

TIME, NARRATIVE, AND FICTION: THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN RICOEUR AND A HETEROGENEOUS TEMPORALITYHARRY JANSEN¹

ABSTRACT

In *Time and Narrative*, Paul Ricoeur confirms the relationship between time experience and how it is epitomized in a narrative by investigating historiography and fiction. Regarding fiction, he explores temporality in three “novels of time” [*Zeitromane*]: *Mrs. Dalloway* by Virginia Woolf, *The Magic Mountain* by Thomas Mann, and *À la recherche du temps perdu* by Marcel Proust. Ricoeur perceives the temporalities as homogeneous; however, in my view, the novels contain at least three different temporalities. Mann seeks a new temporality by ironizing a romantic time of rise and fall and Woolf configures a time we can call the simultaneity of the dissimultaneous. In his analysis of Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu*, Ricoeur explicitly dismisses a Bergsonian approach to temporality. In my opinion, Bergson defends a heterogeneous time that is apparent in Proust’s novel.

Keywords: homogeneous time, heterogeneous time, tropology, Ranke, Mann, Marx, Woolf, Bergson, Proust

Does time exist? Great thinkers about temporality, such as Aristotle, Augustine, and Henri Bergson, hesitated before answering that question. Their hesitation stemmed from the idea that the three elements of time, namely past, present, and future, are fleeting.² They realized the past no longer exists, the future is not yet here, and the present is slipping by so quickly that it is impossible to grasp. Another French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, tried to solve the problem of time slipping away by refusing to identify time exclusively with the movement of the hands on the dial of the clock. He thinks that time is configured as a narrative.

In his three-volume opus *Temps et récit (Time and Narrative)*, Ricoeur substantiates the relationship between time and how it is epitomized in a narrative by investigating historiography (volume I) and fiction.³ In volume II, he explores temporality in three “novels of time”: *Mrs. Dalloway*, by Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), *The Magic Mountain*, by Thomas Mann (1875–1955), and *À la recherche du temps perdu*, by Marcel Proust (1871–1922).⁴ In *Mrs. Dalloway*

1. I would like to thank the editors of *History and Theory* for their helpful comments and Mrs. Val Kid and Mrs. Veronica Timmer for improving my English.

2. See, for Aristotle, *The Works of Aristotle II, Physics*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon 1947), 219b and 220a; for Augustine, *Confessions*, transl. E. B. Pusey, XI, 14.17, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3296/3296-h/3296-h.htm> (accessed November 17, 2014), and for Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1911), 193.

3. Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983–1988).

4. “*Zeitromane*,” novels of time, are not historical novels. The difference between history as fact and history as fiction does not need to be discussed here. The search for different forms of (hidden or

(1925), Ricoeur juxtaposes the clock time of Big Ben to long sequences of silent thoughts, underlining how Woolf mixes the sense of everyday time with the time of the inner self.⁵ *The Magic Mountain* (1924) confronts, according to Ricoeur, the everyday time of working people in the flatland of Hamburg with a “magic” time of illness and death in the Berghof sanatorium at Davos in the Swiss Alps. This spatial division articulates the differences between calendar time and the “beyond-time” of “those up there.”⁶ Lastly, Ricoeur discusses Proust’s temporality in *Remembrance of Things Past*, one of the translations of the French title. This novel encompasses seven volumes and was published between 1919 and 1927. There are two characters called Marcel in the novel: Marcel the hero looks to the future in which he wants to become a writer, and Marcel the narrator looks back in time through voluntary or involuntary memories.

In this paper I defend a variety of temporalities based on a philosophical and historical approach. Thus my analysis of the three novels differs from Ricoeur’s narratological approach in several ways. In volume I of *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur explores historiography and defends a homogeneous and romantic concept of time as one of rise and decline, contrary to clock time. In volume II, he perceives temporality in the three novels not explicitly as rise and fall, but as remaining homogeneous.⁷ Unlike Ricoeur, I think the three novels attempt to remove homogeneous temporality.⁸ This is my first difference from Ricoeur’s approach.

My second difference concerns the number and nature of Ricoeur’s homogeneous temporality. Ricoeur distinguishes only one time, which is based on a narrative logic of temporality that is grounded in the Hegelian-romantic time of historicism.⁹ However, in the nineteenth century, two completely different temporalities contrary to Hegelian-romantic time are also expressed. In my view, there are at least three different temporalities, and all three can be found in these novels.¹⁰ Mann seeks a heterogeneous temporality by ironizing the romantic

lost) time in historiography and in novels of time can be exactly the same. Temporality in the novels of time is, in my view, even paradigmatic for temporality in historiography.

5. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 103-104.

6. *Ibid.*, 112.

7. Concerning historiography, Ricoeur in volume I of *Time and Narrative* confirms what Adrian Wilson states about the modern historical profession’s origin story: it is “emplotted as a romance.” See Adrian Wilson, “The Reflexive Test of Hayden White’s *Metahistory*,” *History and Theory* 53, no. 1 (2014), 1-23, esp. 12.

8. My approach is closer to Reinhart Koselleck’s phenomenological mediation of human experiences of time. In his *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), 132-133, Koselleck distinguishes three modes of temporal experience, whereby “the long-term system changes, exemplified in the fall of the Roman Empire” and “the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous” display a great similarity to the temporalities I discern respectively in Mann’s *Magic Mountain* and in Woolf’s *Mrs. Dalloway*. See also Helge Jordheim, “Against Periodization: Koselleck’s Theory of Multiple Temporalities,” *History and Theory* 51, no. 2 (2012), 151-171, esp. 161-162. In what Koselleck calls “*die Irreversibilität von Ereignissen*” sounds a far echo of the third temporality, especially with Benjamin’s statement concerning the *Angelus Novus* and the discontinuity and ambiguity of time. See section V below (esp. note 73) and also Jordheim, “Against Periodization,” 171. Explicitly comparing Koselleck’s three temporalities with the three I present here exceeds the boundaries of this essay.

9. See section I below.

10. For a theory of historical times in the plural, see also Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft*, and Jordheim, “Against Periodization,” 161.

time of rise and fall. Woolf uses a plot that can be described as the simultaneity of the dissimultaneous. In his analysis of Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu*, Ricoeur explicitly dismisses a Bergsonian approach to temporality.¹¹ Bergson defends, in my view, a heterogeneous time, which can be clearly found in Proust's novel.

Ricoeur observes that the perception of time in Proust's novel is depicted by means of metaphor. This is surely a significant indication of the role tropology plays in all three novels. The topological approach rests on the idea that figurative language reveals the experience of reality. Tropes penetrate, as Hayden White states, "to that level of consciousness on which a world of experience is *constituted* prior to being analyzed."¹² Experience of time is a major aspect of experience of the world, and in my opinion, White's tropes bring temporality into consciousness, thus enabling us to understand and configure it.¹³ His topological approach reveals a real experience of time.

Consequently, there is a third difference between Ricoeur's point of view and my perception of time. Ricoeur's plot in his narrative *constitutes* a time, thus his time is the consequence of emplotment. In my view, tropes *reveal* time-experience before it is narrated.¹⁴ Tropes can be seen as cognitive instruments that put time into words after it is experienced. In my view, the perception of time undergoes four stages: a time-experience (1) is made conscious by retrospectivity (2), becomes comprehensible by tropes (3), and is configured along topological lines in a narrative (4).¹⁵ Therefore a narrative of time in general (historical as well as fictional) is not only a literary artifact but also a way of thinking. This is

11. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 151.

12. Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 33.

13. Frank Ankersmit sees representation, and therefore metaphor, as a cognitive instrument, thus the use of metaphor "bridges the gap between language and reality"; see Frank Ankersmit, "Representation as a Cognitive Instrument," *History and Theory* 52, no. 2 (2013), 171-193, esp. 182. Hans Kellner sees analogies between White's four tropes and the Kantian categories of understanding. Hans Kellner, "Hayden White and the Kantian Discourse: Tropology, Narrative and Freedom," in *The Philosophy of Discourse: The Rhetorical Turn in Twentieth-century Thought*, ed. Chip Sills and George H. Jensen (Portsmouth, UK: Heinemann, 1992). Although Ankersmit has some doubts regarding this "quasi-Kantian topological model," doubts that I share, he does not completely reject it. See Ankersmit, *Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 137-138. Although White uses his topological scheme primarily to detect meaning in a historical text, I use it to discern a temporal reality *behind* the historical text, to make the flux of experience comprehensible. See C. van den Akker, "Mink's Riddle of Narrative Truth," *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 7, no. 3 (2013) 346-370, esp. 354.

14. Unlike Ricoeur and David Carr's *Time, Narrative, and History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), White and Louis Mink in *Historical Understanding* perceive a discontinuity between life (of individuals and collectives) and historical stories (Mink, *Historical Understanding* [Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1987], 57). This means that they associate time only with life itself, not with historians' narratives. This does not mean that time is irrelevant for historical narrative. Ankersmit suggests such an irrelevance by saying, "All that is of real importance in historical writing begins only once we have left time and chronology behind us." Ankersmit, *Meaning, Truth, and Reference*, chap. 2, "Time," 29-47, esp. 39. In my view, time in historiography is not irrelevant, but *hidden*. It is hidden in what Mink calls "the configurational comprehension of a story."

15. Experiences of time are always retroactive; they are the result of retrospective understanding. See Van den Akker, "Mink's Riddle of Narrative Truth," 356. In fiction it is sometimes even necessary to imagine a retrospective view. Proust's death in 1922, and the fact that *Time Regained* is set in 1925, make this clear.

primarily why I decided to study the three novels from a philosophical and not from a literary-theoretical viewpoint.

The metaphor in *Remembrance of Things Past* reflects a temporality that on the one hand juxtaposes present and past, but on the other hand brings them so close together that, in Marcel's words, "I was made to doubt whether I was in the one or in the other."¹⁶ These two aspects clearly display a heterogeneous temporality.

For *Mrs. Dalloway*, the trope is metonymy, which reveals a composite time that also differs from Ricoeur's. Only in *The Magic Mountain* does synecdoche reveal a time of rise and fall. Here we see a temporality that is similar to Ricoeur's narrative time. However, Mann's irony also upsets it, so, there is not *one* configured time, but *three*, truly existing temporalities, revealed tropologically.¹⁷

Ricoeur wants to interpret time experienced in *Remembrance of Things Past* without a "search for sources."¹⁸ This actually applies to all three novels. It means that no historical influences are investigated to explain their temporalities. Although the novels were published between the two world wars, even the First World War and the many references to it do not persuade Ricoeur to take into account its impact on the authors' temporal concepts.¹⁹ For this reason, my approach is not only philosophical, but also historical. This is a fourth difference from Ricoeur, who does not take such an approach.

The first quarter of the twentieth century reveals new experiences of temporality. Stephen Kern, in *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918*, observes divergent perceptions of time in the works of philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, William James, and Karl Jaspers.²⁰ He refers to artists such as Picasso, De Chirico, and Dali and authors like Henrik Ibsen, James Joyce, and Edouard Dujardin for the various temporalities in art.²¹ In science, Einstein's special theory of relativity of 1905 showed that time in a system that moves away at a constant speed seems to slow down when viewed from another system at rest relative to it. In his relativity theory of 1916, he concludes, "every

16. M. Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*, vol. VI: *Time Regained*, transl. A. Mayor and T. Kilmartin, revised by D. Enright (New York: Random House, 1993), 262.

17. Mann's time novel displays another aspect of my tropological approach to time. Unlike White, I use a topology of three instead of four tropes to expose temporality in the three novels. Irony is not a figure of speech that reveals a special time, but one that undermines or amplifies one of the other three temporalities. As such it is "metatropological" and "dialectical." White, *Metahistory*, 37.

18. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 133.

19. See, for instance, Thomas Mann, *Der Zauberberg*, 21. <http://www.cje.ids.czesz.pl/biblioteka/Der%20Zauberberg%20Mann.pdf> (accessed November 17, 2014). On the same page, he states that his book "vor einer gewissen, Leben und Bewußtsein tief zerklüftenden Wende und Grenze spielt . . . Sie spielt, oder, um jedes Präsenz geflissentlich zu vermeiden, sie spielte und hat gespielt vormals, ehemals, in den alten Tagen, der Welt vor dem großen Kriege . . ." (that the events in his book "take place before a certain turning point and border, that has deeply fissured life and consciousness . . . it takes place, or, in order to deliberately avoid the present tense, it took place in former times, beforehand, in the old days, the world before the Great War. . . ." English translation from: Joshua Kovaloski, *Aestheticism and Performativity in Literature of the 1920s* [Rochester, NY: Camden House, and Woodbridge, UK: Boydell and Brewer Limited, 2014], 158).

20. Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2003), 24–29 and 52–53. See also Christophe Prochasson, *Les années électriques (1880–1910)* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991).

21. Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space*, 18–28 and 53–57.

reference body has its own particular time.”²² In film, we find on one side the simple romantic intrigue of a continuing story, based on the irreversibility and uniformity of time. On the other side, movie pioneers like Georges Méliès and Louis Lumière experimented with temporality by making intervals in the film or running it backwards through the projector.²³

Although according to Kern, the First World War imposed a homogeneous time, the three novelists I discuss opposed such a temporality.²⁴ This is why these three novels are so important. Contrary to what Ricoeur asserts in volume II of *Temps et récit*, the novels display an uneasy relationship with homogeneous Hegelian-romantic temporality. My historical perspective highlights that not only Hegel and the historicists play a significant role in identifying temporality, but also Karl Marx and Ernst Bloch, Henri Bergson and Walter Benjamin. The chaotic world around the time of the First World War requires retrospection, and these philosophers provide alternative solutions.

There is a fifth difference between Ricoeur’s and my approach. Ricoeur has chosen the three novels to exemplify his narrative temporality. My choice is not only motivated by the wish to exemplify three different temporalities, but also to clarify what in historiography remains more or less hidden.²⁵ To demonstrate temporality in historiography would take an entire volume; these novels, however, allow an explanation in one article.²⁶

First, I will elaborate on Ricoeur’s Hegelian-romantic concept of time in historiography. Mann’s *The Magic Mountain* is an example of that concept of time, albeit an ironization, which I will explain in the next section. Then I focus on a completely different temporality, namely a composite time, initiated by Marx and fully developed by Ernst Bloch and Fernand Braudel, thereafter using *Mrs. Dalloway* as an example. A third temporality, also not discussed by Ricoeur, is that of Henri Bergson and Walter Benjamin. In Proust’s *Remembrance of Things Past*, Bergson’s concept of time comes to the fore. This will be elaborated in the subsequent sections.

I. A HEGELIAN-ROMANTIC TEMPORALITY

In volume I of *Time and Narrative* Ricoeur investigates the relationship between time and narrative, taking a philosophical path. He combines Augustine’s experience of time with Aristotle’s perception of plot. In his *Confessiones*, Augustine

22. *Ibid.*, 19.

23. *Ibid.*, 29-30.

24. *Ibid.*, 288.

25. Donald Rice and Peter Schofer, *Rhetorical Poetics: Theory and Practice of Figural and Symbolic Reading in Modern French Literature* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), xvi-xvii, and James A. Mellard, *Doing Tropology: Analysis of Narrative Discourse* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987) 7; both studies give another reason for this concealment than the one I have given in note 13. They argue that “literary texts are simply more insistently figural than ordinary language use” (Mellard, *Doing Tropology*, 7).

26. For historiography, see Harry Jansen, *Triptiek van de tijd: Geschiedenis in drievoud (Tryptic of Time)* (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2010); see also Harry Jansen, “Is There a Future for History? On the Need for a Philosophy of History and Historiography,” *Low Countries Historical Review [BMGN]* 127, no. 4 (2012), 121-129.

discusses temporality as a *distentio animi*, which he defines as a state of mind in the present that receives remembrances from the past, pays attention to the present, and has expectations about the future. Memories, attentions, and expectations are things of the mind, not of the world, thus Augustine gives temporality not a real, but a spiritual distension. Augustine proposes that time is also an *intentio animi*. He sees time as a shadow of eternity; therefore, earthly time needs to be directed to God. So time receives not only distension but also direction. This presents Augustine, according to Ricoeur, as thinking that time has an arrow-like, diachronic movement.²⁷

Ricoeur connects Augustine's concept of time with Aristotle's ideas about emplotment in his *Poetica*. Aristotle states that the great Greek dramas are characterized by *mimesis* and *muthos*. *Mimesis* is an imitation of a changing reality brought about by action.²⁸ *Mimesis* of action becomes understandable in a story through *muthos*, which originates in the mind to give synthesis to the heterogeneous of the narrative. The Aristotelian *muthos* of classical drama is very similar to the emplotment of the modern novel.

Ricoeur relates Augustine's temporality to Aristotle's plot, resulting in a followable and therefore diachronic experience of time. Ricoeur's temporality is narrativistic and intriguing, bringing concordance and therefore homogeneity to the discordance in the experience of time. For him, history is the discipline of temporality, and historiography displays the same intriguing, diachronic, and ultimately homogeneous time.

However, Ricoeur sometimes refers to a heterogeneous time because of the discordance remaining in the plot.²⁹ Expressions such as "the synthesis of the heterogeneous" and "discordant concordance" are relevant for his perception of time. Yet the Augustinian orientation to time with its *intentio animi* and Aristotelian plot construction make Ricoeur's temporality, despite its relation to discordance, a homogeneous time. The term "synthesis" in the expression "synthesis of the heterogeneous," points to Ricoeur's uneasy relationship with a heterogeneous temporality.³⁰

There is another argument for Ricoeur's defense of a homogeneous time. Consistent with the American philosopher Maurice Mandelbaum, Ricoeur confirms that the main subjects in historiography are acting individuals and "continuing entities."³¹ States, nations, churches, religions, cultures, and subcultures are continuing entities because they survive the individuals living in them. Ricoeur

27. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 101.

28. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, I, *passim*, and *Time and Narrative*, II, 153 and 156.

29. This is where the plot differs from the covering law. The covering law subsumes, whereas the plot leaves the individual persons and things unharmed.

30. Ricoeur sees *The Magic Mountain* and *Remembrance of Things Past* as *Bildungsromane*. Even *Mrs. Dalloway* depicts Clarissa Dalloway learning about herself and the world she lives in. Ricoeur explains: "It is clear that a discontinuous structure suits a time of dangers and adventures, that a more continuous, linear structure suits a *Bildungsroman* where the themes of growth and metamorphosis predominate. . . ." Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 81.

31. From Maurice Mandelbaum's *The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), Ricoeur learns that general history consists of continuing entities that are singular with no simultaneity of the dissimultaneous. See Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, I, 194-208.

renames Mandelbaum's continuing entities "first-order entities" and states that in a narrative, they can be seen as *quasi-personages*. He thinks that not only individuals, but also first-order entities, have identities, because of their members' "participatory belonging" (*appartenance participative*).³² Like the characters of individuals, the different participatory belongings of first-order entities change during their lifetimes. Sometimes participatory belonging is very strong, such as the coherence of the Dutch during the 1940s German occupation. Sometimes participatory belonging is very loose, as in times of civil war.

First-order entities show a rise and fall in their identities because of their continuity and diachronic character. But identity also suggests homogeneity: a person remains the same despite changes in his personality. To put it simply: John changes continually during his lifetime, but never becomes Bill or Peter. According to Ricoeur, historiography is the narratio of the rise and fall of first-order entities.³³

Hayden White in *Metahistory* states that the connection between parts and a whole comes to the fore through the trope of synecdoche.³⁴ Synecdoche displays a connection of a *totum pro parte*. When we see two policemen, we can say: "The law is coming." Two parts of a whole are identified with the whole as such. This is what participatory belonging does with communities; it makes them *quasi-personages* in a narrative. In Hegel's philosophy of history and Ranke's histories, in which first-order entities such as states, nations, and religions are the protagonists, the topology is determined mainly, according to White, by synecdoche.

Ricoeur's interpretation of plot in historiography is very similar to Ranke's definition in his *Die grossen Mächte*.³⁵ Steven Smith provides a strong quote to describe Ranke's aims: "What could be more pleasant and more welcome to human understanding than to . . . observe in one nation or another how men's enterprises begin, increase in power, rise and decline."³⁶ Book titles in historiography illustrate this paradigm of rise and fall, for instance Jonathan Israel's *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806*.³⁷ The almost organic, temporal development of the historicist "Idee" becomes the development of the

32. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, I, 197-198.

33. Ricoeur sets Foucault's "archaeology of knowledge" against a historiography of first-order entities. Time in Foucault's "archaeological approach" is discontinuous, whereas first-order entities' time is continuous. See Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, III, 217-218.

34. White, *Metahistory*, 35-36, 39-40, 122, 127, 129, 166-167, 189.

35. Ranke states: "Sie [countries, nations, religions] blühen auf, nehmen die Welt ein, treten heraus in dem mannigfaltigsten Ausdruck, bestreiten, beschränken, überwältigen einander; in ihrer Wechselwirkung und Aufeinanderfolge, in ihrem Leben, ihrem Vergehen oder ihrer Wiederbelebung, die dann immer größere Fülle, höhere Bedeutung, weiteren Umfang in sich schließt, liegt das Geheimnis der Weltgeschichte" ("They [countries, nations, religions] unfold, capture the world, appear in manifold expressions, dispute with and check and overpower one another. In their interaction and succession, in their life, in their decline and rejuvenation, which then encompasses an ever greater fullness, higher importance, and wider extent, lies in the secret of world history" English from: White, *Metahistory*, 168). Leopold von Ranke, *Die grossen Mächte*, ed. Friedrich Meinecke (Berlin: Insel-Verlag, 1916).

36. Steven G. Smith, "Historical Meaningfulness in Shared Action," *History and Theory* 48, no. 1 (2009), 2, note 2.

37. Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Other examples are Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), and Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (London: Abacus, 1994).

plot in Ricoeur's collective historical subjects (countries, nations, churches, cultures, and subcultures), which he calls "quasi-personages."

There are differences between the romantic Rankean construction of plot in historiography and Hegel's construction of an intrigue in world history. For Hegel there is one impulse in states, cultures, and civilizations: all aspire to freedom. Ranke and other historicists have a more pluralistic perception of first-order entities. Contrary to Hegel's freedom as *Sinngebung der Geschichte*, historicists see manifold ideas in the endeavors of first-order entities. Consequently, the meaning of history can only be conjectured about, not predicted.

Despite these differences, there are also striking similarities between Hegel and the historicists. First, they all see states, religions, churches, and other first-order entities as the main subjects in history. Ideas make these entities move; this is a second similarity. Hegel's dialectic and the impact of the cunning of reason on history give the continuity of its entities a similar rise-and-decline intrigue as formed by historicists. Therefore, Hegel's concept of time is as continuous, linear, and most of all homogeneous as that of the historicists.³⁸ This Hegelian-romantic form of emplotment in writing history is still the method several historians apply. Thus, it is understandable that Ricoeur identifies historiography with this form of emplotment, although he overlooks other temporal aspects of historiography.

II. THOMAS MANN'S *THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN*

What is time? . . . Time is active, it has verbal nature, it "temporates."
What does it temporate? Change!³⁹

These lines open the sixth chapter of Mann's *The Magic Mountain*. Ricoeur is surely right to see Mann's novel as a *Zeitroman*, a novel of and about time. Mann's quote also corroborates Ricoeur's viewpoint that time is change and movement.

The protagonist in Mann's novel is Hans Castorp, a twenty-three-year-old, newly graduated ship mechanic, about to start his first job. He was orphaned at an early age and was taken in by his uncle Tienappel, who had two sons, Peter and James. In 1907, Castorp leaves Hamburg to stay three weeks at the Berghof sanatorium in Davos where his cousin, Joachim Ziemssen, is recovering from tuberculosis.⁴⁰

Ricoeur's comment about the young man's departure from the flatland of Hamburg and arrival at the sanatorium in the Swiss Alps needs to be seen in the light of his phenomenological analysis in volume III. The time of the flatland is a time of everydayness, of clock-time, and of measurement. The time "up there" is the opposite. Ricoeur connects it with Ziemssen's rather long stay at the Berghof: "Joachim has almost lost the preciseness of measurements."⁴¹

38. Frederick C. Beiser, "Hegel's Historicism" in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 270-300.

39. *Was ist die Zeit? ... Die Zeit is tätig, sie hat verbale Beschaffenheit, sie ,zeitigt.' Was zeitigt sie denn? Veränderung!*

40. Mann, *Der Zauberberg*, 167, and Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 112-130.

41. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 118.

At the Berghof, measurable time is erased and what remains is an “almost immobile time.”⁴² The erasure of time measurement is symbolized by expunging the marks on the thermometer, giving the patients the opportunity to cheat.⁴³ It is the story of the waitress, Adriatica von Mylendonk, who sells Castorp a thermometer. After using the thermometer regularly for two and a half weeks, Castorp visits the sanatorium’s chief doctor and director, Hofrat Behrens, together with Joachim. The doctor detects a spot on Castorp’s lungs, which indicates a disease that will be difficult to cure.

Castorp, oddly enough, is not depressed by his illness. He wants to stay, because he has fallen in love with Clavdia Chauchat, a Russian woman who has what Mann calls *Kirgiesenaugen* [Kyrgyz eyes]. Her eyes remind Castorp of those of a classmate, Pribislav Hippe, whom he knew when he was thirteen years old. He had borrowed a pencil from him and was given clear instructions to give it back. “[He] took his pen from his pocket, a silver-plated pen with a ring that you had to push upwards so that the red colored pen grew out of the metal sleeve.”⁴⁴ The phallic connotation is repeated with Madame Chauchat, from whom he also borrows a pencil and who expresses the same explicit desire to have it back: *N’oubliez pas de me rendre mon crayon*.⁴⁵ Here we see the identification in Castorp’s mind of two different experiences: a romantic synthesis of discordant events. It underlines the homogeneity of the heterogeneous, and as such is surely a romantic identification. Is there any irony in the fact that this refers to a homosexual as well as a heterosexual love event?

The second pencil event occurs at the carnival that Mann calls *Walpurgisnacht*, when Clavdia says she will be leaving the following day. Castorp then desperately declares his love for her. Joachim also leaves the sanatorium, because he is a soldier and the announced mobilization forces him to do his patriotic duty, despite his illness. These two events are, in my opinion, related because they represent several descents from the mountain.

A few weeks later, James Tienappel appears, telling Castorp of all the vicissitudes of the family in Hamburg. The arrival of someone “from below” is also a “rise” in *The Magic Mountain*. The matters from the flatland related by Tienappel annoy Castorp because he is not interested in them at all. Annoyance is also an important indicator of a temporality other than the diachronic and homogeneous time of action and of rise and fall. As we will see later, it sounds more like Bergson’s time of duration.

Castorp teaches himself to ski (also an up-and-down movement), and on one of his trips he ends up in a fierce snowstorm. He barely knows how to survive, but finds shelter in a barn and has a terrible fever dream. First he experiences a paradisiacal state on a Greek beach with beautiful young people and a mother breastfeeding her baby. He then enters a temple where two dreadful old hags are

42. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, III, 134.

43. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 117.

44. “[Er] zog sein Crayon aus der Tasche, ein versilbertes Crayon mit einem Ring, den man aufwärts schieben musste, damit der rot gefärbte Stift aus der Metallhülse wachse.” Mann, *Der Zauberberg*, 167.

45. *Ibid.*, 439.

tearing a child apart. Ricoeur sees that dream as another theme of timelessness. The content of the dream points to another experience of rise (beautiful people and a mother breastfeeding) and decline (witches tearing a child apart).

When Castorp gets back to the sanatorium after this experience, he finds that Joachim Ziemssen has returned. After a rewarding career in the army, he had become so ill that he had to return to the Berghof to die. Clavdia Chauchat has also come back, but in the company of Mynheer Peeperkorn, a Dutch planter who has earned his fortune on Java. Both arrivals can be perceived as a new visualization of a “rise” in Mann’s novel.

After a trip to a waterfall, Castorp is asked to come to Peeperkorn’s room. There the Dutchman turns out to have committed suicide, caused by his “impotence to awaken the woman to lust” (“Ohnmacht, das Weib zur Begierde zu wecken.”) Chauchat then finally leaves the sanatorium. Here the novel displays a rise and fall. Peeperkorn climbs the mountain to die, as does Ziemssen, while Chauchat initially ascends to Berghof, only to descend from it for the last time.

Completely different in nature are Castorp’s encounters with two intellectuals. Shortly after his arrival he meets the Italian Settembrini, an avid supporter of the Enlightenment. Whenever he visits Castorp in the evening, he always turns on the light. The Italian recommends that Castorp should leave, because the Berghof is robbing him of his freedom and zest for life. Settembrini himself leaves the sanatorium and finds a guesthouse in the village beneath the mountain, a “descent” again.

Through Settembrini, Castorp makes the acquaintance of Naphta, a Polish Jew converted to Catholicism, who was educated as a Jesuit. Because of his illness, he never joined the order. His thinking is a mix of anarchist, Nietzschean anti-Enlightenment intertwined with authoritarian Catholicism. Naphta’s ideas embody the desire to place Europe under the dictatorship of the papacy. Thereby he puts his hope in the youth: “Finally, it means a loveless misunderstanding of the youth to believe that they will find their pleasure in freedom. . . . [L]iberation and development of the ego are not the secret and the need of the time. What they need, what they require, what they will create, that is—terror. Their deepest desire is obedience. . . .”⁴⁶

The contrast between Settembrini and Naphta demonstrates a contradiction in European culture, perceived as a contrast between “civilization” (Settembrini) in the Western tradition of Enlightenment and the central European romantic tradition of “culture” (Naphta). The First World War is seen as the consequence of the same contradiction, where the Western allies represent “civilisation” and the Central European powers represent *Kultur*. When his book was published in 1924, Mann knew the outcome of the First World War, which perhaps explains why he mentions a duel between Settembrini and Naphta, in which the latter kills himself.

For the perception of time, the distinction between “civilization” and “culture” is also important. Nietzsche’s temporality of eternal return of the same (*ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen*) is the opposite of an “optimistic time” of Enlightenment, as well as of the romantic perception of time as rise and fall. Settembrini

46. *Ibid.*, 507.

and Naphta represent these two temporalities. Both personages are destined to fall: Naphta in the duel and Settembrini due to illness. The world after the First World War is neither an optimistic temporality, nor a temporality of rise and fall.⁴⁷ Nietzsche's temporality is symbolized by what Mann calls the "eternal soup" (*Ewigkeitssuppe*). With the endless and boring recurrence of eating soup, Mann emphasizes a Nietzschean concept of the *ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen*.

Ricoeur's first-order entities display continuity and participatory belonging, and as such, become quasi-personages in a historical narrative. The Berghof plays the same role in Mann's novel. The continuity is obvious because the sanatorium survives its individual patients. The participatory belonging in the Berghof consists of the patients' conspiracies against the care staff and the silly interactions during the sumptuous meals. When Settembrini warns Castorp to leave, he makes the place a quasi-personage by saying the Berghof is dangerous, robbing Castorp of his zest for life. Here we also see White's synecdochal approach, or rather the ironization of it.

Irony emerges when an old worn-out form becomes a hypertrophy. That is done in the *The Magic Mountain* by the movement of ascending and descending the mountain. A "normal" first-order entity is meant to provide safety and care for the people living in it and above all protect them from illness and death. The Berghof gives no real protection—quite the contrary. Ascending means illness and often death. Descending means a return to the real world. It even consists of military action, as we have seen with Ziemssen. Alongside synecdoche, irony is the prevailing trope of *The Magic Mountain*.

In conclusion, we can say that in historiography, as in Mann's *Magic Mountain*, a romantic temporal perception continues to exist. However, this temporality is deeply ironic in Mann's novel; unfortunately, Ricoeur does not elaborate on it. It is a perception of time that *avant la lettre* even ironizes Ricoeur's own temporality as set out in his first volume.

III. A HETEROGENEOUS, COMPOSITE, AND METONYMICAL TEMPORALITY

In the nineteenth century, new temporalities, unlike the romantic ones, arose. Marx is the first to reject the Hegelian-romantic linear concept of time. He advocates a composite time, in which traditional and modern times are juxtaposed. We find traces of such a composite time in Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*. In this section I would like to show a temporality that originates from Marx and is developed further by Ernst Bloch and Fernand Braudel. This temporality can be called "the simultaneity of the dissimultaneous" or "the synchronicity of the nonsynchronism."⁴⁸

47. Lucian Hölscher, "Mysteries of Historical Order: Ruptures, Simultaneity and the Relationship of the Past, the Present and the Future," in *Breaking Up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past and Future*, ed. Berber Bevernage and Chris Lorenz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2013), 134-151, esp. 148.

48. In English there are two translations of "Ungleichzeitigkeit." See Ernst Bloch, "Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics," *New German Critique* 11 (Spring 1977), 22-38; and *idem*, "Non-contemporaneity and Obligation to Its Dialectic," in *idem, Heritage of Our Times* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991), 97-148.

In November 1837, a young philosophy student wrote a letter to his father. He related that he had been reading fragments of Hegel's philosophy. "But," he added, "I found no pleasure in his *groteske Felsenmelodie*."⁴⁹ After studying Hegel, the author of the letter, Karl Marx, continued with his dissertation on the Greek philosophers Democritus and Epicurus.⁵⁰ Marx's main focus is atomism: Democritus sees human beings as atoms subjected to nature; Epicurus also perceives human beings as atoms, but they can evade their natural as well as their social conditions of oppression once they associate with networks of people with self-awareness. Such a network is for Marx the realization of the Free Spirit, having the possibility and energy to act. "It is a psychological law that the self-liberated, theoretical spirit becomes practical energy and as will, stepping out from Amenthes' shadow-realm, opposes the secular reality."⁵¹ For Epicurus, atomism means that some people can free themselves of oppressive conditions. But it also means that at least two societies exist: a traditional one with oppressed people and a more modern, utopian one with free, forward-looking people. This double-sided society evolves into a double-sided perception of time: a society in which a modern time is juxtaposed to a traditional one. This is the foundation of a composite concept of time. It is also an utterance of a metonymical approach to reality; first, because it is founded on an atomistic perception of man, and second, because a juxtaposition of modern and traditional time is a metonymical form of temporality.

Between the world wars, in the same period that Woolf was writing her novel, Henri Berr, with his *Centre international de synthèse*, founded a new historiography that anticipated the new history of the Annales School.⁵² Fernand Braudel, one of the most famous *Annalistes*, put forward a composite time in the footsteps of Marx and Ernst Bloch. He elaborates on it in *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Here he distinguishes three time layers: a "*temps presque immobile*," a "conjunctural time," and an "*évènemential* time." Thus he is configuring a heterogeneous time of "simultaneity of the dissimultaneous" that deviates fundamentally from a homogeneous, linear concept of time.

This is even more obvious in his second great study, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV^e-XVIII^e siècle*. There Braudel states: "World history is a procession, a cortège, a coexistence of modes of production that we too much tend to think of as a succession of historical ages. In fact, these different modes of production are connected: the more advanced depend on more backward ones and vice versa: development is the other side of underdevelopment."⁵³

In the first part of *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur investigates Braudel's *Méditerranée* study. He asks: "What frames the plot of the Mediterranean?" The direct

49. Karl Marx, "Brief an den Vater 10 November 1837," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke. Ergänzungsband I, Schriften, Manuskripte, Briefe bis 1844* (Berlin: Dietz, 1968), 3-12, esp. 8.

50. Karl Marx, "Doktorsdissertation: Differenz der demokratischen und epikurischen Naturphilosophie nebst einem Anhang," in Marx and Engels, *Werke. Ergänzungsband I*, 257-373.

51. *Ibid.*, 327.

52. Lucien Febvre was the first to deconstruct the myth of historical continuity. See Hölscher, "Mysteries of Historical Order," 146.

53. Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV^e-XVIII^e siècle*. III. *Le temps du monde* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1979), 55.

response is: "We may say without hesitation: the decline of the Mediterranean as a collective hero on the stage of world history."⁵⁴ Ricoeur is thus "synecdochizing" the Mediterranean into a quasi-personage, transforming Braudel's composite temporality into a homogeneous and linear time of decline.

Ricoeur thus overlooks what Marx points out in the Introduction to his *Deutsche Ideologie* and what Bloch, in Marx's footsteps, says in his *Philosophische Aufsätze zur objektiven Phantasie* about a diachronic, homogeneous, and linear concept of time. In Bloch's words:

In a single sentence of Marx almost the entire theory of nonsynchronism is included: however, this sentence is far away from a unilinear succession (and nothing but succession) of an idealistic dialectic. In the Introduction to his "German Ideology" Marx noted the development of productive forces: "It goes further, but slowly: the different [losing] levels and interests are never completely overcome, they drag on continuously next to the winning ones, even for centuries."⁵⁵

Marx stresses that there is no linear time: old, traditional times are juxtaposed to modern ones. He advocates a composite temporality. On the surface of Marx's temporality is the simultaneity of the dissimultaneous. Its foundation is different modes of production occurring in the same chronological time, which visualize a present determined by the past and a present that is forward-looking. It leads to a network of traditional and modern times.

White links Marx's reduction of pluriform reality into a network of modes of production with the trope of metonymy. In its simplest form, we recognize this trope in the image of a "fleet of fifty sails." It is a *pars pro toto* and as such reductionist. Eelco Runia, like White, leans toward Marx. According to White and Runia, Marx "reduces the phenomenal world to the economic realities *behind* it."⁵⁶

This concept of society is based on a reductionist concept of man, the atomistic human being described in Marx's dissertation. Man as an atom can choose a Democritian path leading to continuing suppression or even death. We see that Smith in *Mrs. Dalloway* makes that choice. Man can also choose the Epicurean pathway and thus free himself from the limitations and constrictions of the past as Clarissa Dalloway does. These two different choices also involve different temporalities.

IV. VIRGINIA WOOLF'S *MRS. DALLOWAY*

On a beautiful day in June 1923, Clarissa Dalloway, a woman in her fifties, leaves her home in Westminster to buy flowers. She wants them to add luster to a party she is hosting that evening. Clarissa's husband is an honorable Member of Parliament and her guests are therefore among London's upper class. London in 1923 is still the center of an empire stretching from Western Europe to India.

Westminster's Big Ben plays a crucial role in *Mrs. Dalloway*. It makes the dissimultaneity of the inner time stream of the protagonists of Woolf's novel

54. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, I, 215.

55. Ernst Bloch, "Ungleichzeitigkeit, nicht nur Rückständigkeit" in *idem, Philosophische Aufsätze zur objektiven Phantasie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), 41-49, esp. 44-45.

56. Eelco Runia, "Presence," *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (2006), 28.

synchronous with the time of the clock and the chronological world time of monumental history. That “monumental time” is epitomized by London as “the admirable marble decor of the capital” of a great Empire and, in a sense, of Europe after the First World War.⁵⁷

Walking through the streets, Clarissa thinks of her former sweetheart Peter Walsh. She does not know he is back in London and will visit her the same day. She meets Dr. Bradshaw, whom she explicitly asks not to forget to come to her party. Mr. Bradshaw will spoil that party by telling all the guests about Septimus Warren Smith’s suicide.

Clarissa sees that same person through the window of the flower shop, though she is completely unaware of his existence, because he does not belong to her circle. However, she is connected to him in various ways. The first link is Dr. Bradshaw, who is among Clarissa’s acquaintances, and who is also involved in Smith’s treatment. In Woolf’s novel, rich and poor depend on one another, despite being unaware of one another’s existence. Is this a Marxian view of the world?⁵⁸

Peter Walsh is another link. He visits Clarissa that afternoon, and their meeting leaves him very sad. Clarissa makes it clear that there is no future for them. In a rather emotional state, Peter walks through a park, where he sees two young people sitting on a bench. At first sight of them, he thinks of the joy of being young, but soon notices that Septimus and his Milanese wife, Rezia, are not happy. Septimus was a soldier in the First World War, and his life is now ruled and ruined by shell shock. For Peter, without Clarissa there is no happy future; for Septimus, with Rezia there is no future at all. They both maintain an existence described by Marx in his dissertation as the atomism of Democritus.

Like Clarissa, Peter does not know Septimus and Rezia. Their encounter in the park is one of the many moments of simultaneity of the dissimultaneous in *Mrs. Dalloway*. Clarissa and Septimus seeing an airplane advertising “Kreme Toffee” at the same time is another moment of simultaneity. The same events perceived by different characters synchronously, accompanied by Big Ben sonorously striking the half and full hours, indicate simultaneity. But if we look at the inner experience of the two main protagonists, Clarissa and Septimus, it is a dissimultaneous time.

Clarissa’s stream of consciousness is the expectation of the party that evening, an orientation toward the near future. That expectation is in stark contrast to the spectral remembrance that haunts Septimus’s mind. The loss of a friend and the image of his destruction emerge in different ways when he is quarreling in the park with Rezia. While Clarissa’s orientation is an evening with the elite of imperial Britain, the prospect for Septimus is Dr. Bradshaw’s advice to leave Rezia and go to an institution for the mentally ill.

57. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 106.

58. See Brigitte Bechtold, “*More Than a Room and Three Guineas*: Understanding Virginia Woolf’s Social Thought,” *Journal of International Women’s Studies* 1, no. 2 (2000). <http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol1/iss2/1/> (accessed November 17, 2014). Bechtold underlines that Woolf deplores the lack of choice that women as well as soldiers have.

Septimus's fate is determined by his awful wartime experiences. His trauma forces him to remain in the past. He commits suicide, for death is the only escape from that unbearable, monumental time. To a lesser degree, Peter Walsh has to stay in the past because Clarissa remains unattainable. Perhaps that is why he cannot break free; he is caught in the "ecstasy of her presence."⁵⁹

Meanwhile, Clarissa is enjoying the streets around Westminster, underlined by the sonorous Big Ben. She involuntarily thinks of Peter Walsh, who left for India after their relationship ended. Three temporalities of Woolf's story are contained in these two sentences. According to Ricoeur, the involuntary memories of Peter, the sound of Big Ben, and Peter's stay in another part of the British Empire provide a connection of respectively an inner, a chronological, and a world time.

Clarissa's memories of Peter Walsh's love for her, thirty years ago, are not as blissfully happy as they seem. Peter wanted complete intimacy, to share all their feelings, but Clarissa did not want to go that far. For Clarissa there was also Sally, for whom she had erotic feelings and with whom she shared an intimate, sensual kiss. Clarissa's marriage to Richard Dalloway actually rested largely on his inability to express his love for her. That gave Clarissa a familiar sense of security, but also a feeling of loneliness. Ricoeur feels there is a deep kinship between Clarissa and Septimus. "Septimus is Clarissa's 'double'; in a certain way, he dies in her place."⁶⁰

Clarissa's joyful expectation of her party has its counterpoint in Septimus's horrible past. However Clarissa is also an atom. "The same horror dwells in her, but unlike Septimus, she will confront it, sustained by an indestructible love for life."⁶¹ Septimus is, as it were, an atom in a Democritian way whereas Clarissa's atomism is Epicurean, because she becomes self-assured. Notwithstanding the burden of "lost events" in the past, Clarissa's lust for life wins, whereas Septimus's lust for life is defeated.

Early that morning, Clarissa sees in a shop window Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* open at a page where she reads:

Fear no more the heat o' the sun
Nor the furious winter's rages.⁶²

Not only the expectations of her party, but also Clarissa's complete personality is ultimately directed to the future, to life's expectations. So the "caves" in which Clarissa's and Septimus's two streams of consciousness flow, despite their similarities, remain different.

At the end of the section on Woolf's novel, Ricoeur poses the crucial question: "Overall, may we speak of a single experience of time in *Mrs. Dalloway*?" He gives a two-sided answer: "No, insofar as the destinies of the characters and their worldviews remain juxtaposed; yes, insofar as the proximity between the 'caves' . . . visited constitutes a sort of underground network that *is* the experience of

59. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 112.

60. *Ibid.*, 111. See also 189, note 19.

61. *Ibid.*, 110.

62. *Ibid.*, 106 and 111.

time in *Mrs. Dalloway*.”⁶³ Ricoeur’s “yes” remains a bit vague: “The experience of time is neither that of Clarissa nor that of Septimus; it is neither that of Peter nor that of any other character. Instead, it is suggested to the reader by the reverberation . . . of one solitary experience in another solitary experience. It is this network, taken as a whole, that is the experience of time in *Mrs. Dalloway*.”⁶⁴ Here again Ricoeur tends to synthesize the heterogeneous. Finally there is only one temporality in Woolf’s novel.

Ricoeur’s “underground network of caves” reminds me, odd as it may seem, of Marx’s “underground network” of different atoms leading to different stages in time. A network of caves, in which different “time streams of consciousness flow,” displays a metonymical image of all the complicated emotions Woolf describes: London representing monumental history and world time, the strokes of Big Ben epitomizing chronological time, and “the network of caves” form a screen of simultaneity (maybe Ricoeur’s “yes”) through which Woolf can display the dissimultaneity of temporal experiences of her heroine (Clarissa) and heroes (Peter and Septimus). In that image, Clarissa is an Epicurean atom with her past, but also with her expectations of a near (her party) and a more distant future. Septimus and Peter are Democritian atoms, only living with their pasts, unable to create new expectations.

Ricoeur overlooks the different forms of atomism in which Clarissa, Septimus, and Peter are caught. His inclination to interpret the experience of time without a “search for sources” results in missing in *Mrs. Dalloway* Marx’s and Bloch’s simultaneity of the dissimultaneous and therefore the heterogeneity of the novel’s temporality. The metonymy of the simultaneity of the dissimultaneous makes a temporality visible that would remain hidden without that trope.

V. A HETEROGENEOUS TIME OF DURATION

Henri Bergson and Walter Benjamin establish a new heterogeneous and ambiguous temporality. This also originates from the nineteenth century, but forms a concept of time that has nothing to do with a romantic temporality of rise and fall. Neither of these authors plays a role in Ricoeur’s *Time and Narrative*. Although Bergson is mentioned twice in volume II, it is in a rather negative way.⁶⁵ Ricoeur cites Benjamin and his plea for narrativity; however, he doesn’t mention his creation of a new concept of time and a novel way of narrating it.⁶⁶

For Bergson, time is not an inner stream of consciousness from the past to the future or the reverse, nor is it a synchronicity of the dissimultaneous, deduced from chronology.⁶⁷ For Bergson, time is simultaneously a “ceaseless flux” and

63. *Ibid.*, 112.

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*, 151, 190-191. In his *Memory, History, Forgetting* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), Ricoeur elaborates positively on Bergson’s ideas about memory, but even then he does not refer to Bergson’s heterogeneous temporality. I would like to thank Professor Rosa Belvedresi for this reference.

66. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 28 and 168; and, III, 270.

67. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, transl. F. L. Pogson (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2001), 98-101.

“duration,” characterized by a qualitative multiplicity of heterogeneous experiences we discover intuitively. Bergson explains his “fluid and durational” time by comparing it to empathy.

Empathy arises when we try to feel what other people feel, especially in their most painful experiences. This is not immediately apparent. The pain of others initially gives us a feeling of horror and we tend to dissociate ourselves from it as much as possible. Then we fear that, if we do not help others in their pain, we ourselves will not be helped when we are suffering. A need to help originates from this fear. Yet for Bergson, this is an inferior form of pity.

A more superior form is that we do not want to be an accomplice of nature, which distributes pain on humanity unevenly and therefore unjustly. Consequently, we want the pain ourselves, out of a sense of justice. After all, we cannot avoid the pain that nature assigns to us, and therefore put ourselves in the service of pain. This sense of justice raises us above nature, but also subjects us to it, for avoiding pain is impossible. This makes us humble but also gives us a qualitatively better feeling than our original, more inferior need to help others.⁶⁸

Comparing time with empathy, Bergson states that time is a “stretched now” that is heterogeneous, discontinuous, and ambiguous. The heterogeneous comes from the fact that empathy consists of completely different and even opposing feelings and experiences. Fear of pain alternates with justice, and justice in turn is interspersed with humility, and this again with a feeling of being a better person. Notwithstanding all these alternations, time is also a “stretched now.” Bergson’s time is in fact highly ambiguous.

Time as a “stretched now” consists of continually changing heterogeneous moments that interpenetrate one another. We can “hear” this time when we renounce the ticking and thus the measurements of the clock. Though clock time and chronological time are discontinuous, they differ entirely from Bergson’s discontinuous temporality. Clock time is, as Aristotle observes, a time with a “now,” a “before,” and an “after.” Its discontinuity consists of moments that are different points on a line from past to future. It is the discontinuity of the hands of the clock jumping from minute to minute.

Bergson’s discontinuity concerns the “stretched nows” in which a duration of reflection is succeeded by a completely different one. That duration begins when the clock stops, as William Faulkner says in the *Sound and the Fury*.⁶⁹ It also ends when we hear the clock ticking again. Bergson explains ambiguity by referring to listening to a melody: “such . . . is the melody which one perceives as indivisible, and which constitutes, from one end to the other . . . a perpetual present, although this perpetuity has nothing in common with immutability, or this indivisibility with instantaneity. What we have is a present, which endures.”⁷⁰ At first glance, Bergson’s time reminds us of Augustine’s temporality. He also

68. *Ibid.*, 18-19.

69. “Clocks slay time . . . time is dead as long as it is being clicked off by little wheels; only when the clock stops does time come to life.” William Faulkner, *The Sound and the Fury* (New York, Random House, 1992), 85..

70. Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics* [1946] (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2007), 127. See also 124-132, and J. Hermsen, *Stil de tijd: Pleidooi voor een langzame toekomst* (Amsterdam and Antwerp: Arbeiderspers, 2009), 42.

compares his time experience to music, though not to a melody but to a psalm. The difference between the two is that Augustine's time has an *intentio*, which is missing in Bergson's temporality. According to Bergson, time is a present that endures; it is an endless flow without any direction. Therefore his temporality can be simultaneously flux and duration.

Anticipating the next section, I would like to emphasize that Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu* also displays this Bergsonian ambiguity. In Proust's novel, Marcel experiences a great diversity of happy impressions: "diverse yet with this in common, that I experienced them at the present moment and at the same time in the context of a distant moment, so that the past was made to encroach the present and I was made to doubt whether I was in the one or the other."⁷¹ Proust and Bergson knew each other—Bergson was married to Proust's cousin—and this connection plays a role, in my view, in Proust's perception of a new dimension of time.⁷²

Walter Benjamin gives the most explicit expression of time as duration by explaining Paul Klee's *Angelus Novus*: "There is a picture by Paul Klee called *Angelus Novus*. An angel is depicted as if he were about to move away from something he is gazing at. His eyes stare, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. The Angel of History must look like this. His face is turned toward the past. Where a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls at his feet."⁷³ Like others, this ninth thesis by Benjamin in *On the Concept of History* explicitly opposes a Rankean view of history, with its continuity and rise and fall.⁷⁴ For both Benjamin and Bergson, history is built on a discontinuous series of durations with no causal or other connections. They are ambiguous in character because past and present are intertwined.

In his *Arcades Project (Passagen Werk)* Benjamin succeeds in creating a narration of this heterogeneous, discontinuous, and most of all ambiguous time. The arcades in nineteenth-century Paris were modern constructions of iron, steel, and glass, but also resembled Christian churches; their immense glass roofs "seemed to be modelled after Oriental bazaars." Benjamin sighs: "There is an attempt to master the new experiences of the city in the frame of the old ones of traditional nature."⁷⁵ The epitaph in *Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century. Exposé* of 1939 (the final title of the *Arcades Project*) states the same ambiguity: "History is like Janus; it has two faces. Whether it looks at the past, or at the present, it sees the same things."⁷⁶ This ambiguous concept of time leads to heterogeneity

71. Proust, *Time Regained*, 262. Also: "between that distant moment [the sound of a bell] and the present one, unrolled in all its vast length, the whole of that past which I was not aware that I carried about within me." *Time Regained*, 529. See also Huizinga's historical sensation and Ankersmit's sublime historical experience.

72. Bergson married Louise Neuberger in 1891, and Proust attended Bergson's lectures at the Sorbonne from 1891 to 1893. The title of Proust's novel can be found in Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, 15.

73. W. Benjamin, *Über den Begriff der Geschichte* (1940), in Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, transl. Harry Zohn (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), Thesis IX.

74. *Ibid.*, Thesis VI.

75. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1995), 110 and 111.

76. "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1939), in Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, transl. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin, based on R. Tiedmann's German edition (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 14.

and discontinuity of the narrated time in the *Arcades Project*. We can see that from its contents:

- A. Arcades, Magasins de Nouveautés, Sales Clerks
- B. Fashion
- C. Ancient Paris, Catacombs, Demolitions, Decline of Paris
- D. Boredom, Eternal Return
-
- U. Saint-Simon, Railroads
- V. Conspiracies, Compagnonnage
- W. Fourier
- X. Marx
- Y. Photography
- Z. The Doll, The Automaton⁷⁷

This history of nineteenth-century Paris is not in chronological order, as in most history books. The heterogeneity and discontinuity of temporality in nineteenth-century Paris could not be better illustrated.

VI. MARCEL PROUST'S *REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST*

The third novel of temporality that Ricoeur discusses is Marcel Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu*, a novel of 3,000 pages in seven volumes. As the English title suggests, the novel is about the voluntary and involuntary memories of its protagonist, Marcel. Ricoeur's analysis leans rather heavily on Deleuze's first publication on *À la recherche du temps perdu*, entitled *Proust and Signs* (1963).⁷⁸ In this study, Deleuze plays down the significance of memories, voluntary as well as involuntary. Proust's novel is, according to Deleuze, not about the past, but about the future. He perceives *Remembrance of Things Past* as what Germans call a *Bildungsroman*. Marcel's sensual experiences recalled involuntarily from the past are not the main theme of the book, according to Deleuze, but rather the theme is Marcel's learning of signs that will teach him the essence of literature, music, and art. He needs to know these signs to fulfill his vocation as a writer. Moreover, Bergson's influence on Proust is completely omitted in Deleuze's *Proust and Signs*. Although Ricoeur does not adopt Deleuze's idea of Proust's novel being exclusively a *Bildungsroman*, he surely confirms his denial of Bergson's impact on Proust.

I agree with Deleuze that alongside memories, there is also a movement to the future. To become an authentic writer, Marcel has to discover what his memories, especially the involuntary ones, signify for creating a work of art. Departing from a rather romantic emplotment as in novels up until the First World War, flashbacks and involuntary memories were hard to integrate into a novel such as

77. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, 28.

78. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs: The Complete Text*, transl. Richard Howard [1963] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

Marcel wants to write. However, Proust finally succeeded in going forward as well as backward in his *À la recherche du temps perdu*.

After the publication of *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze perhaps became aware of Proust's achievement, for in his *Difference and Repetition* (1968),⁷⁹ the past returns in his interpretation of Proust's novel. He congratulates Proust for showing how it is possible to achieve the pure past and retain it for ourselves. Bergson is also back in the picture. Deleuze perceives Bergson as the discoverer of the pure past, despite not being able to tell us how to reach and retain it. Ricoeur does not discuss this second study by Deleuze.

Involuntary memory is surely an issue that Proust borrowed from Bergson. Roger Shattuck has pointed out the agreement between Proust's involuntary memory and Bergson's interpretation of it in *Matter and Memory*. He states: "the distinction between voluntary and involuntary memories is basic to Bergson's argument."⁸⁰ Shattuck is not the only one to underline similarities between Proust and Bergson, despite Proust's statements to the contrary. Keith Pearson in "Time, Space, Forced Movement and the Death-Drive" asserts that Jean-Yves Tardie, David Gross, Theodor Adorno, and Julia Kristeva stress similarities between Proust and Bergson.⁸¹ Unfortunately, Ricoeur refers only to Deleuze's first publication on this subject. Further reading would have shown him that nowadays the relationship between Proust and Bergson is closer than Deleuze admits in his first publication.⁸²

Proust's enormous work also shows similarities to Benjamin's *Arcades Project*. Although we can discern a certain chronology in Proust's temporality that is missing in Benjamin's project, there are similarities regarding heterogeneity and discontinuity. The composition of Proust's novel clarifies that:

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|----|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. | <i>Swann's Way</i> (published 1913) | |
| | a. Swann's love | 1877-1878 |
| | b. Combray | 1883-1892 |
| | c. Gilberte | 1893-1895 |
| 2. | <i>Within a Budding Grove</i> (1918) | |
| | a. Balbec I | summer 1897 |
| 3. | <i>The Guermantes Way</i> (1920) | autumn 1897–summer 1899 |
| 4. | <i>Sodom and Gomorrah</i> (1922) | |
| | a. Balbec II | summer 1900 |
| 5. | <i>The Captive</i> (1923) | |
| | a. Albertine | autumn 1900–early 1902 |

79. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, transl. Paul Patton [1968] (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

80. Roger Shattuck, *Proust's Way* (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 2000), 115.

81. Keith A. Pearson, "Time, Space, Forced Movement and the Death-Drive: Reading Proust with Deleuze," *Warwick Journal of Philosophy* 15 (2004), esp. note 6.

82. Like Deleuze in his first publication on Proust, Kern is convinced of a difference between Bergson and Proust in their concepts of time. He follows Proust's denial of a Bergsonian impact on his novels. He perceives that Bergson's experience of time shows a "continuous gnawing of the past into the present," whereas Proust "valued the shock and pleasure of being suddenly immersed in time which has been experienced discontinuously." See Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space*, 58. I do not agree with Kern. He does not see that Bergson's duration is a "stretched now" that consists of continually changing *heterogeneous* moments that interpenetrate one another. Thus, Bergson's time is continually discontinuous and contradictory, as he has shown in his "empathic" perception of time.

	b. Venice	spring 1902
	c. Tansonville	a few days in 1903
6.	<i>The Fugitive</i> (1925)	1914–1916
7.	<i>Time Regained</i> (1927)	1925 ⁸³

I think Proust was the first to make use of this, apparently odd, construction of time. Living in an age when emplotment in a novel was still done in a Hegelian-romantic way with rise and fall, it was very difficult to do otherwise. Although Mann already had had doubts about its genuine mimetic aspects and therefore ironized romantic emplotment, he was not able to replace it with another configuration of time. Proust was able to do so.

A closer look at his novel shows how. In *Du côté de chez Swann*, Proust tells the story of Marcel growing up in the little town of Combray in a bourgeois milieu. It opens with Marcel remembering his experiences as a little boy. He is lying in his bedroom waiting for his mother. She is downstairs with her husband, two of Marcel's aunts, and Mr. Swann, a friend of the family. Marcel stays awake until the guests are gone, longing to hear his mother coming up the stairs to give him a goodnight kiss.

For Ricoeur, *Remembrance of Things Past* is about the temporality of remembrance. So, there is a double movement: forward, the growing up of a young man, and backward, the remembrances. The novel's opening line is almost paradigmatic for that problem. "For a long time, I went to bed early." The action in this phrase happened in a time that is not the same as the time of its telling. Past and future are intertwined. Here we have at the same time the problem and how Proust solved it. He gave his protagonist two features as a personage: Marcel is the hero as well as the narrator.⁸⁴ Marcel the hero is experiencing in a forward direction what the narrator tells in a backward direction.⁸⁵

Marcel, the hero and the apprentice, has all kinds of experiences regarding smells (a hawthorn), tastes (the famous madeleine), love (for Gilberte and Albertine), art (Elstir), literature (Bergotte), music (Vinteuil), and homosexuality (Vinteuil's daughter with her girlfriend). Wanting to write about the great variety of sensations, he feels a vocation to become an author. Until the seventh part of the novel, Marcel-the-hero has doubts about his ability to create a work of art. His sensations are too strong and heterogeneous to form a plot of continuous and homogeneous time. Marcel-the-narrator suggests the hero has succeeded in the end, telling his experiences often in the form of involuntary memories and flashbacks. To gain insight into "the double Marcel," the seventh and last part of Proust's novel, *Time Regained*, is significant because then hero and narrator come together.

Ricoeur interprets this flowing together as a conversion to an "extratemporal being" that "can encompass *in the same look* the distance of the heterogeneous

83. Apart from *The Arcades Project*, it also resembles Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht's *In 1926: Living at the Edge of Time* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); see its "User's Manual."

84. It is almost a coincidence that Proust has the same Christian name.

85. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 134. The forward-looking Marcel displays the narratological technique of the prolepsis; the backward-looking Marcel shows an analeptic approach. *Ibid.*, 83.

and the simultaneity of the analogous.”⁸⁶ The main reason for this conversion is, in Ricoeur’s view, the hero conquering his fear of death, which brings the narrator to an extratemporal situation, making it possible to create a work of art and so fulfill his vocation.⁸⁷

Ricoeur observes that this part of the novel describing Marcel’s reconciliation with death is about lost time and has “the tone of a funeral maelstrom.”⁸⁸ Ricoeur gives a romantic turn of unilinearity to these lost times. Though he acknowledges a distance “between the lost time of the apprenticeship to signs and the contemplation of the extratemporal,” he concludes: “this will be a distance that is traversed.”⁸⁹

The extratemporal is only a point of passage, “an interim time, that of a work yet to be accomplished, one that may be destroyed by death.”⁹⁰ Thus the connection between the apprenticeship and “a sensation of weariness and almost of terror” in the Guermantes library is, according to Ricoeur, a passage of rise and fall. In my opinion, Ricoeur underlines that interpretation with the utterance “time regained is also death regained.”⁹¹

Reconciliation with death is a theme originating in the Romantic era when it was important to reconcile mind and reality in “identity.” Because of this, Ricoeur criticizes Anne Henry’s essay on *Remembrance of Things Past*. She stresses the significance of identity as a “romantic” theme in which the gap between mind and world has always been bridged. But she sees *À la recherche du temps perdu* as a farewell to the romantic novel, because it shows that the gap between the mind and the material world cannot be bridged anymore.⁹² Ricoeur does not agree with her interpretation.⁹³

Philosophers like Bergson and Benjamin try to find a new temporality. Ricoeur, however, wants to maintain a temporality with an Augustinian extension and a diachronic thrust. He therefore rejects a Bergsonian temporality, which he evaluates as lacking extension and dimension.⁹⁴ In my view, the Bergsonian temporality clearly comes to the fore when the narrator in *Remembrance of Things Past* rejects a cinematic approach to reality: “and what we call reality is a certain connection between these immediate sensations and the memories which envelop us simultaneously with them—a connection that is suppressed in a simple cinematographic vision. . . .”⁹⁵ Here again we have a Bergsonian view.⁹⁶

86. *Ibid.*, 144; my italics.

87. *Ibid.*, 145.

88. *Ibid.*, 142.

89. *Ibid.*, 151.

90. *Ibid.*, 152.

91. *Ibid.*

92. *Ibid.*, 133.

93. *Ibid.*, 132. See also Proust, *Time Regained*, 420. Later on I suggest that metaphor is the only trope that displays that problem.

94. Ricoeur sees that “the itinerary of *Remembrance* moves from the idea of a distance that separates to that of a distance that joins together.” Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 151.

95. Proust, *Time Regained*, 289.

96. See Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (London: Random House, 1911), 361; Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, 9-10. “This is why Bergson spends much of the chapters analyzing the cinematographic mechanism of thought. Bergson believed if we could remove ourselves from this illusionary mechanism we would finally be immersed in a true vision of the world and be closer to the funda-

Ricoeur's rise-and-fall emplotment does not match a triumphal view of fulfilling a vocation.⁹⁷ I prefer to take Proust's title more seriously. *Time Regained* is really a sort of triumph.⁹⁸ "Time lost" is the loss of time in numerous sensations and in either involuntary or voluntary memories. Marcel doubts whether he can become an author, because the numerous heterogeneous, discontinuous, and ambiguous sensations and memories seem to render a homogeneous emplotment impossible.⁹⁹

In *Time Regained*, Marcel the narrator discovers there is no need to construct such a homogeneous emplotment to write a novel. An emplotment founded on "the re-creation by the memory of impressions" can also fulfill his ambition. At the end of the novel, in the Guermantes library, Marcel conceives that a work of art is located in the deepening of the memory of impressions.¹⁰⁰

Ricoeur does not completely lose sight of a heterogeneous time when he refers to Proust's utterance: "truth . . . can be attained by us only when, by comparing a quality common to two sensations, we succeed in extracting their common essence and *reuniting them to each other, liberated from the contingencies of time, within a metaphor.*"¹⁰¹ Ricoeur concludes from this passage: "This metaphorical relation, brought to light by the elucidation of happy moments, becomes the matrix for all the relations in which two distinct objects are raised, despite their differences, to their essence. In metaphor [they are] liberated from the contingencies of time."¹⁰² Although Ricoeur acknowledges the existence of distinct moments, metaphorical "concordance of the temporally discordant" is for him what it is all about.

I read Proust's passage as a metaphor to expose *the (in reality experienced) contingencies of time*. In my view, the metaphor does not liberate one from the contingencies of time, but merely underlines its heterogeneity.¹⁰³ I base this observation on Bergson's metaphor of empathy to explain the ambiguity, discontinuity, and heterogeneity of his temporality. Ricoeur and others see Proust's use of metaphor in *À la recherche du temps perdu* as a benchmark of its temporality. This is true, but metaphor is not, as Ricoeur states, the concordance of the discordant, but only the figure of discordance. It describes conditions, as experts observe, "that are ontologically and empirically bizarre."¹⁰⁴ It is the privilege of language and especially of metaphor to make what is impossible in reality communicable in words. Only in language can man be identical to an animal as in "Stalin is a wolf,"

mental principle of existence." S. G. Armstrong, "Deleuze, Bergson and the Movement in Cinema," in *A Collection of Literary and Philosophical Criticism 1* (2012).

97. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, II, 152.

98. Proust, *Time Regained*, 255.

99. *Ibid.*, 412-413, 415, 420, 505 (time as duration), 510-511, 514.

100. *Ibid.*, 525.

101. *Ibid.*, 290; my italics. See, for Ricoeur's reference, *Time and Narrative*, II, 148.

102. *Ibid.*, 148.

103. The contingencies of time remain in reality and the metaphor "time is heterogeneous" is like Ankersmit's "historical metaphor 'a is b,'" that "transcends the borderline between language and reality in the direction of the latter." Ankersmit, "Representation as a Cognitive Instrument," 177.

104. *A Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Stephen Davies *et al.*, 2d ed. (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 287.

or, as Proust “observes,” three church towers can become three girls.¹⁰⁵ Therefore metaphor is the trope that uncovers a Bergsonian, heterogeneous temporality.

VII. CONCLUSION

Ricoeur’s main purpose in discussing the novels of Mann, Woolf, and Proust is to show that a temporality has been configured in all three that deviates from clock time and chronological time. In my *Triptiek van de tijd (Triptych of Time)*, I explained three different temporalities in historiography: a Ricoeurian time of rise and fall, a composite time initiated by Marx and Bloch and practiced by Braudel, and lastly, a heterogeneous time. Ricoeur is an expert in tropology and temporality. Unfortunately, he investigates only the connection between the two in his analysis of *À la recherche du temps perdu*, ignoring the different tropological approaches and thus also the different temporalities in *The Magic Mountain* and *Mrs. Dalloway*. Regarding Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu*, he does not perceive how metaphor exposes a heterogeneous time.

In volume I of *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur observes only one kind of temporality in historiography. He reduces Braudel’s three temporalities to the mere temporality of rise and fall. In this paper, I have tried to show the connection between special tropes and the discovery of time in all three novels. Mann’s *The Magic Mountain* uses synecdoche to ironize the romantic temporality of rise and fall. Woolf’s *Mrs. Dalloway* displays a metonymical temporality founded on human atomism that takes the form of simultaneity of the dissimultaneous. In Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu*, metaphor allows us to discern a time analogous to Bergson’s heterogeneous, discontinuous, and ambiguous temporality. We would have to devote an entire volume to revealing these three temporalities in historiography because of their hidden status in historical writing. The three novels of time, published shortly after the First World War, let us explain them in a nutshell.

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105. Proust, *À la recherche du temps perdu, Du côté de chez Swann* I (Paris 1919), 261. <http://www.archive.org/stream/p1larecherchedut01prou#page/260/mode/2up> (accessed November 17, 2014).