knowledge of the nature of the Idea of Spirit is contained in this thought (Hegel, 1895, III: 96-97, 98; cf. 1895, II: 220-224; 1977: 470-478).[20]

Given the Christology at the heart of Hegel's phenomenology, it is not surprising that he, too, banishes Judaism into exceptional inertness. The Jew's "mind is completely held fast to one side" by legalism and contract. In "this firm bond there is no freedom," and Man approaches Thing: "Man has as yet no inner space, no inner extension, no soul of such an extent as to lead it to wish for satisfaction within itself, but rather it is the temporal which gives it fullness and reality." The Jewish "people" become "identical, inseparable," from their "possessions." Their service is irrational, their obedience "entirely external," their faith "a fanaticism of stubbornness" (Hegel, 1895, II, 209-219).

Christianity conceived the perpetual punishment of the Jews in the public squares of its imagination as a memory of complete alienation and as evidence of its overcoming. Hegel retained both these fantasies, that of Jewish alienation and of dialectical victory. I am not claiming that his methods *depend* on this alienation of the Jews for the success of their syntheses, only that they *repeat* it. But even without inquiring about the extent to which such repetition might qualify their philosophical utility, we should assume that it qualifies their claims to teach us anything immediate about the history of Jews, Judaism, and perhaps even about alienation more generally. There may be ways to produce a Hegelian dialectics free of these messianic fantasies of perfection, and hence free of the projection of materiality that such fantasies displace onto "the Jew."[21] In the meantime we should be skeptical of any discourse that claims to explain the exceptional historical and sociological place of the Jew in terms borrowed from the Christian theology that contributed so much to creating it.

Notes

[1]For an early usage see Michael Beer's allegorical play of 1823, *Der Paria,* in which a Hindu outcast is not allowed to fight for his country (Shmueli, 1968: 170).

[2]All citations from Weber are given from the English translations. For the complex publication history of Weber's work I have relied on Schluchter (1989).

[3]Indeed, it may already have been a response to such polemic, if Gordon Marshall's suggestion is correct. See Marshall (1980: 23 f.), discussing Weber's citations of Sombart's early work in the first version of *Protestant Ethic.*

[4]Sombart is here explicitly restating early modern theological polemics that accused the Calvinists of Judaism (e.g., "Der Calvinische Judenspiegel").

[5]Similarly, Weber stressed that Jewish capitalism, "pariah capitalism," was fundamentally different from Protestant and bourgeois capitalism. For example, Jewish capitalism assigned no ethical value to the outcome of economic transactions with non-Jews, was speculative rather than productive, and did not result in any innovations in the organization of labor.

[6]On Weber's views, see especially Momigliano (1980) and Liebeschütz (1964, 1967). Add to these Caspari (1922); Taubes (1966); Bourdieu (1971).

[7]This last aspect of Weber's thesis has often been criticized as a retrojection of a medieval development to ancient times. See, for example, Causse (1937: 9) and Kimbrough (1972).

[8]Weber and Sombart were not, of course, the only sociologists to ponder the role of Jews in the formation of modern economies: the question was a burning issue in the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth. Nor was Weber alone in applying the term "pariah" to the Jews in the course of such an analysis. For a contemporary and quite distinct vision, see Georg Simmel's comments on "*Der Fremde*" ("The Stranger") and his role in monetary economies (1908: 685-91; 1971: 143-149; 1990 [1907]: 221-227).

[9]The debate is reviewed in Gager (1985: 11-34). For a recent exploration of pre-Christian "Judaeophobia," see Schäfer (1997).

[10]There is an immense literature on these issues. Among the most influential interventions on the question of Paul are Sanders (1977, 1983); Gaston (1979); Gager (1985). On the Gospels see Eckert, Levinson, and Stöhr (1967); Hare (1979); McKnight (1993); Smiga (1992); Farmer (1999). For a response to Ruether on the question of Christology, see Idinopoulos and Ward (1977).

[11]A number of canonical epistles have been classified as not of Pauline authorship by modern New Testament scholarship. These include entire epistles (for example, the "pastoral" letters to Timothy

and Titus, perhaps Ephesians, Colossians, 2 Thessalonians). Even in the more probably Pauline letters, many passages relevant to our topic have come under scrutiny as interpolations or evidence of forgery, such as 1 Thessalonians 2.13-16 ("the Jews, who killed both the Lord Jesus and the prophets, and drove us out, and displease God and oppose all men by hindering us from speaking to the Gentiles that they may be saved"). On this passage see Pearson (1971); Gager (1985: 255-56).

[12]A very helpful exposition of the generative potential of the Pauline dualist system, and of the parameters that tend to temper (or exacerbate) its polarity, can be found in Caspary (1979: 108-116).

[13]The verb occurs only once in the Latin Vulgate: "*quomodo gentes cogis iudaizare?*" The Douay Rheims translation expands a bit: "How dost thou compel the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?"

[14]See, for example, the creed of Ignatius, Eph. 7.2: "both fleshly and spiritual / begotten and unbegotten. / come in flesh, God, / in death, true life. . . ."

[15]Indeed, in the second century the apostle to the gentiles seems to have been more popular among dualists than among those we consider proto-orthodox. See Pagels (1975: 1-13).

[16]For an example of the strength Augustine devoted to the task, and a restatement of his motives for doing so, see his work from the 410s, the *De Genesi ad litteram* (On the literal interpretation of Genesis), Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (CSEL), vol. 28, 8.1, pp. 231-2. He had undertaken but not completed a similar project in 393, *De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus* (On the literal interpretation of Genesis, an unfinished book) (CSEL 28.I).

[17]This Augustinian exegesis of Cain as a type for the Jews was much cited in the Middle Ages; see Dahan (1982: 25-27). Augustine treats Cain quite differently in *De civitate Dei* (On the city of God) 15.7. There Cain is the founder of the earthly city, on which contrast see the beautiful passage of Brown (1967: 321). On the evolution of Augustine's views on religious coercion and his turn to other prooftexts (such as Psalm 59.12, "slay them not") see Brown (1964) and Cohen (1999: 54-55).

[18]In this I am disagreeing with Blumenkranz (1946: 59-68), but in full agreement with Cohen (1999), Fredriksen (1996: 52), Taylor (1995), and others.

[19]I borrow the term "bare life" from Agamben (1998).

[20]Or, as Walt Whitman put it a generation later: "All these separations and gaps shall be taken up and hook'd / and link'd together, / The whole earth, this cold, impassive, voiceless earth, shall/be completely justified. / . . . Nature and Man shall be disjoin'd and diffused no more, /

The true son of God shall absolutely fuse them." "Passage to India" 5 (Whitman, 1982: 534-5).

[21]This seems to me Slavoj Žižek's project in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989). Žižek attempts to reread Hegel through the Lacanian notion of the *point de capiton:* a nodal point of fundamental antagonism that both orients the ideological field and generates its own concealment. (On the *point,* see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985.)

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