

# IN SEARCH OF NEW TIMES: TEMPORALITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND COUNTER- ENLIGHTENMENT

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## ABSTRACT

Isaiah Berlin and other representatives of historicism have made the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment into opposite cultures. The Counter-Enlightenment is a criticism of the Enlightenment from within, so in many respects they overlap. However, with regard to perceptions of time they contradict each other. The times of the Enlightenment lean heavily toward chronology and can be labeled as “empty,” whereas the time perceptions of the Counter-Enlightenment can be called “incarnated” and are identical with historical times. As a consequence the differences between the two temporalities lead necessarily to differences in synchronization.

*Keywords:* Enlightenment, Counter-Enlightenment, empty and incarnated times, noncoeval times, synchronization, Kant, Vico, Herder, Hegel

In the *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* the entry on the Enlightenment is written by a rather unknown author named Helmut Pappé; however, the entry on the Counter-Enlightenment is written by the well-known Isaiah Berlin.<sup>2</sup> Berlin more

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<sup>1</sup>. I would like to thank Angelique Janssens for correcting my English.

<sup>2</sup>. “IV Enlightenment” and “Counter-Enlightenment,” in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, ed. P. P. Wiener (vol. II), <http://tinyurl.com/gso9yq> (accessed September 2, 2015).

or less coined the name “Counter-Enlightenment,” although Friedrich Nietzsche had already used the term *Gegen-Aufklärung*. Apart from the difference in relative fame of the two authors, there is another distinction between the two entries. Pappe constructs his story about the Enlightenment around *items* like “Underlying Structural Change,” “Progress and Perfectibility,” “Stages of Evolution,” and “Nature,” whereas Berlin explores the Counter-Enlightenment around *thinkers* like Vico, Hamann, and Herder.<sup>3</sup> Although several of Pappe’s items come close to perceptions of time, and although Berlin says much about history and individuality, temporality is neither for Pappe nor for Berlin an item to highlight the difference between the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment. Yet temporality is a very strong benchmark for the distinction between the two; therefore, I want to focus on time.

To distinguish the time culture of the Enlightenment from that of the Counter-Enlightenment, we have to look at the perceptions of history and of temporality in the eighteenth century.<sup>4</sup> Although perceptions of time remain mostly hidden in historiography, sometimes a connection between history and temporality becomes visible. This is surely true for the so-called “philosophical history” of the eighteenth century. Especially with Kant, we find a relationship between his historical and his more natural assumptions about time, where “natural time” stands for the time of the sun, the moon, the month, and the year, and historical time for the universal development of humankind into progress. Chronology is something in between natural and historical time and maintains during the Enlightenment a rather mathematical character.

In *History and Theory* of December 2014 a forum was published on multiple temporalities. Helge Jordheim’s and Lucian Hölscher’s contributions to this discussion address time perceptions in the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. Jordheim perceives a need among European historians in the eighteenth century to synchronize “the experience of *Ungleichzeitigkeit* within and between cultures.”<sup>5</sup> Hölscher refers to the famous debate about time between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke in 1715 and 1716. He observes that the latter defends Newton’s view of time as being absolute, independent from all concrete objects in the world, whereas Leibniz advocates the

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<sup>3</sup>. There is a reason for this distinction in structure. The Counter-Enlightenment stems from the Enlightenment, thus several items are the same. Only in specific aspects do the two cultures differ. Therefore this article has the same difference in structure as the one between the entries of Pappe and Berlin in the *Dictionary*.

<sup>4</sup>. I do not make any distinction between time and temporality. Both terms refer to an experienced time as it is epitomized in the writings of philosophers and historians in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

<sup>5</sup>. Helge Jordheim, “Introduction: Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization,” *History and Theory* 53, no. 4 (2014), 514.

inverse thesis, that time cannot exist without the objects to which it belongs. Hölscher uses this debate to show that in historiography an “empty,” chronological time coexists with an “embodied” or “organic” time.<sup>6</sup>

With regard to Jordheim’s article, I want to show that synchronization has different meanings when we look at representatives of the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment. Concerning Hölscher’s article, I intend to use the qualification “empty” for the natural as well as the historical time of the Enlightenment, and the term “embodied” or “incarnated time” for the temporal notions of the Counter-Enlightenment and historicism. “Empty” and “incarnated” are used here in a nonpejorative sense, although I am aware that the term “empty” can be associated with the negative interpretation that historicist-oriented historians and philosophers gave to the historical view of the Enlightenment. However, I do not intend to follow in the footsteps of Meinecke, Auerbach, and Heidegger in the last century in their unfriendly interpretation of the Enlightenment.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, it is surely true that my views on the temporal aspects of the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment are determined in hindsight, as is the case with all historical studies.<sup>8</sup>

The historiography of the Counter-Enlightenment is to a large extent determined by Herder’s polemic against the philosophical history of the Enlightenment. Although we must not overstate the differences between Herder and the thinkers of the Enlightenment,<sup>9</sup> yet regarding historiography and temporality there is a real distinction. This becomes obvious in Herder’s *Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft* of 1799, in which he enters into controversy with his former teacher and tutor, Immanuel Kant.<sup>10</sup> Against Kant’s perceptions of time (see below), Herder defends a theory of multiple temporalities, and as Jordheim

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<sup>6</sup>. Lucian Hölscher, “Time Gardens: Historical Concepts in Modern Historiography,” *History and Theory* 53, no.4 (2014), 582-585.

<sup>7</sup>. See Jonathan Gorman, “Convergence to Agreement,” *History and Theory* 43, no. 1 (2004) 108-109.

<sup>8</sup>. In my “Time, Narrative, and Fiction: The Uneasy Relationship between Ricoeur and a Heterogeneous Temporality,” *History and Theory* 54, no. 1 (2015), 1-24, I am rather critical regarding the homogeneous temporality of historicism. I also can agree with the last sentence of Gorman’s article: “In this, perhaps we might well see ourselves as continuing the ‘Enlightenment project’.” Gorman, “Convergence to Agreement,” 116.

<sup>9</sup>. A. Wood, “Herder and Kant on History: Their Enlightenment Faith,” in *Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Merrihew Adams*, ed. L. Jorgensen and S. Newlands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), *passim*.

<sup>10</sup>. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Frankfurt and Leipzig: Hartknoch, 1799) <https://archive.org/details/einemetakritikz01herdgoog> (accessed December 12, 2015). The differences between Herder and Kant come from Kant’s later works. Herder was influenced by Kant’s precritical works, which are more naturalistic, pragmatist, empiricist, and anti-metaphysical. See John Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

rightly claims, “these times are ‘out of sync’ with one another.”<sup>11</sup> Moreover, Herder’s plurality of times is imbued with a plurality of ontologies, which makes his temporality what I would like to call, following Hölscher, “embodied” or to use my own term, “incarnated.”<sup>12</sup>

Hegel seems to “synchronize” these “incarnated times.” However, this synchronization is of a completely different nature than the one of the Enlightenment. One of the theses of this article will be that the synchronization of the incarnated times of the Counter-Enlightenment was realized by Hegel in his *Phenomenology of Mind*. Before I get there I want to take the following steps. First, I want to elaborate on the historiography of the Enlightenment, including Kant’s part in it. Second, I will try to show that behind Kant’s historiographical ideas, he has specific ideas about temporality, which fit in with a rather empty perception of historical time. Thus, I hope to have explained the empty historical temporality of the Enlightenment and the nature of its synchronization. Thereafter, I will set out the path of the incarnated time of the Counter-Enlightenment, following Isaiah Berlin’s route along Vico and Herder to Hegel. That is the route I want to travel in search of the new times of the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment.

#### THE NEW PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

In 1655 the Frenchman Isaac La Peyrère published his *Praeadamitae*, wherein he raised the hypothesis that people lived before Adam and that *Genesis* concerned only the origins of the Jewish people. Thus he introduced the possibility of two distinct chronologies: a biblical and a new one, the pre-Adamite. La Peyrère also believed that the chronologies of the Chaldeans and Chinese went further back than the Christian era. He claimed defiantly: “But as Geographers use to place Seas upon that place of the Globe, which they know not: so Chronologers, who are near of kin to them, use to blot out ages past, which they know not. They down those Countries which they know not: these with cruel pen kill the times they heard not of, and deny that which they know not.”<sup>13</sup>

Not only the pre-biblical parts of the Chinese calendar, but also fossils of fishes in mountains pointed in the direction of pre-biblical times. Around 1669 Robert Hooke argued that these fossils were “the greatest and most lasting mon-

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<sup>11</sup>. Jordheim, “Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization,” 513.

<sup>12</sup>.Hölscher, “Time Gardens,” 584; See also Jordheim, “Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization,” 512

<sup>13</sup>. Quoted in Paolo Rossi, *The Dark Abyss of Time: The History of the Earth and the History of Nations from Hooke to Vico* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 136. Hölscher also observed remarkable similarities between historiography and geography in the eighteenth century. He states: “The analogies of the disciplines [historiography and geography] in the episteme of the Enlightenment are striking. . . .” Hölscher, “Time Gardens,” 578.

uments of antiquity, which in all probability, will far antedate all the most ancient monuments of the world, even the very pyramids.”<sup>14</sup>

René Descartes designed a new history with regard to the origins of the solar system and the development of the earth. He also came to the conclusion that our globe was much older than the six thousand years of the biblical creation story. But he was prudent, fearing the punishment of the church. Therefore he began the first section of part IV of his *Principles of Philosophy* with the statement, that, although his hypothesis of the age of the globe was false, it must be retained, “to provide an explanation of the true natures of things.”<sup>15</sup> The increasing knowledge of pre-biblical ages and of cultures outside Europe led to theories of the development of the earth in the form of conjectures and hypotheses. Most philosophical historians tried to make these theories compatible with their biblical beliefs, but none of them succeeded completely.<sup>16</sup>

The new discoveries and the resulting contradiction between a biblically oriented and a secularly oriented history created problems with regard to chronology. As a consequence they laid the foundation not only for new chronologies, but also—and this is even more important—for a new philosophical history, developed especially in Scotland, France, and Germany. In the Scottish Enlightenment it was referred to as “conjectural history,” whereby it was allowed to fill in the unavoidable gaps in historical evidence by interpretation and speculation.<sup>17</sup> The French called a similar approach *histoire raisonnée* or *histoire philosophique*. The Germans spoke of *Weltgeschichte* (universal history). These “new histories” have several features in common, which can be summarized as anti-traditional perceptions of subjects, rationality, and horizon.<sup>18</sup> Instead of the traditional political and religious subjects, new items came to the fore as customs and habits, modes of production, civil society, and the position of women. Regarding rationality, the philosophical historians abjured the biblical base of explanation and exchanged it for explications based on human rationality. Maybe most important is extending the horizon in space and time. Traditional history displayed a European outlook, extended only to parts of the Middle East and

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<sup>14</sup>. An important part of this section is borrowed from Siep Stuurman, “Tijd en ruimte in de verlichting: De uitvinding van de filosofische geschiedenis,” in *De ongrijpbare tijd: Temporaliteit en de constructie van het verleden*, ed. Maria Grever and Harry Jansen (Hilversum: Verloren, 2001). 79-96, esp. 84.

<sup>15</sup>. René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, ed. Jonathan Bennett [1<sup>st</sup> ed. Latin: 1644, French: 1647] (2010–2015); part 4: The Earth, [page 58](http://tinyurl.com/j36ahug), <http://tinyurl.com/j36ahug> (accessed December 14, 2015).

<sup>16</sup>. Stuurman, “Tijd en ruimte in de verlichting,” 87.

<sup>17</sup>. Anthony Brewer, “Adam Smith’s Stages of History,” in *Discussion paper* number 08/601 (March 2008), 1, <http://tinyurl.com/nwrrou2> (accessed March 6, 2015).

<sup>18</sup>. Stuurman, “Tijd en ruimte in de verlichting,” 81-85.

northern Africa. Eighteenth-century philosophical history expanded its view to China, India, and America.

The new historical beliefs were universal in character, with stages of progress ending in Europe in the eighteenth century. This becomes clear in the conjectural history of Adam Smith and John Millar, in the French philosophical history of Nicolas de Condorcet, and in the German universal history of August Schlözer. In the fourth paragraph of the *Wealth of Nations*, Smith contrasts the living standards in “savage nations of hunters and fishers” with the standards of “civilized and thriving nations.”<sup>19</sup> Hence Smith distinguished four stages: 1. the age of hunters; 2. the age of shepherds; 3. the age of agriculture; and 4. the age of commerce.<sup>20</sup> Millar also listed four stages in the history of progress: the first is one of barbarism and matriarchy, the second pertains to a pastoral age, the third is the age of agriculture and of the useful arts and manufactures, and finally the stage of “great opulence and the culture of the elegant arts.”<sup>21</sup>

The most rounded illustration of the time perception of the Enlightenment was Condorcet’s posthumously published *Esquisse* of 1795.<sup>22</sup> Condorcet distinguished three stages in history. The first moves from primitivism to the development of language, the second runs from the use of language to the use of writing as it was done by the Greeks, and the third stage starts with the classical period and shows the broadening of culture until Condorcet’s own time. The last period is again partitioned into three stages, in which the first ends with the revival of science and the invention of printing, the second displays the throwing off of the yoke of authority in science, and the third opens with new inventions in mathematics and physics, including Condorcet’s own study in integral calculus.<sup>23</sup> Condorcet feels his own time to be the pinnacle of civilization. All peoples of the world live in the same upward proceeding time, but surely at different stages; Condorcet wants to survey its universal history in one, single sweep.

In Prussia, August Ludwig von Schlözer (1735–1809) wrote a *Universal History* (*Weltgeschichte*), which was meant to be a guide for education. Schlözer wanted to show those factors of the past that could still be perceived in the then present. Man had to keep factors in mind like lifestyle, climate, food, sovereigns, and priests, because “lifestyle determines, climate and nutrition create,

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<sup>19</sup>. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (Toronto: Random House, 2000), Introduction, 4.

<sup>20</sup>. Brewer, “Adam Smith’s Stages of History,” 2.

<sup>21</sup>. John Millar, *Observations concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society* (London: John Murray, 1773). See the Table Contents: xix-xxii.

<sup>22</sup>. Nicolas de Condorcet, *Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain* (1793–1794), ed. O. H. Prior; new ed. Yvon Belaval (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1970), <http://tinyurl.com/jh2wnpf> (accessed December 14, 2015).

<sup>23</sup>. Michael Bentley, *Modern Historiography: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 10-11.

sovereigns force, priests teach, and the examples inspire.”<sup>24</sup> He distinguished six eras in history: 1. A Primeval World (*Urwelt*), from the creation to the Flood, lasting 1600 years; 2. the Dark World (*Dunkle Welt*) from the Flood to the first written sources, especially Moses with the Ten Commandments (400 years); 3. the Preworld (*Vorwelt*) from Moses to the end of the Persian Empire (400 years); 4. the Old World (*Alte Welt*) up to the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 CE (800 years); 5. the Middle Ages (*Mittelalter*) up to the discovery of America in 1492 (800 years); 6. the New World (*Neue Welt*) up to the present.<sup>25</sup> Regarding the first era, in a footnote Schlözer indicated that he assumed that the earth could be older than the creation date of 3987 BC. So his ideas fit in with those of his French forerunners. The rounded numbers of the periods display the chronological and mathematical character of his periodization. It betokens the empty nature of his historical time. The same is true for the staged histories of Smith, Millar, and Condorcet.

#### “THE ROLLING WEB OF REALITY-SORTING EXPRESSIONS”

The worldview and historical belief system founded on biblical knowledge came to an end in the last quarter of the seventeenth century because of new discoveries that resulted in anomalies in what Jonathan Gorman, in the footsteps of W. V. O. Quine, has called a “web” of “beliefs, what expresses reality as a whole.”<sup>26</sup> The anomalies troubled men like Descartes, La Peyrère, and Schlözer. They needed to search for an alternative belief system that solved the inconsistencies of the old one. It was found in a universal history of stages, by which it was possible to sort history anew, consistent with the newly acquired information. The universal history of the Enlightenment is the result of a kind of paradigm shift, or better, what Gorman calls “the rolling web of *reality-sorting expressions*.”<sup>27</sup> For all historians “historical reality is, what we count it to be . . . ,” but this is all the more true for eighteenth-century philosophical historians.<sup>28</sup>

To cope with new discoveries concerning the age of the world, for consistency the web of reality-sorting expressions needed several adjustments. Although the changes were rather drastic, it does not mean that they overthrew the system as a

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<sup>24</sup>. “Die Lebensart bestimmt, Klima und Nahrungsart erschafft, der Herrscher zwingt, der Priester lehrt, und das Beispiel reisst fort.” August L. Schlözer, *Weltgeschichte nach ihren Haupttheilen im Auszug und Zusammenhänge* (Göttingen: 1792–1801), I, 66.

<sup>25</sup>. Schlözer, *Weltgeschichte*, 94–105.

<sup>26</sup>. Jonathan Gorman, “The Limits of Historiographical Choice in Temporal Distinctions,” in *Breaking up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past and Future*, ed. Chris Lorenz and Berber Bevernage (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 162.

<sup>27</sup>. *Ibid.*, 163.

<sup>28</sup>. *Ibid.*

whole. In its metaphysical aspects the new web showed remarkable conformity with the old one. Especially in its staging character, the heavenly city of eighteenth-century philosophers did not differ fundamentally from Augustine's *Civitas Dei* and other earlier Christian philosophers. From a historiographical point of view, Carl Becker is still right.<sup>29</sup> The bible-founded history with its main stages of the Old and New Testament and recently also with pre-Adamite time, became paradigmatic for a new staging of history. As a result, the new sequences of stages were as pre-designed as the old ones. The only difference was that every historian and philosopher of the eighteenth-century now was designing his own series of stages. However, as with the old stages, the newly designed ones were superimposed on what people knew of the history of their world. It is a preordained history with an *a priori* form of time perception. The historical time of the Enlightenment is the empty time of progress, only epitomized in chronology and stages.

#### SYNCHRONIZATION

As a consequence of the extending horizon of time and space, European historians were confronted with the noncoevalness of new discoveries with biblical- and classical-oriented European history, thus synchronizing temporalities became urgent. Moreover, all the distinct "conjectural" and philosophical histories, with their own stages of time, intensified the problem of the multiplicity of temporalities. Helge Jordheim observes this problem in his "Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization." He points to the French *Encyclopédie* by Diderot and d'Alembert, which struggled with continuous new information in the eighteenth century and the multiple temporalities connected with it. The *Encyclopédie*, according to Jordheim, faced the task of "synchronization to bring all temporalities into sync with one another."<sup>30</sup> Jordheim also mentions the work of Johann Christoph Gatterer and his *Einleitung in die synchronische Universalgeschichte* (1771), wherein Gatterer addresses the problem of universal history. According to Jord-

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<sup>29</sup>. Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932). According to Becker, eighteenth-century philosophers wanted to make a sharp division between their present and earlier, medieval and, according to them, dark, superstitious times. Becker, however, states ironically that eighteenth-century philosophers were far more in tune with the philosophies and ideas they so strongly attacked. Twenty-five years after Becker published his book, Peter Gay condemned Becker's "reckless wordplay" and "indefensible generalizations." Gay saw Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, and Helvetius essentially as unbelievers. See Peter Gay, "Carl Becker's Heavenly City," *Political Science Quarterly* 72, no. 2 (1957), 182-199, <http://tinyurl.com/zldqacy> and Jamie Harrison, "On 'Eighteenth-Century Philosophers,'" <http://tinyurl.com/za7wful> (accessed October 14, 2015). In the light of Jonathan Israel's dichotomy between the Radical Enlightenment and the more moderate and deist Enlightenment after 1730, Becker's thesis has received more credibility. Anyway, Becker's book underlines a time culture of Enlightenment in which linear and metaphysical elements dominate.

<sup>30</sup>. Jordheim, "Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization," 515.



heim, Gatterer claims that “the historian needs to take account of what occurs in different places in the world at the same time,” notwithstanding the fact that he also had to “give an account of only one single diachronic narrative.”<sup>31</sup> For such a narrative, synchronization of the multiple times of cultures is needed. In another study, *Vom historischen Plan und der darauf sich gründenden Zusammenhang der Erzählungen* (1767, *On the Design of History and How it is Related to the Coherence of its Stories*), Gatterer designed rules of synchronicity. Despite several frantic attempts, Gatterer’s endeavor to systematize universal history completely failed. His *Einleitung* remained a hodge-podge of chronologies, themes, schemes, and regions.<sup>32</sup>

The synchronization of multiple times in the Enlightenment concerns not only historical times, but also what Koselleck has called “natural time.” He means by this the time of the clock, of the calendar, of chronology, of dynasties and of eras.<sup>33</sup> Jordheim does not want to make a distinction between natural and historical times. “Neither in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the modern temporal regime emerged, nor at the present, at the moment of its collapse, can we find any similar, clear-cut distinction between natural and historical times.”<sup>34</sup> I think he is right: the times of the Enlightenment are natural as well as historical. But this does not mean that inside historical time we do not have to distinguish among the natural, the chronological, and the staging aspects of time. These different features are important. In the Enlightenment, as we will see with Kant, the natural, chronological, and historical aspects of time are from a philosophical point of view not only perceived as distinct, but also as influencing one another. In the Counter-Enlightenment natural and historical time coincide as well, although chronology becomes then the less relevant part of historical time; it fades away in the historical time of becoming.

The narrow connection between natural and chronological time, on the one hand, and its staging aspects, on the other, does not make the historical time of the Enlightenment less empty. Its emptiness pertains to the fact that the stages evolve in an empty shell of a natural and chronological time. The stages are not diachronically linked to each other; they move *in* not *through* time. During the

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<sup>31</sup>. *Ibid.* Koselleck ascribes to Gatterer a past with different truths, and he adds to this that it “showed how the past could retrospectively be seen anew.” Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 249. I do not think that Gatterer’s schemes and chronologies had much to do with differences in truths of (perceived) past realities. His work was new only with regard to his attempts at synchronization.

<sup>32</sup>. Martin Gierl, *Geschichte als präzisierte Wissenschaft: Johann, Christoph Gatterer und die Historiographie des 18. Jahrhunderts im ganzen Umfang* (Stuttgart: Frohmann-Holzboog Verlag, 2012).

<sup>33</sup>. Reinhart Koselleck, “Über die Geschichtsbedürftigkeit der Geschichtswissenschaft,” in Koselleck, *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik* [1972] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 303.

<sup>34</sup>. Jordheim, “Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization,” 511.

Enlightenment, time is only the medium in which historical events occur. This also means that in the Enlightenment's philosophical history, the past has no organic relationship with the present. There only is a made-up connection, in the form of a preordained path of stages, along which humankind moves into enlightenment. In the Counter-Enlightenment, as we will see, time is incarnated in the historical events themselves.

Nonetheless, the historical time of progress is related to chronology because the historians of the Enlightenment connected the temporality of progress with universal history.<sup>35</sup> They wanted to know how far other countries and nations had progressed on their way to the stage of civilization already reached by France, England, and Prussia. It means that in the Enlightenment much attention is paid to the problem of chronological noncoevalness among cultures, nations, and so on and the work of synchronization.<sup>36</sup> As a consequence, I agree with Koselleck's paraphrase of Kant: "So far history has conformed to chronology. Now it is about making chronology conform to history."<sup>37</sup> I regard Hölscher's "empty" time as a chronologically based historical time, compatible with Kant's statement. When Jordheim discusses eighteenth-century synchronization, it is a synchronization of this empty time.<sup>38</sup> Kant is all the more important here because his historical, "empty" temporality is founded on a natural time that underlines its "emptiness." Before we come to that, we have first to investigate whether Kant can be seen as a philosophical historian.

#### KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY

Can Kant be perceived as a representative of the above-mentioned philosophical history? At first sight, the answer can be positive: Kant himself used the term "philosophical history" and had a teleological view of it, in which humankind is on the way to more *Humanität* for which reason is the protagonist.<sup>39</sup> On second sight, however, there may be some doubts because Kant's "regulative principle"

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<sup>35</sup>. *Ibid.*, 510-512.

<sup>36</sup>. *Ibid.*, 514.

<sup>37</sup>. Quoted in *ibid.*, 510.

<sup>38</sup>. *Ibid.*, 514.

<sup>39</sup>. Kant used the term "philosophical history" in the eighth thesis of his *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, transl. Lewis White Beck [1784] (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963): "That I would want to displace the work of practicing empirical historians with this Idea of world history, which is to some extent based upon an *a priori* principle, would be a misinterpretation of my intention. It is only a suggestion of what a philosophical mind . . . could essay from another point of view. . . . To consider this, so as to direct the ambitions of sovereigns and their agents to the only means by which their fame can be spread to later ages: this can be a minor motive for attempting such a *philosophical history*" (my italics). The theses do not refer to pages.

turns his philosophical “history” into something completely philosophical, without being historical. Pauline Kleingeld has reflected on this problem and observes two critical items.<sup>40</sup> First, she deals with Kant’s notion of moral progress as incompatible with his claim that the moral law is unconditional and as such universally valid. Progress or even change seems, therefore, to be redundant. Second, there is seemingly an incompatibility between progress in “moralization” and Kant’s idea that moral agency is atemporal.<sup>41</sup> Kleingeld shows convincingly that both inconsistencies rest on an insufficient understanding of Kant’s philosophical history of rational development.

Kleingeld solves the problem of universal validity by first observing that not reason and morality, but their corresponding predispositions, develop. In the *Idea of Universal History* Kant argues that man in his earliest stages of development only has an “uncultivated predisposition for moral discernment,” not one that fundamentally *differed* from his original, universal reason and morality. Hence Kleingeld asserts that Kant in his “Conjectural Beginnings of Human History” similarly claims that at the beginning of history, “humans understood, ‘although only dimly,’ that they ought to regard their fellow humans as ends.”<sup>42</sup> Thus, from the beginning of time man had a moral nature, but he did not understand completely all its implications. Kant’s history of progress is a history of humans’ better understanding of their own potentialities.

Kleingeld has also resolved the contrast between Kant’s increasing moralization and atemporality. Atemporality means that every generation is born with the same faculties for moral agency. But better understanding of its moral potentialities would imply that later generations enter the world with more highly developed preconditions and thus with better-developed faculties to recognize and obey moral standards. This improvement is against the atemporal character of moral agency. Kleingeld, however, argues that, according to Kant, “every generation . . . must again move through the entire distance which generations before had already covered.”<sup>43</sup> The development of man’s rational faculties is a learning process, which starts anew every time. Kleingeld: “For Kant, unlike Hegel, it is not morality, which needs to go through a historical process, but our understanding of it.”<sup>44</sup> So we may conclude that although some thinkers esteemed a real philosophical history inconsistent with Kant’s *a priori* principles, we can say, following in Kleingeld’s footsteps, that Kant had a genuine philo-

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<sup>40</sup>. Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 16, no. 1 (1999), 59-78.

<sup>41</sup>. *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>42</sup>. *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>43</sup>. *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>44</sup>. *Ibid.*, 69. See, for Hegel, the applicable section below.

sophical history.

Kant labeled his teleology of progress as not *proven*, but as *confirmed* by displaying a “constant growth in civil liberty” (Idea VIII, 27) and a “regular process of constitutional improvement in our part of the world” (Idea VIII, 29).<sup>45</sup> In the same way that the English historians saw the Glorious Revolution as the pinnacle of constitutional improvement (Gibbon<sup>46</sup>) and the French boasted the cultural achievements during the reign of Louis XIV (Voltaire<sup>47</sup>), Kant saw Frederick the Great as the first monarch who “emancipated the human race from tutelage.”<sup>48</sup> This leads not only to the idea that Kant was a real philosophical historian, but also that the philosophical historians saw their own countries as being in the vanguard of civilization.

Although, following Kleingeld, we can see Kant as a representative of a genuine philosophical history, because change is possible in time he remains a historian with an *a priori* perception of human nature and reason. As a consequence of the identity of nature and reason over time, and because time is a category of reason (see the next section), time remains the same; it remains the empty shell in which change can take place. This becomes all the more obvious in Kant’s idea that we can learn from history, an idea that was very strongly present in the Enlightenment. It points at a perception of time in which the past is not fundamentally different from the present, because people in the present can learn from it. Kant’s philosophical history still belongs to the domain of the *historia magistra vitae*. Although progress is already completely in the picture, the past is not yet estranged from the present.<sup>49</sup> Kant used to practice a real philosophical history of progress, but his historical time is as empty as the temporalities of the above-mentioned philosophical historians of the Enlightenment. This is all the

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<sup>45</sup>. Idea VIII, 27 and 29 are from: I. Kant, *Idea for a Universal History*. No page reference.

<sup>46</sup>. Behind Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–1788) is the idea that freedom is “the guarantor of civic health . . . and its denial the harbinger of social sclerosis.” Gibbon’s “freedom” implicitly refers to the constitutional settlement after the Glorious Revolution, on which the whole historiography of English Enlightenment rested. Gibbon chastized the Romans for having lost a liberty once won by Trajan and the Antonines. By that he wants to give a warning to his contemporaneous compatriots not to make the same mistake as the Romans, by frittering away the English liberty won by the Revolution of 1688–89.

<sup>47</sup>. [François Marie Arouet de] Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV* [1751] (Paris: Charpentier et Cie, Libraires-éditeurs, 1874). <http://tinyurl.com/puo2f6v> (accessed October 20, 2015).

<sup>48</sup>. Kleingeld, “Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development,” 61.

<sup>49</sup>. John Zammito has highlighted Koselleck’s idea that progress estranged present and future from the past. John Zammito, “Koselleck’s Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of History,” *History and Theory* 43, no. 1 (2004), 127. I do not think Koselleck is right. Not progress but an incarnated time estranged the present from the past, which, however, does not mean that we need to see the relationship between past and present as a total rupture. Past and present do not relate to each other in the form of shifts between paradigms or epistemes. See also Zammito, “Koselleck’s Philosophy of Historical Time(s),” 133, and the section below about the Counter-Enlightenment.

more true because Kant's empty historical time is supported by a natural perception of time, which also can be called "empty." I will show this in the next section.

#### KANT'S "EMPTY," NATURAL TEMPORALITY

Philosophical history is a preordained history, built more on hypotheses than on proofs or confirmations. From Descartes to Kant, history is hypothetical, and therefore it is called "conjectural," "philosophical," and "empty." Kant's natural temporality is consistent with this kind of history and thus is afflicted with the same emptiness. This is what I want to show below.

Kant's temporality has two functions: first, a conditioning function for objective appearances; and second, a mediating function in order to connect phenomena in the world with pure concepts.<sup>50</sup> Everything is experienced in time, thus time as condition is most important, and moreover, in its mediating function time is as empty as in its conditioning function. As a consequence, I will leave out Kant's mediating function of time and deal only with Kant's time in its conditioning function.<sup>51</sup>

Time as condition has an objective and a subjective aspect. The subjective aspect of Kant's time consists in its form of intuition, in being a so-called "*Anschauungsform*." As such it is a form of the mind and thus nonexistent outside the human subject.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, as a form of intuition, time does not change, but change is something that exists in time.<sup>53</sup> So, time seems to be an *a priori* concept of the mind without any connection to what Kant used to call the phenomenal world. However, he also claims that time cannot exist without our (temporal) experiences. In Kant's words: "we can cognize of things *a priori* only what we ourselves have put into them."<sup>54</sup> About this objective aspect Kant states: "[Time

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<sup>50</sup>. "Daher wird eine Anwendung der Kategorie auf Erscheinungen möglich sein vermittelt der transcendentalen Zeitbestimmung, welche, als das Schema der Verstandsbegriffe, die Subsumtion der letzteren unter die erste vermittelt." Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. (Reissued by Theodor Valentiner, 11<sup>th</sup> ed.; Der Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 37 (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meier, 1917), B 178 (83) <https://archive.org/details/kritikderreinenv19kant> (accessed October 24, 2015). B stands for the second edition of the *Kritik* (1787), where A stands for the first edition (1781).

<sup>51</sup>. Elsewhere I intend to show that Kant's time in its mediating function is as empty as his time as condition. Elaborating on Kant's mediating time would exceed the limits of this text.

<sup>52</sup>. "Die Zeit ist also lediglich eine subjektive Bedingung unserer (menschlichen) Anschauung . . . und an sich, ausser dem Subjekte, nichts." Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 51 (90). See also J. J. A. Mooij, *Tijd en geest: Een geschiedenis* (Kampen: Agora, 2001), 167. Most commentators have found Kant's claim ([or attributed claim](#)) that space and time are only in the mind, not at all in the mind-independent world, to be implausible.

<sup>53</sup>. "Die Zeit verläuft sich nicht, sondern in ihr verläuft sich das Dasein des Wandelbaren." Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 183 (187). See also Mooij, *Tijd en geest*, 167.

<sup>54</sup>. "was wir als die veränderte Methode der Denkgungsart annehmen, dass wir nämlich von den

is] in respect of all phenomena, and therefore of all things that can happen to us in experience, necessarily objective.”<sup>55</sup> So, Kant wants to reconcile objective and subjective time, but this leaves him with an important problem.

There must be an experience of time that fits in with an unmoving form of intuition in the mind. Following Heidegger, I think we must search for such an unmoved experience in the endlessly repeating and therefore continuing “now.”<sup>56</sup> Heidegger touches here upon an aspect of time that has occupied several philosophers. From Aristotle and the patriarch Augustine in antiquity to the French philosopher Henri Bergson at the beginning of the twentieth century, many thinkers have racked their brains over the idea that the three elements of time, namely past, present, and future, are fleeting.<sup>57</sup> They all realized that the past no longer exists, the future is not yet here, and the present is slipping away so quickly that it is almost impossible to grasp. Nevertheless, they clung to the “now” as a reference point for the existence of time. Heidegger sees Kant’s experienced “now-time” as the phenomenal side of his temporality. For Kant, as Heidegger sees it, the “now” is the enduring phenomenon in which causality and, as a consequence, change evolve as a form of succession.<sup>58</sup> As a continuing “now,” time is for Kant “das Unwandelbare im Dasein” (the unchangeable in existence) in which change becomes observable.<sup>59</sup> The continuing “now” is in agreement with Kant’s Newtonian idea that time is absolute. It implies that past and future have only a phenomenological status, as far as they can be identified as a past and future “now.”

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Dingen nur das a priori erkennen, was wir selbst in sie legen.” Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B xviii (29).

<sup>55</sup>. “in Ansehung aller Erscheinungen, mithin auch aller Dinge, die uns in der Erfahrung vorkommen können, notwendigerweise objektiv.” Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 51 (90).

<sup>56</sup>. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 183 (187). Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1991) 101; Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* [1927] (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986), §81. Sometimes for this “continuing now,” the Latin expression “nunc stans” is used. Because “nunc stans” can also refer to an embodied continuing now, I want to leave out this term here.

<sup>57</sup>. See for Aristotle, *The Works of Aristotle II, Physics*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1947), 219b and 220a; for Augustine, *Confessions*, transl. EB. Pusey, XI, 14.17, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3296/3296.txt> (accessed November 17, 2014); and for Henri Bergson: *Matter and Memory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1911), 193.

<sup>58</sup>. “Das Schema der Ursache und der Kausalität eines Dinges überhaupt ist das Reale, worauf, wenn es nach Belieben gesetzt wird, jederzeit etwas anderes folgt. Es besteht also in der Sukzession des Mannigfaltigen, insofern sie einer Regel unterworfen ist.” (“The scheme of cause and causality of a thing is after all the real, upon which, if it is set at will, at any time something else follows. It [the scheme of causality H.J.] exists in the succession of the manifold, insofar as it is subject to a rule” (my translation). Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 183 (187).

<sup>59</sup>. The “unchangeable in existence” is the opposite of “endurance in change,” an expression used by Herder (see below).

Kant's empty natural time has consequences for his historical time. Above we saw that Kant's historical time is empty because of its preordained character. This preordained emptiness must be supplemented with the thought that the past is of interest for the present only in its quality of a "past now." Or to put it otherwise, the past is relevant for the present only with regard to its "now" aspects. There is no difference in identity between the present (as present-nows) and the past (as past-nows). Because the past-nows have the same identity as the present-nows, Kant thought, people can learn from the past. Hence Kant's philosophical history is present-oriented. His perception of phenomenological time as only a sequence of fleeting, instantaneous "nows" is paradigmatic for the philosophical history of the Enlightenment. It leads to a form of history-writing that had no intention of knowing what kind of influence the past may have had on the present; the discipline of history had only to show what stage of morality, of humanity (*Humanität*), and of culture humankind had reached. As a consequence the past was not seen as ontologically linked with the present, and the present was not perceived as a product of the past. Because history is most of all a learning process, historiography was pragmatic in the sense that it could teach people by example. Like Kant, the historians of the Enlightenment imputed only a moral function to historiography, to show the good, and most of all the reasonable, events and developments in the past and to condemn the bad ones.

#### THE COUNTER-ENLIGHTENMENT

The Counter-Enlightenment does not follow upon the Enlightenment but develops cheek by jowl. It differs in several aspects from the Enlightenment, but surely not in all.<sup>60</sup> Allen Wood even claims regarding Johann Gottfried Herder, one of the most outspoken representatives of the Counter-Enlightenment, that "while acknowledging the equally plain fact that when the chips are down, he is himself a part of it [the Enlightenment]."<sup>61</sup> Representatives of the Counter-Enlightenment were philosophical historians not very different from those of the Enlightenment. They all wanted a new history, most of the time even a history of progress, with a past the present could learn from. Thus, although the Counter-Enlightenment is a criticism of the Enlightenment, it is a criticism from inside. In my view the biggest distinction between the philosophical history of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment is the growing unease in the Counter-Enlightenment with the Enlightenment's empty time. An alternative came up only gradually, which I would like to call, in Hölscher's words, an embodied time, or to use my own term, an "incarnated" time.

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<sup>60</sup>. Allen Wood, *The Free Development of Each: Studies on Freedom, Right and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 123.

<sup>61</sup>. *Ibid.*

As a consequence of incarnation, “learning from the past” received a different connotation in the Counter-Enlightenment. It did not mean that the past had the same now-identity as the present. The past came to be seen more and more as different from the present.<sup>62</sup> However, this perception of a difference between past and present was accompanied by the idea that the present was in one way or another a result of the past. Studying the developments of the past could improve acting in the present.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, the idea of differences between past and present and the idea that the present is a result of the past are two sides of the same coin. It is the coin of a growing awareness of an incarnated time. Events no longer happened *in* time, but *through* time. Only with Herder did this time receive its almost complete form, which implies that, for instance, Leibniz and Vico (two representatives of the Counter-Enlightenment I will discuss below) were not yet as far as Herder. Hegel went still further than Herder by his incarnation of the Idea in historical reality. Thus, when I speak below of historicism and historicist time, I refer to Hegel’s incarnated time.

#### THE CLARKE/NEWTON AND LEIBNIZ DEBATE (1715–1716)

Isaac Newton (1643–1724), as we know, saw time as absolute and independent of real objects; it was only an instrument for measurement. Leibniz (1646–1716), in his discussion with Newton’s disciple Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), called time the order of things that follow one another and distinguished it from space, which he perceived as the order of things existing at one and the same moment. Leibniz identified time and change and stated that time exists in things: “I have demonstrated that Time, without things is nothing else but a mere ideal Possibility.”<sup>64</sup> Leibniz gave time a first organic propensity, namely an existence in the form of a relationship. Time exists in its capacity “to create sequences”

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<sup>62</sup>. Collingwood in the footsteps of Hegel asserted the same: “that different periods in history are really different—not only chronologically, but different in their fundamental characteristics.” See Jan van der Dussen, *History as a Science: Collingwood’s Philosophy of History*, (PhD diss., Leiden: Krips Repro Meppel, 1980), 456.

<sup>63</sup>. There is a big difference between the pragmatism of the Enlightenment, which works by historical examples, and the “pragmatism” of historicism. Ranke, for instance, wants to show the present as a product of past developments by giving the Idea of it. The Idea is a principle of life from which politicians could learn and by learning could develop it further. As Ranke states: “Demnach ist es der Aufgabe der Historie, das Wesen des Staates aus der Reihe der früheren Begebenheiten darzuthun und dasselbe zum Erkenntniss zu bringen, die der Politik aber nach erfolgtem Verständnis und gewonnener Erkenntniss es weiter zu entwickeln und zu vollenden.” Leopold von Ranke, “Über die Verwandtschaft und den Unterschied der Historie und der Politik,” in Ranke, *Sämmtliche Werke*, (Leipzig, 1872), XXIV, 288. The historians of the Enlightenment did not want to give an Idea or trend, only examples of more or less greater statesmen, or better or worse behavior. I would like to thank Reinbert Krol for this reference.

<sup>64</sup>. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Fifth Paper,” in Samuel Clarke, *A Collection of Papers, Which passed between the late learned Mr. Leibniz and Dr. Clarke, in the Years 1715 and 1716* (London: 1717), number 55, <http://tinyurl.com/gnv759a> (accessed November 18, 2015).



and as such it gives historical objects extension and inner coherence. According to Hölscher, Leibniz assumed time to be “embodied” and “organic.” As such, time exists as a sequence of events that have something in common, whereby a relationship is created. Hölscher speaks of a “spirit” connecting events that have no direct effect on one another.<sup>65</sup> Leibniz’s monadology is not far from this idea. In his *Monadology* of 1714, he states: “And every momentary state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its ‘immediately’ preceding one, so that its present is pregnant with the future.”<sup>66</sup> Indeed, a state as a “natural consequence of a preceding state” and an expression such as “pregnant with its future” points at an organic relationship. However, I wonder whether this can be seen as a definitive step in the direction of time as being embodied and organic.

I think Hölscher’s conclusion has been drawn too quickly. First, Leibniz’s “substance” in the above quote can be a “now” in the Kantian sense, while a past “now” is only an example to learn from. As such this “past-now” can be “pregnant” with the future. Second, Hölscher also argues that Leibniz’s relationship among past, present, and future fits in with his idea that these three temporalities are an order of things, not related in an empirical but in a spiritual sense by a *Zeitgeist*, a spirit of time.<sup>67</sup> With Hegel the *Zeitgeist* has an organic connotation (see below), but is that already the case with Leibniz? The German term “Zeitgeist” arises, according to Hölscher himself, only in the second half of the eighteenth century.<sup>68</sup> Third, Hölscher points out with regard to Leibniz’s vision “that all parts of the historical universe are related to one another in perfect harmony.”<sup>69</sup> This means a preordained connection and not a *contingent* relationship between events and entities in historical reality. Fourth, it is not very difficult to undo Leibniz’s “creating sequences” from their possible ontological status and replace them in the human mind. In that case we are close to Kant’s causality as a category of the mind and as a consequence not far from his empty perception of time. Moreover, and this is my fifth point, it takes a whole story on historical temporality to perceive its complete and real, incarnated status.<sup>70</sup> Maybe Leib-

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<sup>65</sup>.Hölscher, “Time Gardens,” 586. See also Lucian Hölscher, “Mysteries of Historical Order: Ruptures, Simultaneity and the Relationship of the Past, Present and Future,” in Lorenz and ,Bevernage, eds*Breaking up Time*, 134-151, esp. 141-143.

<sup>66</sup>. G. W. Leibniz, *The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology*, ed. Jonathan Bennett, last amended 2007), principle 22. <http://philpapers.org/rec/LEITPO-2> (accessed December 14, 2015).

<sup>67</sup>.Hölscher, “Mysteries of Historical Order,” 141

<sup>68</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup>.Hölscher, “Time Gardens,” 585. See also Hölscher, “Mysteries of Historical Order,” 141. He refers here to §61 of Leibniz’s *Monadology*, in which an interconnection of things in reality is asserted. Nevertheless, it is a connection of souls and moreover preordained, thus not far from a connection *a priori*.

<sup>70</sup>. Isaiah Berlin sees Leibniz as a historian of the Enlightenment, not of the Counter-Enlightenment, because his perception of history was nothing other than “satisfying curiosity about

niz's remark is a tiny beginning on a long path toward a really "embodied" time. It is the story of what Isaiah Berlin called the Counter-Enlightenment, and that story I am now going to tell. It starts with Vico.

#### VICO

It is not by accident that the Napolitano Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) called his study of the philosophy of history *Scienza Nuova* (1725–1744). *New Science* means better than past science and as such it is an utterance of the ascending temporality of Enlightenment. However, it differs from it in not being a new glorification of the "natural" sciences initiated by Newton. On the contrary, the *Scienza Nuova* contains a passage that seems to be against the spirit of the Enlightenment and its adoration of the sciences:

a truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which, since men had made it, men could hope to know.<sup>71</sup>

Truth can be acquired, according to the minds of the Enlightenment, along three lines of knowledge. First, we distinguish metaphysical or theological knowledge obtained by rational intuition, faith, or revelation; second is deductive knowledge, as in logic, grammar, or mathematics; and third, perceptual knowledge based on empirical observation as in the natural sciences. Vico claims the discovery of a fourth type, namely knowledge of social activities of which we ourselves are the authors. The other three types of knowledge are based on an observer's point of view looking at the outside of things. Vico underlines a participant's point of view, looking at the world from the inside, that is, from the motives and purposes of all those who participate in social life. Here Vico is the first to stress an *understanding* approach to reality; it seems identical with the "*Verstehende*" method of historicism. Thus, with this idea Vico attacked the so-called new science of the Newtonians and thus became the first philosopher to create a dichotomy between the natural and the cultural sciences.

However, notwithstanding novelties, Vico maintained aspects of the Enlightenment in his thought about time and history. He had an optimistic view of the possibility of knowing the past, and he presented his "science" as new, which

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origins, disclosing the uniformity of nature, doing justice to men of worth, offering support to Revelation, and teaching useful lessons by means of examples." Isaiah Berlin, *Two Studies in the History of Ideas* (New York: Random House, 1977), 142.

<sup>71</sup>. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico* (1744), transl. Thomas Bergin and Harold Fisch (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1948), [section III, 331], 85.

displays an enlightened, future-oriented vision of the world. Moreover, man was next to God as co-creator of the world and could in principle discover the truth about it, a statement that matches the Enlightenment's optimism as well. Furthermore, the manmade world must be rediscovered according to Vico "within the modifications of our own human mind." Although this is a reflection about the social world, it seems to be more about intelligibility than about existence.<sup>72</sup> It does not directly point at an incarnated time.

Eelco Runia, however, has pointed at precisely such an "existential" aspect of Vico's *New Science*. According to Vico, as Runia sees it, people participate in social life by and in "institutions" ("cose" or "things"), which is important for Vico's time perception. Institutions are "things" from the past in the present, giving the past "presence" in the present. Hence they are "repositories of time," or as Runia states, "places where history can get a hold on you."<sup>73</sup> "Things" of the past are, in addition to places, also "topics." As places, "anybody can visit" them, as "topics" men as "walkers may 'invent' their contents in order to experience 'presence'."<sup>74</sup>

Berlin observes something else. Humans can understand their history because of their faculty of language, which enables them to reconstruct the vocabularies of past civilizations and thus to understand their realities. Here lies a big difference between Berlin, on the one hand, and Runia, on the other. Berlin underscores human beings' capacity to understand the past, whereas Runia underlines the transfer of the past into "presence" and hence the possibility of experiencing it in a rather direct way.<sup>75</sup> Yet both authors presuppose in Vico's *New Science* an incarnated time, although Runia is the most outspoken on this issue. He states that Vico's institutions, "things," topics, or places are "not empty but full, not shallow but deep, not dead but alive."<sup>76</sup> Thus, with Vico institutions are not only repositories of time, they *are* time, incarnated time!

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<sup>72</sup>. Berlin's interpretation has made Vico a direct forerunner of historicism. He saw Vico's staging of history not only as a "pursuit of an intelligible purpose," which can still be seen as an epistemological issue, but also as an "effort to understand himself and the world, and to realize his capacities in it." Berlin, *Vico and Herder*, 32-35.

<sup>73</sup>. Eelco Runia, "Presence," *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (2006), 1-29, esp. 13.

<sup>74</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup>. It is remarkable that with regard to historicism, Croce and Meinecke seem to be aware of a similar difference. Croce defended, in Meinecke's eyes, an epistemological form of historicism in which logical categories regarding individuality— as for instance the individual as a person of action, led by reason—make it possible to understand historical humans in different periods of the development of humankind. Meinecke himself adhered to historicism as a principle of life ("eine neue Schau menschlichen Lebens überhaupt"), wherein individual phenomena are inapprehensible and irrational. See R. A. Krol, "Het geweten van Duitsland: Friedrich Meinecke als pleitbezorger van het Duitse historisme," (PhD. Diss., Groningen, 2013), 140.

<sup>76</sup>. Runia, "Presence," 13.

Berlin adds another historicist aspect to Vico's time perception: his view of history as a movement of rise, growth, decline, and fall. "Our Science therefore comes to describe at the same time an ideal eternal history traversed in time by the history of every nation in its rise, progress, maturity, decline and fall."<sup>77</sup> Berlin perceives this as the *idée maîtresse*, the main theme, of Vico's view of history.<sup>78</sup> Indeed, it seems at first sight to be a very historicist perception of time, especially when we consider Steven Smith's quote of Ranke's appeal for history: "What could be more pleasant and more welcome to human understanding than to . . . observe in one nation or another how men's enterprises begin, increase in power, rise and decline."<sup>79</sup> However, Berlin observes too that Vico adds to this "ideal eternal history" that it is "the single, universal pattern which all societies, in their rise and fall, are bound sooner or later to fulfil."<sup>80</sup> This is a remarkable utterance because it brings Vico back to a nonhistoricist way of thinking. The "ideal eternal history" seems to be a category of the mind whereby we can know the time pattern of history. On the one hand, it differs from Kant's category of time as an "eternal Now," but on the other hand, it remains an *a priori* category. Although Berlin perceives this *storia ideale eterna* more as a Platonic than as a Kantian time pattern, he also claims that it is a principle, knowable *a priori*.<sup>81</sup> Vico's ideas about time are still in between the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment.

#### HERDER

In his *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit* (*This Too a Philosophy of History*), published in 1774, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) condemns the rationality, anti-traditionality, and the universal horizon of Enlightenment historiography. He praises tradition in the form of the virtues of past times, whether the patriarchal religion of the Orient, the patriotism of Greece and Rome, and last but not least the hegemony of Christianity over all spheres of life in the Middle Ages. He opposes the criticism of enlight-

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<sup>77</sup>. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, 93 [Book I, 349].

<sup>78</sup>. Quoted from Berlin, *Vico and Herder*, 64.

<sup>79</sup>. Steven Smith, "Historical Meaningfulness in Shared Action," *History and Theory* 48, no. 1 (2009) 1-19, esp. 2, note 2. Another statement by Ranke has the same connotation: "They [states and nations as continuing *entities*] unfold, capture the world, appear in manifold expressions, dispute with, and check and overpower one another. In their intersection and succession, in their life, in their decline and rejuvenation, which then encompasses an ever greater fullness, higher importance, and wider extent, lies the secret of world history." Leopold von Ranke, *Die grossen Mächte*, Kapitel 7: <http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/-3017/7> (accessed November 29, 2015).

<sup>80</sup>. Berlin, *Vico and Herder*, 65.

<sup>81</sup>. *Ibid.*, 113. Moreover, he also refers on the same page to Pythagorean, neo-Platonic, and Renaissance roots.

ened thinkers regarding primitive cultures. Herder argued that ancient languages, such as those of Homer and the Bible, were more poetic than modern languages, which had become too intellectualized, too rule-governed, too cut off from everyday life. Herder's essay sketches the Enlightenment as an era of philosophy, of abstract intellect, and he loathed its superficiality, artificiality, and its mechanical way of thinking. He perceived it as an age of skepticism, of religious unbelief, and of abstract cosmopolitanism, looking down from the supposed height of its philosophical wisdom on all earlier ages, regarding itself as the final goal of human history.

Herder perceived progress as *Bildung* because he saw all kinds of individualities develop from childhood to maturity. This fits with Kant's view of history as a learning process. But Kant saw this learning process as recurring in every individual while being an all-embracing process to a better world, whereas Herder perceived it as a unique learning process, enabling not only individual persons, but also peoples, nations, cultures, countries, and other continuing entities to search their own way into adulthood.<sup>82</sup> It is, as we will see later on, a phylogenesis in accordance with an ontogenesis, which leads to a completely different form of synchronization.

Herder's perception of *Bildung* as an individual process into maturity marks a sharper watershed between the time culture of the Enlightenment and the time culture of the Counter-Enlightenment. First of all there is a difference in the perception of culture. In the Enlightenment, cultures were seen only as epistemological instruments or as a kind of colligatory concept to reflect pragmatically on the past. Herder saw those cultures and the change from one into the other as what Michael Bentley very aptly called "a crucial feature of how the world worked."<sup>83</sup> Herder underlined the individuality of each culture, equating it with nation: "Every nation is one people, having its own national form, as well as its own language: the climate, it is true stamps on each its mark, or spreads over it a slight veil, but not sufficient to destroy the original national character."<sup>84</sup> There seems to be some hesitation in Herder's underlining of the individuality of every nation. Language, on the one hand, stimulates an inner, uninterrupted development of the nation; climate as a cause from the outside, on the other hand, can be a disturbance of its organic evolution. This disturbance, however, gives evolution an open, contingent teleology. Is this a first sign of the dialectics that inheres in histori-

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<sup>82</sup>. See, for continuing entities, Maurice Mandelbaum, *The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 11.

<sup>83</sup>. Bentley, *Modern Historiography*, 22.

<sup>84</sup>. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Humankind*, ed. F. E. Manuel [selections from T. O. Churchill's translation of J. G. Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*; 2 vols., 1800-1803] (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 166.

cism?<sup>85</sup>

Contrary to Kant, who perceived time as a form of intuition for observing the phenomenal world, Herder saw temporality as something of the observer's reality itself, or, better: the observer is embedded in real time and time is embedded in himself. There is no discontinuity between the observer's reality and historical and temporal reality.<sup>86</sup> With Herder we come very close to the time culture of Romanticism. Caspar David Friedrich's painting of the *Strandszene in Wieck* displays its incarnated time. The painter himself, standing on the beach of Wiek on Rügen and looking at the arriving and departing ships at sea, feels that his own inner time and the time of the world coincide. It shows the coherence of the undulating time of man and world. The same goes for Herder: "Everything has come to bloom upon the earth which could do so, each in its own time and in its own milieu; it has faded away, and it will bloom again, when *its* time comes."<sup>87</sup> Here time is not only something in the mind, but inside man and world.

As a consequence, Herder does not want to measure the past by the present, as was the case in the Enlightenment. For him there is no distinction between how things are and how they ought to be. Herder judged nothing; all genuine expressions of experience are valid.<sup>88</sup> Although he had his preferences—he preferred the Greeks to the Romans, for instance—he is able to defend them all. His main purpose is to penetrate to people's actions, goals, and circumstances, making no distinction between highly civilized Greeks or the Native Americans of California. Here Berlin notes that Herder actually is the inventor of the historicist "*Einfühlen*." Vico wanted to "understand" the past, allowing him to become a predecessor of Ranke's "*Verstehen*." According to Berlin, Herder went a step further than Vico, because his "*Einfühlen*" anticipated the historicism of Dilthey.<sup>89</sup>

This means a completely different view of past and present. In the Enlightenment, past and present are the same in their "now-ness" and they are fixed givens, creating a sequence of stages. With Herder, past and present differ from each other, but they are still part of the same continuing process. This process consists of governing agencies such as climate, language, education, neighbors,

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<sup>85</sup>. Frank Ankersmit has pointed to this dialectic in historicism by arguing that the individuality of every phase in history (see Ranke's "Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott") is an element of synchronicity in an overall diachronic, organicist movement. See Frank Ankersmit, *Historical Representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 132-133; Ankersmit, *The Historical Sublime* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 144; see also Krol, *Het Geweten van Duitsland*, 119.

<sup>86</sup>. My impression is that Herder did not develop a participant's point of view, as Vico did.

<sup>87</sup>. Quoted in Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 75.

<sup>88</sup>. Krol, *Het geweten van Duitsland* 118-119.

<sup>89</sup>. Berlin, *Vico and Herder*, 163.

and so on, bearing within them the rule of their own destination and creating an inner process of concrete, unique individuals. “A nation is made what it is by ‘climate,’ education, relations with its neighbours, and other changeable and empirical factors, and not by an impalpable inner essence or an unalterable factor such as race or colour,” according to Herder.<sup>90</sup>

This remark was addressed directly at Kant and enhanced the conflict with the philosopher of Königsberg. Herder thus perceived reason itself as changeable in time, whereas Kant saw it as remaining the same in the course of history, although people learned to use it better. It implies that Herder’s teleology of reason is open, which is to say, reason can change, although it needs to be combined with individuality. He called the combination of development and identity “Dauer im Wechsel” (“endurance in change”).<sup>91</sup> He sees identity as the opposite of every classification by orders, classes, or stages. “The creator of all things does not see as a man sees. He knows no classes: each thing only resembles itself. . . . I do not believe that nature erected iron walls between these terms.”<sup>92</sup> As a consequence Herder creates a multiplicity of times:

In reality every mutable thing has its own inherent standard of time; this exists even if nothing else is there; no two things in the world have the same standard of time. My pulse, my step, or the flight of my thoughts is not a temporal standard for others; the flow of a river, the growth of a tree is not a temporal standard for all rivers, trees and plants. Life times of elephants and of the most ephemeral are very different from each other, and how different are not temporal standards on all planets? In other words, there are . . . in the universe at any time innumerable different times.<sup>93</sup>

In this quote Herder demonstrates what Hölscher called an “embodied” time, a time incarnated in reality, a time more historicist than enlightened. Herder talks of multiple times, and he is not really interested in synchronization of these incarnated times. This is what I read in the following passage:

We humans have problems with the One in history, “in the perspective of humankind”—where does it stand, the One, big endpoint? Where is the direct way to it? What does it mean, “progress of humankind”? Is it enlightenment? Is it improvement? Is it perfectibility? More happiness? Where are the standards? Where are the facts to find a standard in such different times and among such different peoples, even if we have the best information from outside?<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>90</sup>. Quoted in Berlin, *Vico and Herder*, 173. See also Krol, *Het geweten van Duitsland*, 118.

<sup>91</sup>. Quoted in Berlin, *Vico and Herder*, 134.

[Correct](#)

<sup>92</sup>. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. B. Suphan (Berlin, 1877-1913), vol. VIII, 177. English quoted from: Berlin, *Vico and Herder*, 164.

<sup>93</sup>. Quoted in Kimberley Hutchings, *Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press 2008), 39.

<sup>94</sup>. Quoted in Jordheim, “Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization,” 516. Jordheim observes here the same nonsynchronicity as I do, but I do not agree with his solution to the problem.

Herder wants to underline here a multiplicity of embodied times, opposing the universal, empty time of the Enlightenment with its chronological synchronization. It will be Hegel's endeavor to synchronize this multiplicity of real, ontological, and embodied times.

Concerning temporality, Herder is more ideal-typical (in the Weberian sense) of the Counter-Enlightenment than Vico. His perception of time as incarnated and therefore palpable in continuing entities (nations, cultures, and so on) is firmly directed against Kant's *a priori* conception of time and also against his phenomenal temporality of nows.<sup>95</sup> And although Vico's "ideal eternal history" differs fundamentally from Kant's static category of time, it remains an *a priori* category of the mind. Herder's perception of time as existing inside world and man make him, more than Vico, the forerunner of historicism. Vico maintained a dualistic sphere of thinking, opposing the *storia ideale eterna* with the real facts of past and present.

#### HEGEL AS A MEMBER OF THE COUNTER-ENLIGHTENMENT

The beginning of the *Phenomenology of Mind* (1806) manifests Hegel as an adept of the Counter-Enlightenment, in which elements of the Enlightenment are discernible.

For the rest it is not difficult to see that our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things hitherto prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past and to set about its own transformation. It is indeed never at rest, but carried along the stream of progress ever onward. But it is here as in the case of the birth of a child; after a long period of nutrition in silence, the continuity of the gradual growth in size, of quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first breath drawn—there is a break in the process, a qualitative change and the child is born. In like manner the spirit of the time, growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, disintegrates one fragment after another of the structure of its previous world. . . . This gradual crumbling to pieces, which did not alter the general look and aspect of the whole, is interrupted by the sunrise, which, in a flash and at a single stroke, brings to view the form and structure of the new world.<sup>96</sup>

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See below.

<sup>95</sup>. With Kant time does not change, but change occurs in time; with Herder time changes with and within each phenomenon, despite the fact that the phenomenon in its temporal change does not lose its identity. Kant's perception of time as "unchangeable in existence" is the opposite of Herder's "endurance in change." (See notes 58 and 90.)

<sup>96</sup>. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, transl. J.B. Baillie, 2001), <http://tinyurl.com/o9q27u3> (accessed April 12, 2015), 5-6.

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This whole passage breathes progress and the hope of a better future, a hope the Counter-Enlightenment shares with the Enlightenment, in whose breeding ground it stands. Nevertheless, we perceive also typical elements of the Counter-Enlightenment, for instance, the comparison of phylogenesis with ontogenesis by comparing the time of the French Revolution with the development of a newborn child. Hegel distances himself from Kant and comes close to Herder when he continues:

When we want to see an oak with all its vigour of trunk, its spreading branches, and mass of foliage, we are not satisfied to be shown an acorn instead. . . . The beginning of the new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in manifold forms of spiritual culture; it is . . . a whole which, after running its course and laying bare all its content, returns again to itself; it is the resultant abstract notion of the whole. But the actual realization of this abstract whole is only found when those previous shapes and forms, which are now reduced to ideal moments of the whole, are developed anew again, but developed and shaped within this new medium, and with the meaning they have thereby acquired.<sup>97</sup>

By perceiving time as a movement and as an organic process in which the present and future are determined by the past, Hegel asserts that it is not sufficient to explain the multiple totality of the present by pointing at one single origin. Here Hegel shows himself an adept of Herder and an antagonist of Kant, who saw reason as the acorn of man's moral history (see above). According to Kant, it is sufficient to show reason as the origin of man's moral behavior; man's history is no more than learning better what morality is. In the metaphor of the acorn and the oak Hegel rejects Kant's perception of reason.<sup>98</sup>

With regard to Kant's nontemporal character of moral improvement, by which every person individually has to learn anew the lessons from the past, Hegel in his *Phenomenology* seems to take a stand as well. He argues:

This bygone mode of existence has already become an acquired possession of the general mind, which constitutes the substance of the individual, and, by thus appearing externally to him, furnishes his inorganic nature. In this respect culture or development of mind (*Bildung*), regarded from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what lies at his hand ready for him, in making its inorganic nature organic to himself, and taking possession of it for himself.<sup>99</sup>

Moral improvement, but also cultural improvement in general, displays a development through time. The individual as part of culture, or in Hegelian terms, as part of the general Mind or Spirit, can make his "*unorganische Natur*" ("unorganic Nature") organic by participating in civilization (the Spirit). Thus, the Spirit is historical and develops itself through time. Humanity's duty is to ap-

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<sup>97</sup>. *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>98</sup>. Collingwood states: "[t]he true nature of an institution is shown not in its beginnings but in its developments." Quoted in van der Dussen, "*History as a Science*," 339.

<sup>99</sup>. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, 11-12.

propriate the experiences of the general Mind. In terms of temporality, this means that historical time needs to become individual time. Moreover, by participating in the Spirit, civilization becomes the product of people's actions.<sup>100</sup> By acting, Hegel said, people create new times and these times incarnate in history.

#### A DIFFERENT PERCEPTION OF SYNCHRONIZATION

This leads to a completely different perception of synchronization. Jordheim is almost right to consider the experience of noncoevalness (*Ungleichzeitigkeit*) within and between cultures and the work of synchronization as the "most important new contribution in eighteenth-century thinking about time."<sup>101</sup> However, this is true only for the Enlightenment's thinking about time in the eighteenth century. Synchronization seems possible, then, only with an empty time. Jordheim's view on the temporality of the Enlightenment is mistaken by not distinguishing between the empty time of most enlightened historians and the embodied times of Herder and Hegel. As a consequence he misrepresents Herder's two famous studies. In *Auch eine Philosophie* (1774) Herder envisioned a multiplicity of embodied times, while maintaining the universal form of history of the Enlightenment, with a "synchronized and strictly diachronic narrative of the progress of humankind."<sup>102</sup> This view seems to shipwreck with the history of the Egyptians and the Phoenicians. They did not precede or succeed each other, but lived contemporaneously; thus, a linear, diachronic, and homogeneous following in time became impossible. Herder chooses an "organic" solution by seeing both cultures as "twins of the same mother."<sup>103</sup> This synchronization of Herder is rather incidental, and because of its organic character, completely different from the chronological and staging synchronization of the Enlightenment. Moreover, in his *Metakritik* (1799) he opposes such a synchronized, natural time and proposes instead a noncoeval, incarnated time. In his later work Herder completely leaves the path of synchronization.

Jordheim does not want to observe Herder's resignation from synchronization, and worse, he also sins against the chronology of Herder's two studies. He first refers to his *Metakritik* of 1799 to show his multiple temporalities and then he uses his former *Auch eine Philosophie* to suggest that Herder synchronizes the multiple times of his *Metakritik*. Thus, Herder's accidental synchronizing of times comes prior to his statement about the multiplicity of times in his *Me-*

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<sup>100</sup>. Georg Lukács, *Der junge Hegel: Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie*, 2 vols. (Zürich: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1973), II, 723-725.

<sup>101</sup>. Jordheim, "Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization," 514.

<sup>102</sup>. *Ibid.*, 517.

<sup>103</sup>. *Ibid.*

*takritik*. There he went several steps further down the path of multiplicity, abhorring synchronization.<sup>104</sup>

#### HEGEL'S SYNCHRONIZATION

Hegel took up the challenge of multiple times with his unification of time and reason. He made clear that all the individual temporalities of nations, states, and so on come together in the all-embracing *Weltgeist*, the Spirit of the world. As we have seen above, Hegel describes the present in the Preface to his *Phenomenology* as a time of birth and as a direction sign to a completely new world in the near future. Birth means here the first embodiment of Reason, as *Weltgeist* in a real subject. This incarnation takes place in the “*Welthistorische Persönlichkeit*” (“World Historical Figure”) of Napoleon, as the reconciliation of the actual and the rational and as the apotheosis of history. Because Napoleon reconciles reality and rationality, Hegel is able to unveil in this reconciliation his own so-called Absolute Knowledge.<sup>105</sup>

According to Alexandre Kojève, Napoleon is the French doer who has achieved historical development by his bloody struggle. Hegel is, according to Kojève, the German thinker, who by his reason has revealed the meaning of this development. The Napoleon/Hegel duality is the new Christ, the incarnated Logos, reconciling reality and reason in time.<sup>106</sup> Hegel does so by seeing the French emperor in the *Phenomenology of Mind* as the (negative, but also positive) unifier of past developments and as the dawn of a new era.<sup>107</sup> As such he “synchronizes” the multiple embodied times perceived by Herder. Maybe the unification of Napoleon has not yet been completely accomplished, but the future will succeed in this endeavor. As such, Hegel endorses “‘progress’ as the [incarnated and therefore] irresistible force carrying us toward the future utopia.”<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>. See the quote at note 93.

<sup>105</sup>. I do not want to discuss here the question whether, according to Hegel, Napoleon was the incarnation of the demon of power, steering his own fate and that of the state entrusted to him, or he was only an instrument of the *Weltgeist*, ignoring his voice in the end and thus losing his power. The fact that Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right* smoothly replaced Napoleon with the Reformation does raise the suspicion of the latter option. See Krol, *Het geweten van Duitsland*, 168-169.

<sup>106</sup>. Alexandre Kojève, *Hegel, Kommentar zur Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Stuttgart: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 97, 1975), 294-295.

<sup>107</sup>. Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, 701-703. Historically seen, it is the dawn of a new era; philosophically seen, it is, according to Kojève, the end of the history of philosophy, because Hegel's philosophy has accomplished whatever can be said about the relationship between concept and time. “Als adäquate Beschreibung des Wirklichen negiert sie nichts und schafft daher nichts Wirkliches: sie hat keine wirkliche oder geschichtliche Zukunft vor sich.” Kojève, *Hegel, Kommentar zur Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 292. Kojève here agrees with Heidegger and Koyrè.

<sup>108</sup>. Quoted in Goran Blix, “Charting the ‘Transitional Period’: the Emergence of Modern Time in

As the thinker of an embodied time, Hegel belongs to the Counter-Enlightenment. Maintaining his belief in progress and reason and his feeling for the need for synchronization, Hegel remains in the *Phenomenology of Mind* also a thinker of the Enlightenment. Because synchronization is more a feature of the Enlightenment than of the Counter-Enlightenment, there is some ambiguity in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*. However, the Counter-Enlightenment does not abandon the idea of reason and progress, thus Hegel can be seen as a representative of the (Counter-)Enlightenment.

In the *Phenomenology of Mind* the present is the dawn of a new era; in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820) the present displays evening glow instead of dayspring.<sup>109</sup> In 1820 incarnated time led to a perception of temporality as an enduring transition, in which the present is less a place of birth and more the product of the past.<sup>110</sup> Here Hegel has left the main reminiscences of the time of the (Counter-)Enlightenment with its underlining of progress, and has become, with regard to time, a historicist. Already in his *Phenomenology of Mind* Hegel had succeeded in synchronizing the multiple, embodied times—so manifestly present with Herder—in Napoleon as the compelling incarnation of the *Weltgeist*. In his *Philosophy of Right*, time is not only incarnated, but also unified in the constitutional monarchy as the “hieroglyph of Reason,”<sup>111</sup> as the incarnation of God's plan in the world.<sup>112</sup> In 1820 Hegel left the (Counter-)Enlightenment, in which he still stood in 1806. In 1820 he became a moderate-conservative representative of an embodied time, which he then saw as transitional but also as unruly.<sup>113</sup> This stubborn, incarnated temporality forces him into a moderate political attitude, coming close to withdrawal and waiting.<sup>114</sup>

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the Nineteenth Century,” *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (2006), 66.

<sup>109</sup>. Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, 704.

<sup>110</sup>. “The concept of transition brings these two vectors (birth and decline) together, and ascribes progress and decadence simultaneously to the same time.” Blix, “Charting the ‘Transitional Period’.” 63. The concept of transition can bring birth and decline together because transition is an aspect of an incarnated and undulating time perception.

<sup>111</sup>. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, addition to §279.

<sup>112</sup>. See Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 177. Unlike Hegel, historicists like Ranke and Humboldt returned to a multiplicity of times, only unified by God's invisible hand in history.

<sup>113</sup>. As a representative of the Counter-Enlightenment, Hegel perceived society as dynamic. As a representative of historicism, Hegel still considered change and not standstill as the “normal” situation. However, change meant then more “going along with reality” (Karl Mannheim, “Mitbewegen mit der Wirklichkeit”), than “going with revolutionary upheaval.” See also Frank Ankersmit, *Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 10.

<sup>114</sup>. Blix, “Charting the ‘Transitional Period’,” 66.

## CONCLUSION

Regarding the eighteenth century, we have to make several distinctions with regard to temporality. First, there is a distinction between time in the Enlightenment and in the Counter-Enlightenment. Second, inside the time culture of the Enlightenment are three temporalities: first: a natural time, put into words by Kant in his time of intuition (*Anschauungsform*); second: chronology; and third: a historical time of stages. Natural time as *Anschauungsform* is changeless and refers to phenomena as endless, repeating nows. That is why I call it empty. In this empty time the present (of the eighteenth century) is the “reasonable” benchmark for the past, and as such the past can serve only as a container of good and bad examples. Chronology is empty because it has only an ordering function, foremost made necessary by the discovery of pre-Adamite times. Historical time is empty, because of its pre-ordained, staging character.<sup>115</sup> Synchronization of historical times in the Enlightenment means predominantly coordinating the European, biblical chronologies with the “pre-Adamite” and non-European chronologies and tuning in to historical stages.

The times of the Counter-Enlightenment are not empty, but “incarnated,” or, as Hölscher called Leibniz’s time, “embodied.” As such, natural time and historical time, although distinct, almost coincide because time is incarnated in reality and hence also in history. However, the tuning in to chronologies remains important, albeit of a completely different nature from the synchronization of empty times. “Synchronization” of incarnated times happens with Hegel in his all-embracing Reason or *Weltgeist*, as the great, unifying mover of history.

*Nijmegen, The Netherlands*

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<sup>115</sup>. For this character, Jordheim provides an important quote from Schlegel against Condorcet’s *Esquisse*: “The real problem of history is the inequalities between the different strands of human development.” Jordheim rightly sees this quote as a proof of the eighteenth-century noncoevalness of historical time. Jordheim, “Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization,” 514.