

CHAPTER IV

“I BESIEGED THAT MAN.” DEMOCRACY’S REVOLUTIONARY START

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In searching for the "origins of Athenian democracy" I have avoided the individualist, institutionalist, and foundationalist premises undergirding much historical work on Athenian political history.¹ My approach to the history of Athenian democracy cares relatively little for the motivations of Cleisthenes or (e.g.) Solon, Ephialtes, Pericles, or Demosthenes, since I do not think that democracy was "discovered" or "invented" by an individual. Rather I suppose that these (and other) highly talented individuals responded creatively to what they correctly perceived as substantial changes in the Athenian political environment, and that these changes were the direct result of collective action. The responses of creative individuals had much to do with the shape of Athenian political culture, but should not be simply equated with it. Next, while I acknowledge that institutions are important in that they allow for the stabilization of a new order of doing things and thus provide a basis for subsequent evolution (see below), I suppose that democratic institutional practices arose in response to a historical rupture, to an "epistemic" sociological/ideological shift — i.e. a substantial and relatively sudden change in the ways that Athenians thought, spoke, and behaved towards one another.² And finally, I suggest that we should replace the notion that Athenian-style democracy was the product of a constitutional "foundation" with a view of *dēmokratia* as pragmatic, experimental, and revisable: originally a product of action on the part of a socially diverse body of citizens and subsequently sustained and revised by the decisions and practices of the citizenry.³

What I am seeking, then, is an epistemic shift, and an event which crystallized that shift and thereby motivated individuals to design institutions capable of framing and giving substance to a dramatically new understanding of society. I will argue here that the key shift occurred in the last decade of the sixth century, and that the decisive event was an uprising by the Athenian dêmos. That uprising took place in response to an attempt by a foreign invader and his quisling Athenian supporters to dissolve the existing Athenian government in 508/7 B.C. Democracy comes into existence with the capacity of a dêmos to act as a collective historical agent. In Athens, that came about when “I, the people” did something that really mattered, by besieging “that man” (a Spartan king and his allies) for three days on the Athenian acropolis.

Two Ancient Accounts of the Athenian Revolution

The most complete and earliest account of these events is by Herodotus, who did the research (that is, collected stories from informants and visited monuments) for his Histories in the mid-fifth century B.C., just within living memory of the uprising itself^t:

[After the last of the tyrants had been deposed by the Spartans] two men were especially powerful (edunasteuon): Cleisthenes, an Alcmaeonid, who was reputed to have bribed the Pythian priestess, and Isagoras, son of Tisander, a man of a notable family ... These men were engaged in a civil conflict over power (estiasian peri dunamios). Cleisthenes was getting the worst of it in this dispute and brought the dêmos into his group of comrades (ton dêmon prosetairizetai). After that he divided the Athenians into ten tribes instead of four as formerly... When he had associated (prosethêkato) the Athenian dêmos, formerly utterly despised (apôsmenon), with his side (moiran), he gave the tribes new names and increased their number, making ten phylarchs in place of four, and assigning ten demes to each tribe... Having brought over (prosthemenos) the people, he was stronger by far than

his rivals in the civil conflict (tôn antistasisiôteôn).

Isagoras, who was on the losing side, devised a counter-plot, and invited the aid of Cleomenes, who had been his guest-friend since the besieging of the Peisistratids. It was even said of Cleomenes that he regularly went to see Isagoras' wife. Then Cleomenes first sent a herald to Athens demanding the banishment of Cleisthenes and many other Athenians with him, the Accursed, as he called them. This he said in his message by Isagoras' instruction, for the Alcmaeonids and their faction were held to be guilty of that bloody deed while Isagoras and his friends had no part in it. When Cleomenes had sent for and demanded the banishment of Cleisthenes and the Accursed, Cleisthenes himself secretly departed.

Afterwards, however, Cleomenes appeared in Athens with a smallish force. Upon his arrival, he, in order to take away the curse, banished seven hundred Athenian families named for him by Isagoras. Having done so he next attempted to abolish the Council (tên boulên kataluein epeirato),⁵ and to transfer political authority to a body of three hundred supporters of Isagoras. But when the Council resisted and refused to obey (antistatheisês de tês boulês kai ou boulomenês peithesthai), Cleomenes, together with Isagoras and his supporters, occupied the Acropolis (katalambanousi tên akropolin). However, the rest of the Athenians (Athênaiôn de hoi loipoi) who were of one mind (ta auta phronêsantes) [regarding these affairs], besieged them [on the Acropolis] for two days. But on the third day a truce was struck and the Lacedaemonians among them were allowed to leave the territory [of Attica].

[Cleomenes] was thus again cast out together with his Lacedaemonians. As for the rest [of Cleomenes' men: Timesitheus of Delphi is the only one named], the Athenians imprisoned them under sentence of death. ... These men, then, were bound and

put to death. After that, the Athenians sent to bring back Cleisthenes and the seven hundred households banished by Cleomenes. (Hdt. 5.66-73.1).

The Aristotelian Constitution of Athens (Athenaiôn Politeia), written a century after Herodotus, in the late fourth century B.C., offers a generally compatible, and indeed largely (although not entirely) derivative account of the events of 508/7:

When the tyranny had been put down, there was a period of faction-strife between Isagoras, son of Teisander, who was a friend of the tyrants, and Cleisthenes, who belonged to the family of the Alcmaeonids. Cleisthenes, having got the worst of it in the comrade-groups (hetaireiai), enlisted the dêmos on his side, offering to hand over the government to the multitude (plêthos).

Isagoras began to lose power, so he again called in the aid of Cleomenes, who was a great friend of his, and jointly persuaded him to drive out the curse, because the Alcmaeonids were reputed to be a family that was under a curse. Cleisthenes secretly withdrew, and Cleomenes with a few troops proceeded to expel as accursed seven hundred Athenian households.

Having accomplished this he tried to put down the Council and set up Isagoras and three hundred of his friends with him in sovereign power over the state. But the boulê resisted (tês de boulês antistasês) and the multitude gathered itself together (kai sunathroisthentos tou plêthous),⁶ so the supporters of Kleomenes and Isagoras fled for refuge (kataphugon) to the acropolis, and the dêmos invested it and laid siege to it for two days. On the third day they let Cleomenes and his comrades go away under a truce, and sent for Cleisthenes and the other exiles to come back.

The dêmos having taken control of affairs (kataschontos de tou dêmou ta pragmata), Cleisthenes was their leader (hêgemôn) and stood first with the people (toû dêmou prostatês)... These were the causes, therefore, that led the dêmos to trust in Cleisthenes. And when this time he had become chief of the multitude (toû plêthous proestêkôs), in the fourth year after the deposition of the tyrants, in the archonship of Isagoras [he enacted various institutional reforms]. These reforms made the constitution much more democratic than that of Solon; for it had come about that the tyranny had obliterated the laws of Solon by disuse, and Cleisthenes aiming at the multitude (stochazomenon tou plêthous) had instituted other new ones, including the enactment of the law about ostracism. (Ath. Pol. 20-22.1)

Retelling the Story

There are many ways a contemporary historian of ancient Greece might retell the story of Athens in the eventful year of the archonship of Isagoras. Modern accounts have tended to emphasize elite personalities and inter-elite conflict, and to see the democratic institutional "foundation" as the invention (whether for altruistic or self-interested purposes) of elite individuals — most notably, of Cleisthenes himself.⁷ By contrast, my story about 508/7 centers on a revolutionary uprising that takes place without leadership in the traditional sense. In my story Cleisthenes' leadership and the successful implementation of the reforms associated with his name are responses to the revolutionary situation, and so it is not Cleisthenes, but the Athenian dêmos (qua citizen body), that is the protagonist.⁸ Cleisthenes plays an important role in my story, but he is not the lead actor. The events of the year 508/7 constitute a genuine rupture in Athenian political history because they mark the moment at which the dêmos stepped onto the historical stage as a collective agent, a historical actor in its own right and under its own name.⁹

In the aftermath of the expulsion of the tyrants in 510 B.C. the political battlefield of Athens was initially disputed between rival aristocrats, supported by coterie of limited size and heavily weighted to the upper end of the socio-economic spectrum. Isagoras and his supporters sought to narrow the existing (Solonian/Peisistratean) "constitution," first by restricting the body of those entitled to citizenship,¹⁰ and then by turning over political power to a small, and homogeneously pro-Spartan elite. Isagoras' main opponent was Cleisthenes, a leading member of the politically prominent Alcmaeonid family. There is no reason to suppose that Cleisthenes was a "proto-democrat" in the era before 508/7. His prior political record suggests no deep ideological commitments: Cleisthenes had been willing to accept the high office of archon under the tyranny, although some elements of the Alcmaeonid family were probably active in resistance to the tyrants in subsequent years.¹¹ Cleisthenes may have felt that his family's anti-tyrannical activity had earned him a position in the subsequent political order. But in the event, it was Isagoras, with his Spartan connections, who was elected archon for 508/7 B.C.¹²

In what was probably an improvised and rather desperate response to Isagoras' election, Cleisthenes brought the "formerly despised" dêmos (the mass of Athenian citizens — including free sub-hoplites) into his group of comrades — his hetaireia. His surprise move suggests that he was aware of a desire for political recognition on the part of the dêmos. The aetiology of that desire is complex, but we may assume that (inter alia) the constitutional reforms of Solon and the civic festivals sponsored by the tyrants had undercut traditional lines of authority and encouraged Athenian political self-consciousness. By 508 B.C. the ordinary Athenian male was no longer a politically passive client of a great house. He had begun to view himself as a citizen rather than as a subject and at least some part of his loyalty was owed to the abstraction "Athens."¹³ Cleisthenes played to the demotic desire for recognition and he gained the trust of the dêmos by promising (perhaps actually proposing) legislative initiatives that would place decisions about

citizenship in the hands of the people themselves, and would broaden the scope of non-elite political participation.

In 508 Athenian political institutions were rudimentary and dominated by the elite. We may suppose there were occasional meetings of a political Assembly that citizens (even sub-hoplites) had the right to attend. But it is unlikely that those outside the aristocratic elite could address the Assembly; nor could a non-elite Athenian hope to serve as a magistrate, or on the Areopagus council.¹⁴ Cleisthenes, as a leading member of a prominent family and as an Areopagite, surely did have both the right and the power to address the Assembly. It seems a reasonable guess that he cemented his alliance with the dêmos by proposing in the Assembly changes in the structure and duties of the tribes and the probouleutic council. The sub-elite (and especially the sub-hoplite) Athenians saw that these reforms would reduce their vulnerability by guaranteeing their standing as citizens, and might allow them to express more fully their emerging sense of themselves as citizens. With his new mass hetaireia, Cleisthenes surged past his aristocratic rival in the struggle for power and influence.¹⁵ Our sources are silent on the matter of just how Cleisthenes' new influence was made manifest, but we may guess that it was signaled by victories in the Assembly, possibly even by demonstrations in the streets.

Isagoras was, however, still archon and any proposed constitutional changes would remain mere words until and unless the citizen Assembly's expressed will actually decided the course of events. To prevent that outcome, Isagoras called upon Cleomenes, who ordered the expulsion of Cleisthenes and many others on the "standard archaic" assumption that eliminating aristocratic leadership would solve the problem. Cleisthenes had no interest in heroism or martyrdom; he duly snuck out of town. Yet even after Cleisthenes' departure, Isagoras remained uneasy about the Athenian situation. A mixed-nationality military force, featuring a core of Spartans and led by Cleomenes, soon arrived in the city. On Isagoras' recommendation,

Cleomenes proclaimed some 700 families "religiously polluted," on the grounds of blood spilled by Cleisthenes' Alcmaeonid ancestors, and drove them from the polis. Presumably this mass purge served to eliminate the deeper "second tier" of Cleisthenes' supporters.¹⁶ With Cleisthenes and other prominent Athenians who had opposed Isagoras in exile, the archon Isagoras and his Spartan allies now seemed to be securely in control of Athens. That might have been the end of Cleisthenes' experiment in "mass politics." Athens seemed fated to become a second Argos — an occasionally restive but ultimately impotent state within Spart's zone of control, unhappy with Spartan dominance but incapable of becoming a serious rival.

What happened next was completely outside of any Athenian's prior experience: It was the moment of popular revolution I alluded to above. Cleomenes attempted to abolish the existing Council in favor of a body of three hundred supporters of Isagoras. But the Councilmen refused to obey the dissolution order. Their resistance would have been futile in the face of Cleomenes' soldiers, except that "the rest of the Athenians, being of one mind" now rose up in arms. Caught by surprise by this dangerous expression of popular solidarity, Cleomenes, Isagoras, and their supporters quickly withdrew to the stronghold on the Acropolis. But the problem did not go away. The armed multitude besieged them on the Acropolis for two days and they surrendered on the third. Cleomenes and his Spartans were expelled from Athenian territory. In the aftermath of the expulsion of the Spartans, some non-Spartan members of Cleomenes' force (including Timesitheus of Delphi) and perhaps some supporters of Isagoras (although not Isagoras himself: Hdt. 5.74.1) were arrested and subsequently executed. It was after these events that the Athenians recalled Cleisthenes and the 700 families (Hdt. 5.73.1). Cleisthenes had retained the people's trust through his short period of exile, and he immediately set about instituting the promised changes in the constitutional order, presumably by proposing a series of decrees that were passed by the citizen Assembly.¹⁷

Explaining a Revolution

The retelling of the story I offer above attempts to make sense of our two surviving ancient accounts. I have tried to show that Herodotus and the Athenaiôn Politeia described a truly remarkable but perfectly possible chain of events, albeit in light of their own interpretive principles and in the political vocabulary of their own eras. The alternative to trying to make sense of what our primary sources tell us happened is to assume (as do some historians studying this period) that the ancient accounts must be rejected out of hand on the grounds of their putative incompatibility with the conditions of archaic Greek society and the sociology of mass action: Their argument is that an essentially leaderless uprising by "the demos" did not take place because such an event could not take place in Athens in that period. This approach seems to me flawed for two reasons: (1) it rests on an a priori denial of the possibility of exactly the sort of historical rupture that I suppose is necessary for Athenian democracy to come into being. (2) It leaves the field of interpretation more confused than need be: having rejected the stories offered by the ancient sources, the historian must either make up his own account of 508/7 on the basis of an elaborate theory of "human behavior under the conditions of archaic society," or remain completely agnostic about what took place. Neither (1) nor (2) seem to me to be desirable interpretive stances for Greek historians. I hope to have shown that we can make good sense of the evidence without resorting either one.¹⁸

My goal in retelling the story was to draw attention to the revolution of 508/7 as a historically significant event. I do not offer here anything like a full and satisfactory account for the classical democracy of the fifth or fourth centuries. The revolution was, I believe, a necessary condition for the emergence of democracy in that it made the overt rule of the people possible. The energy released by the revolution was a key factor in Athens' subsequent political evolution:

in the short term in the “Cleisthenic” innovations affecting citizenship, local authority, the advisory Council, the army, and control over leaders; in the longer term in the panoply of democratic institutions that developed the course of the fifth century and fourth centuries. I do not, however, claim that the revolution of 508/7 caused democracy in the strong sense of being its sufficient condition. In and of itself, the revolutionary event would not have been sufficient to bring about the complex and sophisticated body of institutions associated with classical Athenian democracy. Any full explanation for Athenian democracy must make room for the influence of individual initiative, for external developments, for contingency, etc.

Moreover, a full and satisfactory account of classical democracy would have to take into account a long pre-revolutionary history. The transgressive (Wolin 1996), episteme-shattering-and-creating moment of revolution certainly could not have come about accidentally or by magic; it required a prior history of volatile mass/elite relations and the emergence of demotic self-consciousness (see, in general, Ober 1989: ch. 2). The prior conditions that enabled the revolution of 508/7, certainly include the much earlier Greek embrace of what Robert Dahl calls the "Strong Principle of Equality" (Dahl 1989; Morris 1996); the archaic co-evolution of Greek agriculture, land warfare, and "republican" political organization (V. Hanson 1995, 1996); Solon's reforms and the beginnings of citizenship as defined by specific legal immunities (Manville 1990; Wallace 1998); the development of "civilian self consciousness" under the Peisistratid tyranny (Eder 1988); as well as Cleisthenes' promise to institute a political program emphasizing guarantees of citizenship and enhanced participation. Proper attention to the pre-revolutionary background can help us to understand why the Athenian dêmos was ready and willing to act as a collectivity in response to the offensive actions of Isagoras and Cleomenes on the one hand, and to the resistance offered by the Athenian Councilmen on the other. And yet deep background can take us only so far. There must be a moment when potential energy is

released as kinetic energy — when political possibilities become realities. In the history of Athenian democracy that moment occurs while Cleisthenes and his close supporters are in exile and when the dêmos steps out onto the historical stage to besiege Isagoras and his Spartan minions on the Acropolis. Revolutionary action is important in my story because (whether or not the term dêmokratia was used in 508/7) it made democracy possible by changing the terms of discussion, by enlarging the bounds of the thinkable, and by altering the way citizens treated one another.

Our two surviving ancient historical accounts of the actual moment of revolution are clear in assigning collective agency to the dêmos, but they are frustratingly compressed. We will presumably never know the details of what actually happened between Cleomenes' attempt to dissolve the Council and his surrender on terms. The material specificity of the events of the Athenian Revolution still exist for us only at the level of imagination. But we can at least attempt to define the limits of reasonable speculation by specifying what did not happen. First, and perhaps foremost, we should not imagine the siege of the Spartans on the Acropolis as a leader-organized military campaign. My retelling of the events of 508/7 foregrounds what is perhaps the most striking element in the story: the absence of organized leadership. The uprising was in favor of a program of constitutional changes, yet it occurred when the proposer of those changes was in exile, along with all of his most prominent (primary and secondary tier) supporters.

There is no mention of military leaders in Herodotus' or the Athenaiôn Politeia's description of the siege. Nor is there in the only other classical source for the revolution: Aristophanes' comedy, Lysistrata (lines 273-282). Here the chorus of Old Athenian Men, girding themselves for an assault on the Acropolis (held by a mixed-nationality force of women), urge each other on "since when Cleomenes seized it previously, he did not get away unpunished, for despite his Laconian spirit he departed giving over to me his arms, wearing only a little cloak,

hungry, dirty, hairy-faced... that's how ferociously I besieged that man, keeping constant guard, drawn up seventeen ranks deep at the gates." The "I" in question, the agent of Cleomenes' humiliation, is a collectivity: the Athenian dêmos here represented by its patriotic old men. This is not, of course, history, but a poetic and comic description. Nevertheless, the Aristophanes passage probably does represent a living popular tradition about the siege (Thomas 1989: 245-247). And that tradition apparently focused on the military action of the people as a collectivity rather than on any doings of their leaders.¹⁹ By contrast, institutionalized leadership is a prominent feature of the surviving historical accounts of a prior siege by Athenians of political revolutionaries on the acropolis: the result of Cylon's attempt to seize a tyranny in 636 or 632 (Ober 1998: 74 with details).

The ascription of the leading role in the drama of 508/7 to the Athenian people as a collectivity, rather than to individual leaders, is reiterated later in Herodotus' text (5.91.2): When the Spartans reconsider the wisdom of having deposed Hippias in 510, they complain to their allies that at that time they had handed over the polis of Athens to "an ungrateful dêmos," which "having just recently been freed by us, reared up (anekupse) and, in an act of exceptional arrogance (periubrisas), drove out [from Athens] both us and our king." This is, of course, Herodotus speaking and not the "real" Spartans, but it confirms that the historian regarded the Athenian dêmos as the primary revolutionary actor. The absence of leaders in his earlier account is no casual lapse. There is, of course, no way of countering the argument that there still "might have been" prominent leaders who were subsequently mysteriously or maliciously neglected by the Athenian historical and oral traditions. But the only reason to invent such leaders is an a priori assumption that a coherent and plausible story cannot be told without them. My point is that a coherent and plausible story can be constructed on the basis of the sources that we do have. Those sources focus on a dêmos that was both revolutionary actor and direct beneficiary of the

reforms which followed the uprising.

Those who prefer to seek prominent men as leaders for the uprising can point to that fact that leaderless revolts are extremely rare in human history. But the appearance of democracy is also a historical rarity. The problem with a purely "long durée," evolutionary, "business as usual" approach to history, an approach that rejects the unique significance of remarkable events, is that it cannot allow for sudden and dramatic changes in what is possible; it cannot accommodate the conundrum that revolutionary action (and thus democracy) is impossible until the moment of its occurrence. Explaining the sudden appearance of the possible through (formerly) impossible action is the point of focusing on radical disruption and transformation. This does not happen often in history, but we should pay careful attention when it does.

If my retelling is not leader-centered, nor is it hoplite-centered. Again, I appeal to the sources. Neither Herodotus nor the Aristotelian Athenaiôn Politeia depicts the siege of the acropolis as undertaken by an army of hoplites, as opposed to a socially diverse body that included both men of hoplite status and thetes (free sub-hoplites). According to Herodotus it is Athenaiôn hoi loipoi (the rest of the Athenians) who, united in their view of the situation, do the besieging. The Athenaiôn Politeia (20.3) mentions to plêthos and ho dêmos. The fact that no "regular army" appears in our sources might best be explained by the hypothesis that no "national" army existed in the era before the carrying out of Cleisthenes' constitutional reforms. If there was no national army, then we must suppose that archaic Athenian military actions were ordinarily carried out by aristocratic leaders, men who were able to muster substantial bodies of armed followers (Frost 1984). If this is right, the mass expulsion recommended by Isagoras and carried out by Cleomenes would have thoroughly disrupted the traditional means of mustering the Athenian army — and this may well have been among their motives for undertaking large-scale expulsions of their opponents. It is not modern scholars alone who doubt the ability of the

masses to act without orders from their superiors.

The action that forced the surrender of the Spartans was evidently carried out in the absence of traditional military leaders and without a regular army. It is thus best understood as a riot — a violent uprising by large numbers of armed and semi-armed Athenian citizens — perhaps somewhat akin to the surprising mass uprising that led to the siege and capture of the Bastille in Paris in 1789 and thus precipitated the French Revolution.²⁰ In order to explain Cleomenes' quick surrender, we must assume that the riot was sudden, large-scale, and intense.²¹

The rioters were also disciplined enough to sustain their action over a period of days. Having occupied ~~of~~ the Acropolis, Cleomenes and his warriors were barricaded on a natural fortress, a stronghold that had frustrated the regular Spartan army during the campaign against the tyrant Hippias in 510. Herodotus (5.65.1) claims that if Hippias' sons had not fortuitously fallen into their hands, the Spartans would never have succeeded in dislodging Hippias, who had supplied himself with adequate provisions. Rather, "they would only have besieged the place for a few days and then returned to Sparta." Yet in 508/7 the royal Spartan commander agreed to a humiliating conditional surrender on only the third day of the siege — a surrender that entailed sacrificing certain of his comrades. Cleomenes' agreement to these harsh terms suggests that the forces arrayed against him were too numerous for a sortie and that he had not laid in enough supplies to wait out a siege. Apparently Cleomenes had occupied the Acropolis in haste, which in turn suggests that the popular uprising occurred quite suddenly. What was the factor that sparked the dêmos' unexpected action?

Herodotus' account describes the relevant events in the following stages:

1. Cleomenes attempts to dissolve the Council
2. the Council resists
3. Cleomenes and his force, along with Isagoras and his supporters, occupy the

Acropolis

4. the rest of the Athenians are united in their views
5. they besiege the Spartan force
6. Cleomenes surrenders on the third day of the siege

If we are to follow Herodotus, we must suppose that steps 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are chronologically discrete and sequential events. Step 4 cannot, on the other hand, be regarded as a chronological moment. Herodotus' language (ta auta phronêsantes — "all of one mind") supports the idea of a highly developed civic consciousness among the Athenian masses — a generalized ability to formulate a popular consensus and act upon it. Of course popular unity of purpose would not have been instantaneous. Word of events 1-3 would have spread through Athens through the piecemeal word-of-mouth operations typical of a largely oral society. Presumably those living in the city learned what was going on first, and the news then quickly spread to the rural citizenry.²²

If we take our lead from Herodotus' account, two precipitating factors could explain the crystallization of opinion and the outbreak of violent anti-Spartan action on the part of the Athenian dêmos. First, the riot may have been sparked by the Spartan attempt to dissolve the Council and the Councilmen's resistance (thus the dêmos' action would be a consequence of steps 1 and 2, but before step 3). According to this scenario, Cleomenes and Isagoras responded to the sudden uprising by making a defensive retreat to the nearby stronghold of the Acropolis. Alternatively, the riot might have broken out only after the Spartan occupation of the Acropolis (thus after step 3). On this reading, the riot would be precipitated by the Spartan's offensive (in both senses of the term) takeover of the sacred Acropolis. This second hypothesis fits with Herodotus' (5.72.3-4, cf. 5.90.2) story of Cleomenes' disrespectful behavior at the temple of Athena on the Acropolis. Yet it does not explain why Cleomenes brought his entire force up to the Acropolis or why Isagoras and his partisans (Hdt. 5.72.2) were with Cleomenes on the

Acropolis during the siege.²³

It is certain that the author of the Athenaiôn Politeia (20.3) saw Cleomenes' and Isagoras' move to the Acropolis as a defensive response to the threat posed by a mass action on the part of the Athenians: he claims that when "the boulê resisted and the multitude gathered itself together, the supporters of Cleomenes and Isagoras fled for refuge (katephugon) to the Acropolis." Athenaiôn Politeia's ascription of motive has independent evidentiary value only if its author had access to evidence (whether in the form of written or oral traditions) other than Herodotus' account. That issue of source criticism is contested and cannot be resolved here. But if (per above) Aristophanes relied on Athenian oral tradition in his comic restaging of the siege, it is not de facto unlikely that the author of Athenaiôn Politeia, who certainly had independent information on Cleisthenes' actual reforms, might have read or heard that Cleomenes and Isagoras fled to the Acropolis when a mob formed subsequent to their unsuccessful attempt to dissolve the Council. Even if we were to regard the account of the siege in the Athenaiôn Politeia as completely derived from Herodotus' account, it would remain the case that the author of the Athenaiôn Politeia interpreted Herodotus' account as describing a flight rather than a planned act of aggression.²⁴

Although certainty cannot be achieved in the face of our limited sources, I think it is easiest to suppose that the riot initially broke out when Isagoras and Cleomenes sought to dissolve the Council and the Councilmen resisted. Once again, the French Revolution provides an illuminating parallel: The mass uprising that led to the capture of the Bastille was sparked by an attempt by King Louis XVI to dissolve the National Assembly (Ober 1996: 46-49 with details). Caught off guard by the uprising, Cleomenes and Isagoras retreated with their forces to the Acropolis stronghold to regroup. They must have hoped and expected that the riot would subside overnight. Yet rapidly spreading news of the occupation of the Acropolis further

inflamed "the rest of the Athenians" and so the ranks of the rioters were continually augmented as rural residents took up arms (regular or makeshift) and streamed into the town. From Cleomenes' perspective, the bad situation, which had begun with the resistance of the Councilmen, quickly degenerated into a crisis. Stranded on the barren hill without adequate food or water, and with the ranks of his opponents increasing hourly, Cleomenes saw that his position was hopeless and he negotiated a surrender that saved himself and his Spartan countrymen. With the successful completion of the siege by the Athenian dêmos, democracy became possible.

The origins of democracy

To say that an event made democracy possible requires us to define what we mean by democracy. If we define democracy as the institutional practices prevalent in 461-411 (or subsequently) we will of course have aprioristically eliminated any era before that period as "democratic." My preferred alternative is to look at the root meaning of the compound word dêmokratia and the ideals that are exemplified in philo-democratic writing (and parodied by democracy's critics) from the fifth through the fourth century. Dêmokratia means, imprimis, "the power of the people": the publicly manifested power of the dêmos to make things happen. It is the authority or dominance of the dêmos in the polis. That dêmos includes as full "sharers" in the politeia not only the "middling" hoplites but the common (working, sub-hoplite) people who make up the clear majority of the adult native male population. The distinction between "dêmos = all native males, irrespective of class" and "dêmos = lower classes only" is one drawn by critics or opponents of democracy, not by democrats themselves.

I have suggested that the inauguration of democracy is attendant upon an "epistemic shift" — one with profound implications for speech, thought, and action. But the shift which occurred in 508/7 did not lead to the sudden end of leadership by members of the Athenian elite.

Even those (like myself) who regard collective actions without formal leadership as possible, must grant that such actions are historical rarities. Indeed, as noted above, it is their rarity that makes them important. Building a complex society on the basis of an ongoing sequence of "genuinely leaderless actions" — on "revolution, revolution, and more revolution" — remains in the realm of naïve anarchist fantasy or cynical political mystification. Nor is it necessary to assume that the profundity of the epistemic shift was universally recognized or acknowledged at the time. In his 1835 introduction to Democracy in America, A. de Tocqueville chided his aristocratic French contemporaries for their failure to grasp the scope of democratic change in the early nineteenth century. As Tocqueville pointed out fifteen years later, in the introduction to his twelfth edition, it was not until the revolutions of 1848 that many aristocrats finally woke up to the new order of things. So too it may not have been until the mid-fifth century — by which time the political options for each elite Athenian had been reduced to asserting himself within the democratic order (by seeking to become a popular orator), working at overthrowing the democracy (per the oligarchic revolutionaries of 411), or criticizing democracy from the sidelines (per Ps-Xenophon's Athenaiôn Politeia) — that the full extent of the epistemic shift was manifest. But, remembering Tocqueville's impatience with his contemporaries, we should not allow some Athenians' delayed "uptake" to blind us to the substance of the epistemic shift itself.

As both Athenian democratic orators and critics of democracy such as Aristotle (among others) pointed out, dēmokratia is the celebration by the dēmos of a way of life centered on the freedom of the citizen and political equality. Clearly the content and application of both eleuth-root and iso-root terms evolved dramatically in the course of the fifth century, in part as a result of political debates between democrats and their critics (Raaflaub 1983, 1985, 1989). Yet I would say that any time that a dēmos which included sub-hoplites (1) possessed and employed the power to make things happen and (2) used that power to establish or further practices

predicated upon and productive of freedom and equality among the members of that broad-based citizen body, then dēmokratia in a classical Greek sense also pertained. Under this definition, democracy became at once a possibility and a reality only when the dēmos became at once a self-conscious and willful actor in its own right, a grammatical subject rather than an object of someone else's verb, when that which "seemed right to the people" (edoxe toi demoi) determined policy. Once again, that moment occurs in 508/7.²⁵

In sum, the narrative I have offered above, based on close reading of Herodotus and the Aristotelian Ath. Pol., is quite different from what some classical scholars suppose "must have been" the case, based on the presumption that the story of democracy's origins should focus primarily on the ordinary conditions of archaic society, on aristocratic leaders, and on the "hoplite class." Yet this presumption requires slighting our closest contemporary accounts, which indicate that (1) the dēmos did act, and (2) that it acted in the absence of organized leadership. (3) The action of the siege was sustained and (4) it was carried through to its conclusion (surrender of Cleomenes). Finally (5) it had profound implications for the future of the polis. It is to a consideration of a few of those implications that we may now turn.

One immediate consequence of the Revolution was actualization of the package of "Cleisthenic" reforms. The relationship between those reforms and the promises Cleisthenes made to the dēmos in order to bring them into his hetaireia remains unclear; the reform package might best be thought of simply as pre-revolutionary promises reviewed and reinterpreted in the new light of post-revolutionary social realities.²⁶ Below, I sketch a few of the changes that were put into place during the immediate post-revolutionary generation (the thirty-year period 507-478). In my introduction, I rejected the "institutionalist" explanation for the origins of democracy as putting the cart before the horse. But without the structure provided by subsequent institutional changes, the energies of the revolution of 508/7 would have dissipated. The

revolutionary event might have proved to be no more than an archaic Greek *Jacquerie* — a moment that scared entrenched elites and ruffled the surface of society yet failed to disrupt the deep structures of elite control. The essential series of "first (post-revolutionary) generation" institutional changes mark a break with past (pre-democratic) practice, a break that is arguably more radical than anything that happened subsequently in the long and eventful history of Athenian democratic development. Inter alia, these early changes promoted the rise of the polis of Athens from the middle ranks of regionally-significant towns, to the status of a great Mediterranean power.²⁷

First and foremost, the reform of the system of Athenian tribes and demes, as described by the Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.*, and elucidated by the work of several generations of Greek historians, is truly remarkable. As Lévèque and Vidal-Naquet (1964; English transl. 1996) argued in detail (one need not accept all of their ideas to take the basic point), the reform was sweeping, amounting to a rupture in the way that public space and time were imagined. The new system of local authority at the level of the demes enforced a startlingly new conception of each man's claim to citizenship as directly dependent upon a decision of his fellow citizens as a voting group: one's claim to merit citizenship, based on one's legitimate birth, was now to be a matter judged by one's fellow demesmen. Thus, by making "the inhabitants in each of the demes fellow-demesmen of one another" (*Ath. Pol.* 21.4), the new constitution placed directly in the hands of ordinary men the power to decide the momentous question: "Who is fit to be one of us?" From that moment on, at the highly charged moment at which he sought to have his son recognized by the community as an adult Athenian, and thus regarded as worthy of all the immunities and all the participation rights of the citizen, the wealthy aristocrat and the landless laborer alike were dependent upon the vote of their fellow Athenians.

The new system had an immediate and measurable effect upon Athens' capacity to

compete militarily with neighboring powers. In 506 B.C., barely a year after the tribe/deme reform, Athens celebrated its first really significant foreign policy/military success, against a dangerous coalition of Spartans, Boeotians, and Chalcidians. The four-horse bronze monument erected on the Acropolis with its cocky inscription commemorating the victory over the Chalcidians, along with the establishment of a cleruchy at Chalcis, sums up the new Athenian military self-confidence (Hdt. 5.74-78).²⁸

Given that there was little time to train a new army, we may guess that the Athenian victories were largely due to the great size and high morale of their field armies: I imagine something like the "levée en masse" of revolutionary France, the hastily assembled but massive armed force which scored dramatic victories over regional rivals in the years after 1789. The post-revolutionary Athenian land army was clearly an artifact of the new post-revolutionary political order. The victories of 506 immediately changed Athens' status within the Greek world. As Herodotus notes, "The Athenians at this point became much stronger. So it is clear how worthy an object of attention is equality of public speech (*isêgoria*), not just in one respect but in every sense. Since when they were ruled by tyrants, the Athenians did not stand out from their neighbors in military capability, but after deposing the tyrants, they became overwhelmingly superior" (5.78).

We need not necessarily imagine the victories of 506 as the work of a clearly articulated hoplite class within the Athenian state. Pericles Georges (1993) makes the compelling suggestion that the Cleisthenic reforms, which put the Athenian citizen body in control of its own membership, may have been more radically egalitarian in their effects than is often supposed. Georges points out that most elements of the hoplite panoply could be quite cheaply "home made" and that the true worth of the warrior was tested in battle. A man's hoplite (*zeugite*) status was self-asserted and confirmed by those of his demesmen and tribesmen with whom he fought.

It was not tested by some government functionary on the basis of "objective" wealth criteria. And so there was much room for slippage between the categories of subhoplites and hoplites, between thetes and zeugites. This sort of slippage would surely have been encouraged in the aftermath of the military success of the siege of 508/7 which, if we are to believe our ancient sources, must have included Athenians of "subhoplite" status.

In the years following the Revolution the Athenians adopted a bold new plan for a probouleutic Council, which would now be selected according to the new system of tribes and demes. The organization of the new Council of 500 allowed "local knowledge," gained through face-to-face interactions to be "networked" and thereby made available at the national level. The new system also proved to be an extremely effective "learning by doing" form of civic education. It promoted polis-level patriotism and a conviction that personal sacrifices for the common good benefitted each Athenian, rather than serving the interests of a narrow elite. The organization of the new Council of 500 was based directly on the new system of tribes: much of the work of the Council was done by tribal teams of fifty. The experience of working closely with (indeed, for part of the year living with) a team of men from all across Attica, addressing the vital matter of designing the agenda for the citizen Assembly (and much routine administration as well), constituted a deep education in the value of "equality of public speech" and in the habits of group-based decision-making. Upon his return home, the former Councilman brought back to his fellow-demesmen a deeper understanding of how the new system worked in practice.²⁹ Moreover, his term of service was annual and so the Council's membership changed every year. As A.W. Gomme pointed out long ago, the principle of rotation meant that the new Council of 500 (unlike the Areopagus Council, with its life membership of former archons) could never develop a cohesive "corporate identity." And this meant that the extraordinary power associated with "agenda-setting" was annually redistributed among a broad spectrum of the citizenry, rather

than being monopolized by a small and cohesive elite.³⁰

The newly established probouleutic Council points to the consolidation of the post-revolutionary Assembly as a deliberative decision-making body, and is a clear sign that post-revolutionary Athenian decision-making would not return to pre-revolutionary "business as usual." A purpose-built Council-building was, according to the most likely chronology (see Shear 1994), part of an ambitious Athenian public building program inaugurated around 500 B.C. The new building program established the central, open area below the Acropolis, Pnyx, and Areopagus as the center of Athenian civic life.

Among the dramatic series of "first generation" institutional innovations, the introduction of ostracism is especially notable, in that it is a frank assertion of the power of the dêmos as a political collectivity to judge the public behavior of each prominent member of the community, and to gather for the express purpose of voting to expel an individual from the community. Ostracism procedure began with a decision by the Assembly. Next came the preparation of makeshift (metaphorical) weapons, to be aimed at a dangerous man. The metaphorical weapons were deployed at a mass gathering in the Agora. The end product was the expulsion of a designated public enemy. The entire process could be seen as a political ritual that allows for (although does not mandate) the annual reperformance of the revolutionary moment itself. Here a strong distinction can be drawn between the Athenian Revolution of 508/7 B.C. and the French Revolution that began in 1789. Whereas both the Athenian and French Revolutions featured the execution of persons judged "public enemies," the Athenian revolutionary moment did not devolve into organized Terror against aristocratic "counter-revolutionaries." Ostracism channeled what could have become a nasty habit of venting demotic ire in acts of mass violence into a carefully delimited institutional exertion of the "power to exile." The object of that power was limited to one prominent individual each year and punishment was limited to temporary

banishment (Forsdyke 2000).

The longer-term effect of the Revolution was evident in the next generation. About 25 years after the Revolution, in 483/2, the Athenians made the remarkable decision to build the greatest single-polis naval force the Greek world had ever seen. Once again, similar stories are told by Herodotus (7.144.1-2) and the Aristotelian. Ath. Pol. (22.7): on the motion of Themistocles the Athenians decided not distribute the revenues from a providential silver strike to the individual citizens, but to devote the funds to the construction of a gigantic number of triremes (100: Ath. Pol. or 200: Hdt.). The fleet building went very quickly; by 480, Athens was able to contribute 180 ships for the battle of Salamis.³¹ The conditions necessary for a big polis-fleet included not only a certain amount of usable capital (the silver) but also the capacity to train a large body of shipbuilders and very large pool of trustworthy manpower to man the ships themselves.

The providential silver surplus provided only partial means to the goal of building a navy; it was certainly insufficient to pay a full complement of mercenaries to man the great fleet. Athens in the 480s did not enjoy the reliable income that control of the Isthmus provided Corinth, the other major sea power on the Greek mainland before the Persian Wars (40 ships contributed in 480). If the key to Corinthian sea power was great wealth, which meant that reliable oarsmen could be hired, then the key to Athens' navy is the utilization of Athens' relatively vast sub-hoplite citizen manpower reserve. But this reserve could not be tapped until the thetes were "militarized" until they, like hoplites, were ready and willing to defend the state with their bodies. Nor could it be tapped until the hoplites, in their turn, were ready to depend for their salvation on the bodies of thetes.

The full militarization of the thetes must be intimately related to the revolution of 508/7 and its immediate aftermath. The great Athenian fleet of 480 B.C. is the naval counterpart to the

Athenian land army which succeeded against the Peloponnesians, Boeotians, and Chalcidians in 506. Both army and navy were unexpectedly successful and each was made possible by the faith that Athenian citizen society had in itself — a generalized faith in "polis qua dêmos" that blurred the lines between the roles appropriate to hoplites and thetes. Because the Athenians could now trust their fellow citizens (including thetes) with military power, Athens as a polis was able to translate the potential power latent in its demography and mineral wealth into actual, deployable military force. It is the new sense that all citizens can now be asked to guard the polis that leads to the radical decision to abandon Attica in 480 and to depend on the fleet for the preservation of the polis.³² That momentous decision, as Herodotus is at pains to explain (7.142), was made in the open Assembly, after vigorous debate ("many opinions" [gnômai...pollai] were aired in the Assembly). In the course of the debate the traditional authority of "elders" and "religious experts" (chresmologoi) was decisively rejected and a bold plan, which depended directly upon the recently militarized thetes was adopted. Once again, this points to a radical break with the pre-revolutionary political and social order.

If the project of building and manning a huge navy is inconceivable before the democratic revolution, then, a fortiori, so too is the creation of an Athenian Empire. After the Persian Wars, and with the Spartans quickly bowing out of any continued leadership role, the Athenians willingly took on the task of Hellenic leadership, at a moment when just rebuilding the sacked city and its economy might have seemed more than enough.³³ The first post-revolutionary (thirty-year) generation comes to an end just as Athens launched upon the confederation/empire-building mission that other scholars have seen as the necessary precondition for "true" democracy. But the Delian League and, eventually, the empire became possible only because Athens (unlike non-democratic poleis) could ideologically tolerate the presence of a huge and permanent armed force of sub-hoplite citizens. In this sense, the navy and thus the empire can be

understood as artifacts of democracy, rather than its necessary preconditions.

Permanent armed forces in poleis were typically associated by the Greeks with the rule of tyrants who required mercenaries to secure their control of affairs (e.g. Xenophon, Hiero 5.3, 6.4-5, 6.11, 10.3-8). Aside from Sparta, with its special condition of a massive helot population, the Greek moderately oligarchic "hoplite republic" is defined by the amateur and occasional nature of its politics and its armed forces (Hanson 1995, 1996). In what Victor Hanson has called the "normative polis" the dêmos of warriors (qua political assembly), like the army (qua phalanx of hoplites), exists only in emergencies: at and for those moments of crisis when it calls itself into being. By contrast, the democratic Athenian dêmos met frequently and regularly to transact all manner of business. And, as a corollary, Athens could afford (politically and ideologically as well as materially) to create and maintain (as a navy) a permanent and institutionalized military apparatus. Athens could afford to build and maintain the military force that made empire possible because of democratic social relations — because of the generalized feelings of trust and good faith between social classes, between mass and elite, between hoplites and thetes.

Democracy (as a state of mind, an ideology) was the enabling condition of the Athenian empire, even as that empire was itself the enabling condition of the full panoply of legislative, judicial, and magisterial institutions developed in the middle decades of the fifth century. My point is that the Athenian empire, like the navy, is a product of the origins of democracy, not vice versa. The empire did indeed make possible the further articulation of the democratic institutional order. And that further articulation arguably enabled the Athenians to survive the crises of the late fifth century and rebuild a vibrant democracy in the fourth century. That is an important and exciting story, without which Greek democracy cannot be truly understood. But it is a story about democracy's capacities and long-term resilience, not about its origins.

¹ This essay builds upon and borrows freely from Ober 1996 (originally published in Dougherty and Kurke 1993: 215-32, now reprinted in Robinson 2004 and Rhodes 2004) and Ober 1998b; I have attempted to streamline the arguments made there, and to add some new points. At the same time, much that I wrote previously has necessarily been left out here. I will refer the reader to more detailed discussions in those earlier pieces on various matters of fact and interpretation. My “revolutionary origins” thesis has provoked critical attention by scholars who do not accept that an essentially leaderless and classless uprising would have or could have occurred in 508/7; earlier critiques are noted in Ober 1996 and 1998. More recent critiques include Samons 1998 (focusing on aristocratic leaders and farmer-soldiers and presuming the universal validity of the “iron law of oligarchy”), Forsdyke 2000 (arguing for hoplites, not thetes, at the siege), Rhodes 1998 and 2003 (arguing that leaders would have been necessary and noting that my argument takes Herodotus’ account literally), Anderson 2003 (emphasizing the role of aristocratic leaders).

² Of course, the process is complex, since the experience of using institutions will affect people's attitudes. The priority of socio-cultural norms over institutional structure is the central conclusion of Putnam 1993. His long-term (twenty year) study of regional differentiation in Italian politics is especially impressive in that it is based on a massive collection of empirical evidence. The bottom line of Putnam's study is that even very profound "top down" institutional changes will have very little practical impact on the process of democratization when the underlying attitudes of the populace are stable and predicated on fundamentally undemocratic assumptions (e.g. about patron-client relations). On the other hand, Putnam's study tends to assume that regional Italian socio-cultural attitudes are historically conditioned and deeply entrenched. It does not envisage the sort of epistemic shift I propose for Athens in 508/7

³ Pragmatism as experimental and revisable: Dewey 1954; cf. Rorty 1982, West 1989.

⁴ There is a large modern bibliography on Herodotus’ methods of historical research and composition (see, recently, the essays collected in Luraghi 2001, Bakker, de Jong, and van Wees 2002, Derow and Parker 2003), but Thomas 1989 remains fundamental.

⁵ The implied subject of the verb epeirato is either Cleomenes or Isagoras. The grammar seems to point to Cleomenes, although presumably it was Isagoras (as archon) who gave the official order to the boulê. The point is in any case merely procedural: Herodotus' narrative demonstrates that Cleomenes and Isagoras were working hand in glove throughout. It is unknown which Council Herodotus refers to: the main candidates are the the Areopagus Council, a probouleutic Solonian Council of 400, or a newly instituted Council of 500 (Ober 1996 48, 50 n. 30). The important thing is that the Council in question is regarded by all parties as a primary seat of Athenian governance.

⁶ Stanton 1990, 142, 144 n. 6, translates sunathroisthentos tou plêthous as "the common people had been assembled," on the grounds that "the verb 'had been assembled' is definitely passive." But I take the (morphologically) passive participle as having a reflexive rather than a passive meaning; on the distinction see Rijksbaron 1984, 126-148. Reflexive meaning for the passive participle of sunathroizô: Xenophon, Anabasis 6.5.30; of athroizô: Thuc. 1.50.4, 6.70.4; and especially Aristotle, Politics 1304b33.

⁷ The altruistic “Cleisthenes the democratic visionary” of e.g. Ehrenberg 1973, has largely been overtaken by the manipulative “Cleisthenes the promoter of Alcmaeonid interests”: Lewis 1963, Stanton 1984. For a recent and detailed Cleisthenes-centered account of this period of Athenian history, see Anderson 2003.

⁸ Cleisthenes' decision to "bring the dêmos into his hetaireia" was, of course, one of the factors that led to the Revolution, but it should not be confused with the moment of uprising itself.

⁹ Here, I am borrowing concepts and imagery from Hannah Arendt 1959, 1963 and Sheldon Wolin 1994, 1996.

¹⁰ Diapsêphismos: Ath. Pol. 13.5 and 21.2, with detailed discussion by Manville 1990: 173-91.

¹¹ Accommodation and resistance of Alcmaeonids to the tyranny: Lewis in CAH IV² (1988): 288, 299-301. But cf. the skepticism of Thomas 1989: 263-264, who argues that the Alcmaeonids may have made up the tradition of their anti-tyrannical activity and the story of their exile under the Peisistratids from whole cloth.

¹² Isagoras as archon: Ath. Pol. 21.1. Ath. Pol. 22.5 claims that after the institution of the tyranny, and until 487/6, all archons were elected (hairetoi). The tyrants had manipulated the elections to ensure that their own supporters were in office (see Rhodes 1981: 272-273); exactly how the elections would have been carried out in 509/8 (and thus what Isagoras' support consisted of) is unclear. We need not, anyway, suppose that Isagoras' election was indicative of a broad base of popular support; more likely his support was centered in the (non-Alcmaeonid) nobility. On the power of the archaic archon, see Ath. Pol. 3.3; 13.2 with comments of Rhodes 1981: ad locc.

¹³ See Ober 1989: 60-68; Manville 1990: 124-209; Meier 1990: 53-81. On the lack of formal patronage structures in classical Athens see Millett 1989 with response of Zelnick-Abramowitz 2000.

¹⁴ Solonian constitution: Ober 1989: 60-65, with references cited. For the Areopagus from the time of Solon to Cleisthenes, see Wallace 1989: 48-76.

¹⁵ Cleisthenes' connection with the dêmos is underlined by Hdt. 5.69.2: see Wade-Gery's seminal article (1933, 19-25). It has been widely accepted that the Assembly was the arena in which Cleisthenes won the favor of the people; cf. discussion by Ostwald 1969: 149-160.

¹⁶ On mass purges as a tool of aristocratic politics in archaic Greece, see now Forsdyke 2000.

¹⁷ Herodotus 5.66.2, implies that at least some of the reforms were put into place before Cleomenes' arrival; Ath. Pol. 20-21, discusses the reforms after giving the history of the revolution proper. I think it is most likely that some reforms were proposed and perhaps actually enacted by the Assembly before Kleomenes' arrival, but presumably there would not have been time for all the details of the new constitution to have been put into place. See below for the

question of when the Council of 500 was established. For a review of the chronological issue, see Hignett 1952: 331-336; Rhodes 1981: 244-245, 249; Chambers 1990: 221-222.

¹⁸ Raaflaub 1998 with my detailed response in Ober 1998b. Note that (1) is based on strong version of *longue durée* historiography, which now seems pretty much *passé*, and that (2) gives too much scope for historiography that is utterly theory-driven (as opposed to theory-influenced — cf. Ober 1996: 13-17).

¹⁹ Saying that the uprising occurred without institutionalized leadership does not eliminate the likelihood, that there were historiographically invisible "leaders of the moment." My "essentially leaderless revolt" allows for the likelihood that some men (who had not been especially prominent before and were not especially prominent afterwards) assumed local and tactical leadership roles during the original uprising and the three-day siege.

²⁰ Ober 1996 for details of the comparison.

²¹ I am assuming throughout that Cleomenes was an experienced and sane military commander, and that his decisions were made accordingly. On the dubious tradition of the madness of Cleomenes, see Griffiths 1989. It is interesting to note how the demos' action simply disappears in some respectable scholarly accounts, e.g., Ehrenberg 1973: 90: "Cleomenes and Isagoras met, however, with the resistance of the council... which they had tried to disband and which was most likely the Areopagus The Spartans withdrew, Isagoras was powerless, and many of his followers were executed."

²² On how information was disseminated in Athens, see Hunter 1994.

²³ Herodotus' statement that Cleomenes seized the Acropolis and was subsequently thrown out along with the Lacedaemonians (exepipte meta tôn Lakedaimoniôn: 5.72.4) makes it appear likely that the whole force had gone up to the Acropolis together, had been besieged together, and had surrendered together. It is unlikely that a significant part of Cleomenes' forces joined him on the hill after the commencement of the siege and Herodotus says nothing about any of his men being captured in the lower city before the surrender. It is worth noting that Cylon (Hdt. 5.71; Thuc. 1.126.5-11) and Peisistratus (twice: Hdt. 1.59.6, 60.5) had earlier seized the Acropolis, each time as the first stage in an attempt to establish a tyranny. Cleomenes' case is different in that his move came after he had established control of the city.

²⁴ For a discussion of the relationship between Herodotus' narrative and Ath. Pol. 20-21, see Wade-Gery 1933: 17-19; Rhodes 1981: 240-241, 244, who argues that Herodotus was Ath. Pol.'s sole authority for 20.1-3. For general discussions of Ath. Pol.'s use of sources, see Chambers 1990: 84-91.

²⁵ The Salamis decree (IG I³ 1) which Meiggs and Lewis (1988) date to shortly after 510 (although by letter forms it could go as late as 480 or so) is the first attested use of the edoxe tôn dêmōi formula. It provides clear evidence for actual enactments by the demos gathered in

Assembly. Whatever is going on in this difficult inscription, it is clear that the demos is taking for itself the authority to regulate the conditions under which certain people in Salamis (whether Athenians or Salaminians) would be allowed to hold land and what their military obligations would be. In sum, the demos is making state policy in its own name and, what is more, has probably taken for itself the power to decide about the conditions of citizenship.

²⁶ Herodotus (5.69-72), who is confused about the substance of some of the reforms, puts the enactment of the reforms before Cleomenes' arrival. Ath. Pol. (20.1) in an apparent attempt to square his account with that of Herodotus while retaining chronological sense (see Rhodes 1981: ad loc.), says that Cleisthenes gained the advantage over Isagoras "by proposing to hand over" (apodidous: transl. Rhodes) the politeia to the plêthos. Then (20.2-21) comes Cleomenes' intervention and the uprising, in the course of which the people got control of affairs. Cleisthenes then became leader and hegemon. The dêmos placed its trust in Cleisthenes who then, still in the archonship of Isagoras (i.e. 508/7), undertook the reforms.

²⁷ The precise dating of these reforms is a matter of intense scholarly debate; for my present purposes, precise dating is less important than the (generally accepted) fact that they all took place within the first generation after the Revolution. Cf. Badian 2000: 455-56, who notes that the entire implementation period of the post-revolutionary reforms was characterized by an ongoing military crisis.

²⁸ An as-yet-unpublished archaic inscription from Boeotia referring to the "liberation" of Chalcis may suggest that the Athenian cleruchy was short lived (my thanks to John Ma for alerting me to this document), but it thereby offers further confirmation of Athenian success in 506.

²⁹ The functioning of the deme/tribe system in terms of networking knowledge, civic education, and convictions about the common good is sketched in Manville and Ober 2003: 63-76, Ober 2004.

³⁰ Early history of the Council of 500: Rhodes 1985. Lack of corporate identity: Gomme 1951. Significance of the power of agenda setting: Dahl 1989: 112-14.

³¹ We may compare other mainland poleis which contribute relatively tiny naval forces to the Hellenic navy in 480: Sparta 16 ships, Megara 20, Sikyon 15, Epidauros 10, Troizen 5; the island polis of Aigina contributed 30 (Hdt. 8.1, 43-48). On Athenian ship-building in the late 480s, see Labarbe 1957 and Wallinga 1993.

³² On the the radical newness of the form of polis power which is thereby made possible, and attempts to understand it in terms of Persian models, see Crane 1992a, 1992b; Georges 1993a, 1993b.

³³ Rosenbloom 1995 on the early turn to imperialism. Cf. Starr 1970 for the slow pace of postwar Athenian coinage.