

Citizens of Nowhere in Particular: Cosmopolitanism, Writing, and Political Engagement in Eighteenth-Century Europe

SOPHIA ROSENFELD, *University of Virginia*

Abstract *This article explores the connection in the late eighteenth century between the invention of citizenship and the obfuscation of local, corporate or national identity under the guise of cosmopolitanism. The common premise in much recent writing on nationalism is that the nation, even if it is an ‘imagined’ community, provided the critical framework in which political identity and, hence, political participation first became possible for ordinary people. However, it is clear that in absolutist Europe, private subjects were often best able to make themselves into political actors on either the national or the continental stage by de-situating themselves rhetorically, that is, claiming to speak from no place, no position, and no name except ‘friend of humanity’ or ‘citizen of the world’. Moreover, this literary strategy of insisting on one’s fungible individuality — the notion that one was no more than a generic ‘simple citizen’ and no less than ‘the plenipotente of my own ideas’ in a culture obsessed with social position and family name — ultimately helped to bolster an alternative (and often historically overlooked) way of thinking about relations among states and the individuals within them that marked an early challenge to the hegemony of national interest.*

Cosmopolitanism has had a poor reputation in modern politics. Self-identification as a ‘citizen of the world’ or ‘friend of humanity’ has often been seen as a cover for disengagement, a way for private individuals to avoid experiencing the local attachments, commitments, and loyalties necessary for the development of real political sentiments. Indeed, cosmopolitans have repeatedly been tarred as cold-hearted and selfish elitists, individuals who have chosen to be spectators rather than participants in the making of history.

The roots of such sentiments can be traced back to the later part of the eighteenth century. Despite the internationalism of the great literary figures of the age, from Hume to Voltaire, and their much vaunted universalist philosophical orientation, the political stance associated with explicit cosmopolitanism seems to have come under increasing suspicion as the Old Regime in Europe drew to a close. In 1762 the *Dictionnaire de l’Académie française* defined the cosmopolitan as ‘someone who adopts no country [*patrie*] ... and is not a good citizen.’ That same year, from a very different vantage point, Rousseau noted in his *Social Contract* that a cosmopolitan was, in fact, someone who ‘pretended to love the whole world in order to have the right to love no one.’¹

The reason for the emergence of such attitudes lies most obviously in the growing power of the concept of the nation, an idea just beginning to take on its modern meaning at this same moment. In the late eighteenth century, the nation and one’s fellow nationals were already on their way to forming a critical focus for individual

political loyalties. Since then it has nearly become an article of faith that the nation alone provides the framework in which the political identity and, consequently, political engagement and participation associated with citizenship becomes possible for private persons and, eventually, the masses. For only the nation seems to supply the rootedness and emotional centering, along with the guarantee of rights, that the identity of 'citizen', with all its potential for sacrifice, requires.

This basic assumption and the historical trajectory that produced it have, in recent years, galvanised scholars in several disciplines. Social scientists, as well as historians and literary scholars, have spent enormous energy trying to explain exactly how the idea of the nation has come in the modern world to generate the kinds of solidarities and commitments previously associated primarily with religious faith or family and village life. And as the natural foundations for the sentiment of national belonging have been challenged by cultural theorists, new insights have emerged concerning the interpenetration of local and national identities (rather than the triumph of the one over the other) in the formation of modern understandings of citizenship.² Historians have lately been inclined to agree with Edmund Burke: 'to be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon that we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections.'³ Other, larger loyalties follow from and often reinforce this one.

Much less scholarly attention has, however, been directed toward re-examining the relationship between political activism and identification with the borderless, universal idea of one humanity — despite the revival of this abstraction in flourishing human rights movements and 'humanitarian interventions' as of late. Indeed, insofar as the cosmopolitan is still understood to be self-consciously unrooted, detached from local as well as national loyalties, the sense that these concepts — citizen and cosmopolitan — are antithetical to one another has only grown. Cosmopolitanism or even internationalism based on thinking of oneself as a member of the general category of 'human' remains, for most commentators, an impossible foundation for the development of meaningful and productive ties to others; it is simply too large and too abstract to ever be a strong focus for affections.⁴ As Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith have both asked rhetorically to make this point: would anyone ever be willing to die for the European Community or any other late-twentieth-century transnational body or ideal?⁵ In the modern world, regardless of the aspirations of small numbers of bureaucrats in international organisations, it is still axiomatic that national belonging and the emotional engagement necessary for participatory citizenship go together.

But has geographical rootedness always been the only truly viable foundation for political activism? And must this necessarily remain the case even as the particularistic humanism associated with national interests comes under increasing criticism in the contemporary world? Perhaps the time has come to reconsider the history and potentiality of transnational identity and transnational concerns as alternative (though closely related) contexts for the development of political engagement. Or, to put it slightly differently, perhaps it is time to look again at the relationship of universalism to both localism and nationalism in the emergence of the modern understanding of the citizen as commentator on and participant in the business of rule.

In the essay that follows, I do not contest that in continental European history the roots of political engagement and activism among private subjects — or what might be called the prehistory of modern citizenship — can be traced back to the decades immediately preceding the French Revolution, the era of Rousseau. But I argue that the development of this conceptual space cannot be explained solely as a product of the creation of new national loyalties based upon the idea of natural rights harnessed to a

shared history, culture, and terrain. Neither can we simply speak of the expansion of the local identity and privileges of the city dweller onto a larger but still finite national plane.⁶ On the contrary, what concerns me in this paper is a specific body of literature produced during the late eighteenth century within that amorphous space that we now know as the transnational (albeit European and generally francophone) Republic of Letters in which individual subjects transformed themselves into political spokesmen by de-situating themselves rhetorically.⁷ That is, they chose, in an era of when corporate and familial-local identity defined a person publicly as well as privately to a degree hard to understand in the atomised, individualistic culture of the present, to write literally from no place, with no name, and with no specific allegiances to any specific or particularist body. All they generally claimed for themselves was a natural connection to humanity, understood as the sum of all individual beings in the world endowed with human nature and resulting rights and a moral imperative to act on this non-exclusive collectivity's behalf.⁸ And from the novel position of their membership in this global 'imagined community', to borrow and modify Benedict Anderson's oft-quoted description of the nation, the private residents of an ostensibly apolitical, cosmopolitan literary republic found, in the age of absolutism, a way to justify their engagement in the theoretically exclusive business of the state. Moreover, these same individuals discovered a position from which to envision and to proselytise for a world configuration that broke decisively with the accepted vision of a balance of power among distinct sovereign bodies, each looking to protect its own special interests. What these global citizens advocated instead was the formation of an international society among nation-states based on the model of relations among individuals in civil society and, ultimately, a challenge to the hegemony of national interest.

Read today, these texts, with their titles like *Conciliateur de toutes les nations d'Europe, ou Projet de paix perpétuelle entre tous les souverains de l'Europe et leurs voisins*, hold our attention as much for their fantastic, utopian qualities as for their political arguments or theory.⁹ World congresses and balloon diplomacy are typical key ingredients. But much of the interest of these texts lies in the way that they encourage us to rethink our often resolutely presentist assumptions about the connection between geographical or familial rootedness, on the one hand, and the political identity associated with citizenship, on the other. For in the years immediately preceding the French Revolution, before the nation-state had become an entirely hegemonic paradigm even in Western Europe, it appears that the idea of political engagement was not yet necessarily dependent on one's sense of belonging to a distinctive subgroup of humanity. Rather, as we will see, public action often depended upon the opposite: deliberate deracination and namelessness on the part of the individual subject.

To understand this seeming paradox, we need to begin by tracing the roots of participatory citizenship to the context of absolutism. It is important, first, to recall the degree to which both political decision-making and political expression were understood to be the monopoly of kings and their chief advisers in early modern Europe. Central to the theory of monarchical absolutism, as it was explained in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the idea that to a ruler alone belonged the right to determine the interests of the people of his kingdom and to make and enforce laws on their behalf. As the late-seventeenth-century political theorist Bishop Bossuet explained it, 'the prince is a public person, the whole state is in him, the will of the whole people is contained within his own.' As a result, he alone speaks for those he commands: 'when the prince has judged, there is no other judgment.'¹⁰ This did not mean that all subjects were therefore condemned to silence. But it did mean that all public expression of

individual views was strictly regulated by the state. In France, for example, the act of publication, when undertaken by private persons, required a royal endorsement, a permission granted by the grace of the king based on official censors' assessments of the nature, form, and source of the message being promulgated. It also meant that repressive censorship was considered necessary to control for the possibility of private individuals circulating ideas that challenged political, religious, or moral authority or expressed their own, heterodox conceptions of the public good, either orally or in print.¹¹ Such prohibitions were taken especially seriously when it came to international affairs and the waging of wars of national or dynastic interest, the chief concern of early modern statecraft. Until the outbreak of the French Revolution, it was common sense in most of continental Europe that the determination of foreign policy — in theory as well as practice — was the exclusive prerogative of ministers and heads of state.¹²

Yet it is also vital to keep in mind that the second half of the eighteenth century saw, despite the continued existence of official prohibitions, a growing number of writers, from an expanding range of social backgrounds, publishing an increasingly wide array of ideas in an increasingly broad range of literary genres. More specifically, an ever-larger body of unofficial, francophone literature found its way into circulation across Europe. This included works that were printed clandestinely in places like Switzerland and the Netherlands, where strictures were less severe than in France, as well as works that appeared in France with the tacit permission of authorities who, in effect, chose to look the other way. And within this burgeoning realm of illegal and quasi-legal publication, a swelling number of writers chose, following the extended international conflicts of the mid-century, to compose and to make public their proposals for the construction of international or inter-European peace. The intention behind these texts — like much underground literary production of the late eighteenth century — was not generally to appeal directly to hostile monarchs. Rather, it was to influence a new entity: trans-European public opinion, a realm of philosophical contestation and, ultimately, political pressure established in good measure by writers themselves.¹³ Publication and response became a form of public action, a challenge to the absolute sovereignty of the state. And what these authors sought to communicate were generally not suggestions for improving a particular dynasty's fortunes externally. Instead, they were alternative and often adversarial blueprints for developing international or global political systems that worked against specific royal ambitions and associated conceptions of society, especially on the part of absolute monarchies.

The most famous of these texts — those of William Penn, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, and Immanuel Kant, for example — have been summarised in numerous places, including that branch of the history of ideas concerned with tracing the development of 'peace plans' or federative world visions through the ages.¹⁴ But many other such treatises remain relatively obscure, footnotes at best in this scholarly literature. In their eighteenth century guise, they generally involved the establishment of 'universal republics,' meaning loose confederations of European or Christian states in which sovereigns were called upon to abandon their independence in matters of exterior politics and to abide by international legal rulings so as to stop the interminable wars that had plagued the continent since the Reformation. But what I want to emphasise here is not primarily the differences in the details of their contents, the number of jurists or the nature of the architecture that each imagines being essential to the establishment of a world court, for example. It is, instead, how their individual authors justified writing these polemics, that is, making themselves into political actors, the precursors of participatory citizens, and intruding upon terrain from which they were, in both principle and practice,

supposed to be excluded. At issue is ultimately the question of authorial self-representation in an era before not only the concept of the nation but also the related vision of the author as public spokesman and participant in the business of rule had assumed the self-evident status that it has today. For it is from this perspective especially that these eighteenth century texts can strike us as odd and, given conventional wisdom about the necessary connection between national and political identity, surprising.

Almost all the authors of these polemics call considerable attention to themselves as individuals. They make no effort to disguise the fact that the words on the page are the product of the minds of single, specific beings, writers, who are conveying their own, distinctive thoughts to and on behalf of the world at large. Indeed, these authors assume a distinctly modern, proprietary attitude towards their ideas insofar as their status as originator and claimant of a set of unique imaginings is worn as a badge of honor, the key to individual distinction. One creator of a mid-eighteenth century peace plan proudly refers to himself as nothing less than the ‘plenipotente of my own ideas.’¹⁵ In this fashion, these texts lend credence to Michel Foucault’s well-known claim that ‘the coming into being of the notion of the “author” [in the course of the eighteenth century] constitutes the privileged moment of *individualisation* in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy and the sciences.’¹⁶

Yet, in describing themselves, these writers tend to insist neither upon their many accomplishments as *hommes initiateurs* nor upon their specific qualities born of their particular situation in life. Instead, surprisingly, what they stress is their lack of expertise, their lack of connections to the sphere of political decision-making, indeed, their lack of (or, at least, distance from) any specific title, rank, or position of importance. Moreover, most also forgo the chief marker of status, identity, and even morality in early modern Europe: the legal name.¹⁷ They routinely hide that compound of Christian first name and familial surname that was considered essential both to defining a unique, individual self and to demarcating the official place of that person within a clearly delineated social and often geographical framework established from birth. This is not to say that most of these texts were ‘anonymous’ works in the early modern sense that the author’s identity remained unknown to the reading public.¹⁸ Often the actual, legal name of the author was an open secret. But writers frequently eschewed the specificity of their given patronymic — with all its associations with family, class (or estate), profession, ethnicity, religion, region and/or nationality¹⁹ — in favor of simple sobriquets or descriptive labels of a deliberately impersonal variety. Some identified themselves only by their unbounded affection for humanity at large, calling themselves ‘a friend of mankind’ or ‘Doctor Man’lover.²⁰ Others, employing such unspecific terms as ‘a simple citizen’ and ‘an isolated human being,’ emphasised what we might call their authors’ generality, their abstract representativeness as human beings in a world without meaningful subgroupings or divisions.²¹ As the literary critic Thomas Keenan points out, the word ‘human’ has long stood, in contradistinction to proper nouns, as ‘the name of that which would precede geographical divisions and political articulations, of that which is by definition essentially unbordered.’²² And these same writers also often insisted that the business of publishing their personal musings had taken place either in an improbable and clearly incorrect location (such as Tahiti or Peking) or in an indeterminate, unknowable one (such as a cosmopolis of very ancient origin) so as to further desituate themselves in any geopolitical sense, not to mention thwart the law.²³ For the Chevalier G***, the author responsible for *La Paix de l’Europe ne peut s’établir qu’à la suite d’une longue trêve, ou Projet de pacification générale, combiné par une suspension d’armes de vingt ans, entre toutes*

les puissances politiques (1757), there was no necessary contradiction between describing himself first as the ‘plenipotente of my own ideas’ and then as ‘an ordinary person’ with no recognisable public identity or location. The creators of these texts were, it seems, determined to represent themselves, in the context of their political theories, as single, private individuals sharing their own, singular thoughts *and* as any individual, without connections to any particular family, location, history, or status associated with any particular — and socially and legally sanctioned — name. Local and national situatedness were here simultaneously subsumed, though not necessarily rejected, in favor of both a universal identity as a human and a personal one as a political actor.

There existed more than one way to enunciate this seemingly paradoxical message about one’s situation as author, beginning with the title page and extending into the body of the text. One variant, adopted by the author of the *Nouvel essai sur le projet de la paix perpétuelle* (Switzerland, 1788), was to open with silence. By leaving off any reference to himself or his precise location from the book’s introductory pages, the author could imply that he was refusing either the specificity or the arbitrariness of the proper (family) name as an effective mode of self-identification. But the second stage of this strategy found the author gradually revealing more and more in the course of the essay about an alternative aspect of himself: his philosophical orientation and his motivation as a public spokesman on matters of international relations. Early on in this book, its author (later unmasked as the Swiss moral theorist Antoine de Polier de Saint-Germain) clarified what did not form the basis of his claims; he was neither a Quaker nor a critic of the authority of kings. But he also opined that a king’s first responsibility was to his people and that the glory of a monarch had to be subordinated to the happiness and interests of the nation’s subjects — or that monarch should be held accountable. And, in this spirit, our unnamed author, a self-declared ‘obscure and simple citizen of the world’ with no particular talents, knowledge, skills, or attributes except for ‘my tender and lively affection for humanity and my pure and ardent zeal for the happiness of my fellow men,’ assumed the job of moral scold.²⁴ He presented his treatise as a reminder to all Christian sovereigns of their responsibility to think in humanitarian terms about international as well as domestic situations so as to avoid the shedding of innocent blood. What he then advanced was an argument for the voluntary renunciation of the rights of the strongest and a plan for a co-operative association among all ‘Christian’ powers (including the new United States) with the goal of maintaining perpetual peace. In other words, in this book, the self-proclaimed identity of the author and his political vision came together. As ‘the voice of humanity [i.e. the author’s voice] becomes more and more audible,’ the very principles of justice and compassion towards other (nameless) individuals so loudly touted by the (nameless) individual author are transformed into the operative principles of relations among sovereigns and nations as well.²⁵

But this was only one possibility. An alternative method of authorial self-fashioning, employed that same year by another francophone commentator on international law, was to call immediate attention to himself through the creation of a new (and patently false) extrahistorical authorial identity. The title page of the work in question announced the public appearance, in the imaginary ‘year I of Reason,’ of a *République universelle, ou l’Humanité ailée, réunie sous l’Empire de la Raison* penned by the fictitious ‘Reinser II de Genève.’ In one sense, this kind of parodic opening seems quite the opposite strategy from that discussed above; indeed, *République universelle* is a much less sober response to the problem of international organisation, what with its emphasis on

flying machines and a transnational alphabet of geometric shapes as critical components of the solution. But the author's treatment of his own name as a personal possession to be altered at will functioned, just like anonymity, to call attention to the falsity and misguidedness of the existing socio-political hierarchy and its associated naming practices. And the use of this power specifically to crown himself with a fictitious but easily decoded royal pseudonym resulted in the author (once André Guillaume Resnier, now Reinser II) assuming an authority that he did not rightfully have by either law or tradition, much like the spurious authors of those religious forgeries known as pseudepigraphia. What Resnier did with the title page and text that followed was to establish himself as part of an alternative moral elite distinguished by its compassion, public-mindedness, and dedication to rationality. The character Reinser II reveals nothing of his 'real' corporate, professional or personal status and displays no interiorised, private self (though he dedicates the text to his unnamed mother). But he repeatedly describes himself as a spokesman for 'Reason' as well as a 'martyr for truth.'²⁶ Reason, it seems, has dictated Resnier's text much the same way that 'humanity' has made itself known through that of his contemporary, Polier de Saint-Germain.

In the case of Reinser II, the end result is a quasi-masonic dreamworld. Public works programs rule the day. Enlightened legislation makes possible considerable new freedoms for ordinary people. And nobility based on birth or rank ceases to exist in favor of an egalitarian and enlightened fraternity among all men (indeed, the author mentions that only those who, like himself, contribute real services to public happiness should be honored with a title). Finally, a universal pact of friendship and esteem among all kings, and peoples, of the world, combined with an international legal system that governs like a tender, enlightened mother, produces a global family. Resnier ultimately reveals himself to be much less timid about eradicating differences among subgroups of humanity than is Polier de Saint-Germain; the former's 'universal republic' is a real political entity rather than a metaphor. But in their treatises, the two contemporaries make a similar translation from self to world, based on erasure of the particularity, privacy, and arbitrariness associated with their 'real,' socially-sanctioned names. What these texts share is a method of justifying both their production and their contents based on denying the reader's expectations regarding the author's familial, local, and even national identity.

Of course, such practices of erasure and reinvention as employed by Resnier and Polier de Saint-Germain cannot be described as entirely novel at the time of the publication of two works in question. These kinds of authorial strategies were neither unique to this particular moment in European history nor reserved solely for cosmopolitan-themed works. Despite (or maybe because of) the stringent laws regarding publication, descriptive pseudonyms with neo-Stoical connotations had a long history in France and elsewhere in Europe and the New World prior to the mid-eighteenth century. The appearance of the Marquis de Mirabeau's *L'Ami des hommes, ou Traité de la population* (1755) and then Oliver Goldsmith's *The Citizen of the World or Letters from a Chinese Philosopher, residing in London, to his friend in the East* (1762) seems only to have marked an especially successful moment in the history of pen names containing references to such universalising abstractions. After all, Mirabeau's best-selling tome soon earned him the unshakable sobriquet 'ami des hommes' ('friend of mankind') and set off a wave of imitators calling themselves 'friends' of a whole range of entities and social groups, from women to children to the sick.²⁷ And in England and then the new United States, Matthew Carey, who followed Goldsmith in taking the descriptive pen name 'Citizen of the World' in connection with the publication of his *Fragment:*

Addressed to the Sons and Daughters of Humanity (1796), found use at other intervals for a range of invented authorial identities, including ‘A Citizen of Philadelphia,’ ‘A Catholic layman,’ ‘A clergyman of the church of England,’ and ‘Caius,’ ‘Colbert,’ and ‘Jefferson.’²⁸

But in the late eighteenth century, the employment of pseudonymous cosmopolitan monikers, in conjunction with expressions of fungible individuality, was especially associated with the publication of transgressive peace plans. And, as my examples suggest, in this distinctive context the rhetorical stance of unbinding oneself from any specific corporate or local status in favor of *both* one’s singularity as an individual *and* one’s representativeness as a member of a boundaryless collectivity, such as humanity, served several, interrelated purposes. It opened up a space for a new kind of non-nationally-specific political identity and engagement. And it rendered feasible a new type of secular political vision outside — or, more precisely, alongside — the related frameworks of both the nation-state and the locality. To understand why, we need, first, to explore the uses of pseudonymity in the eighteenth century Republic of Letters and, second, to consider the effects of this practice on the transformation of the writer into a thoroughly public actor and an example for his own political theory.

Some of the primary reasons for the popularity of authorial disguises in Enlightenment Europe, and especially France, were simply practical in a world where published writers were vulnerable beings. At the most basic level, eighteenth-century France witnessed an increase both in concern with *bienfaisance* (the idea of public responsibility towards others) and in how elaborate the official censorship apparatus was. In this context, the anonymity that went with the adoption of an unidentifiable, generic pseudonym along with a false or foreign address enabled writers to express unorthodox opinions while avoiding post-publication repression. Such naming practices can thus initially be understood as a form of precautionary self-protection designed to make it possible to publicise ideas that were politically dangerous. Many of the greatest works of the Enlightenment were, after all, printed without explicit mention of their author’s identity for exactly this reason (and still many of the most important *philosophes* spent periods in exile or prison). Furthermore, in an age in which the social status of the ‘author’ remained precarious, disguising personal connections to a text allowed an individual to preserve his (or her) modesty and dignity in face of the social stigma potentially associated with publication.²⁹ This was especially important for those who saw public authorship as an activity inappropriate to one’s rank or sex.

But as recent work on gender and print culture in early modern Europe has convincingly demonstrated, obfuscating or suppressing one’s family name was not only a defensive gesture, a matter of protective disguise or self-effacement during the Old Regime, even for aristocratic women. After all, leaving one’s legal name off a book’s title page did not guarantee freedom from persecution, especially when secrecy was only partial. And pseudonymity was a popular practice in Great Britain too, where, compared to the continent, censorship policies were much less restrictive after the late seventeenth century. Rather, the anonymity that came with a pen name, including an epigrammatic or descriptive one, also offered certain advantages to writers as they attempted, against the backdrop of monarchical power, to carve out a rhetorical space for effective public action. In the best cases, the adoption of a pseudonym could potentially function as a form of liberation and, consequently, empowerment, especially for one who wrote from a marginal position in terms of sex, social status, geography, politics, religion, or some combination thereof.³⁰ As Adrian Baillet explained as early as 1690 in his detailed treatise *Les Auteurs déguisez*, giving oneself a new name in print was

only sometimes about real secrecy, prudence, or social conformity. It was also, much to his stated dismay, often a matter of realising one's 'desire' or 'fantasy' of masking, creating, and confusing identities apart from established laws governing publication or naming.³¹

On the one hand, the act of giving oneself an entirely public, invented persona, detached from any reference to any recognisable corporate, regional, or even familial status, allowed the writer to suggest that his or her private identity was off limits to the reading public. By saying something along the lines of 'I am only a simple citizen, with no name or status worth calling attention to, just one among many,' the author could appear to be defending him or herself against charges of exhibitionism or hubris or immodesty associated with publicity. And such a strategy could also, ideally, help to focus public judgment on the content of the text in question rather than on the (private) person of the author. But this was only part of the story. On the other hand, the author's nominal transformation into an anonymous but entirely public-minded being could also entail considerable rhetorical benefits for the author as he or she tried to elevate the value of his or her public utterances as interventions in the public sphere. And in the case of the peace plans under consideration here, their authors frequently found that they could use their humanitarian pseudonyms as a foundation for epistemological and moral empowerment for themselves as protocitizens, as well as for their political projects.

How was this possible? After all, namelessness or anonymity should have been a liability, both in the eyes of the law and in the eyes of the reading public. It clearly set one apart as an outsider to power, and it generally marked one as a transgressor or conspirator, a person who had no legitimate authority to speak in this form or on this subject. However, by explicitly drawing attention to their lack of connections or position, eighteenth-century authors could also confirm their radical autonomy and, hence, impartiality as intellectual voices, the fact that they were not beholden to any particular interest or any kind of received wisdom associated with any one faction. That one had nothing to gain in terms of power, status, or territory not only made one appear to be more honest; it also allowed one to claim to be able to see, and say, that which a diplomat or minister, entrenched in the existing system and compromised by professional biases and concerns, could not. As, for example, the author of *La Paix de l'Europe ne peut s'établir qu'à la suite d'une longue trêve* (the unnamed Ange Goudar, a French expatriate adventurer, polygraph, economist and spy for hire) noted it was only as a result of his status as an outsider to power that he was able to consider the world of politics objectively, as a 'knowable science,' rather than subjectively as a private matter.³² Furthermore, as self-declared nobodies, simply friends of men and disembodied observers of their ways, writers could suggest that they were ideally situated to recognise their links to humanity as a whole. Reason, compassion, and imagination combined to reveal a general picture of human suffering and its causes in which the particular or private identities of the persons in question were of no import.

Out of these epistemological advantages then came a distinctive ethical position from which to write. As a byproduct of their profound sense of the deep connections between themselves and others, 'friends of humanity' could not only claim a basis for advancing critiques of socially unjust practices (such as expansionist warfare) and establish a rallying cry for their cause. They could also assume a moral authority, and consequently, privilege for themselves that allowed them to overcome the normal obstacles to public expression and, as private individuals, do and say that to which they would ordinarily not be entitled. That privilege or right — rooted in an ethical

obligation not open to question — was to speak for and act on behalf of this collectivity and its interests, understood as the highest of values, even if it meant breaking particular laws or challenging the sovereignty of the state.

Indeed, this moral argument for insubordination in terms of both identity and speech ultimately provided a practical foundation from which to argue for one's own, fundamental role, as citizen and author, in overturning the status quo and transforming the world at large. Based on the ethical assumption that speaking for humanity put one above all particularist interests and laws, including those of one's own state or nation, the generically human scribe became free in practice as well as theory to strip kings and princes of their exclusive authority and the prerogatives that they derived from their position. Indirectly, the officially nameless writer could work to reduce the power of names, whether the king's or his own, which were commonly invested with the dignity of essences; Resnier, for example, through his adoption of a patently false royal moniker, began by puncturing the nominalist illusion that names are destiny rather than empty, mutable signifiers.³³ Then, more explicitly, this same nameless writer could justify stepping into the king's shoes and appropriating his authority as a spokesman and public actor by publishing the author's own musings on the public good of the world's citizens. Indeed, the author could make himself, for all his professed modesty, into a self-declared 'great man.' According to J.-P. Brissot de Warville, identifying with humanity and its welfare had this beneficial side effect: 'To be a man, to love one's fellow men is to bring together all the virtues, to acquire the energy that produces great men, because it cannot be doubted that love of humanity alone can generate great acts and create true heroes, true philosophes.'³⁴ Goudar concurred in his own peace treatise; the history of 'great men' was often only the history of those who had perturbed the political status quo by taking matters into their own hands.³⁵

Not surprisingly, then, in the utopian plans that followed from these claims, the nameless or pseudonymous writer usually insisted on subordinating the king's or even the king's particular subjects' needs and desires to the needs and desires and 'rights' of humanity, including all other nameless individuals, as a whole. For the resulting vision spelled out in these texts was of a world in which no particular sovereign or people or nation could be the highest authority on earth. All have agreed to submit to an international legal order, generally rooted in humanitarian considerations and human rights, which trumps the particular wills of any collectivity or constituent part. And at the heart of this new world vision is the modern, public self, the prototype for the engaged citizen whose first loyalty is to a borderless humanity.

Of course, we are now more aware than ever before (thanks to postmodernist and postcolonial theorists) of some of the dangers inherent in this model of the abstract universal human and its counterpart — the exalted, if fungible, individual — that the European Enlightenment produced. The chief charge is that this same cosmopolitan faith in a shared human nature which, combined with instrumental reason, provided the theoretical foundation for eighteenth century visions of humanitarianism, has also, in practice, worked over the last two and a half centuries to routinely deny the humanity of those beings or peoples who have departed too radically from an elite and male and eurocentric norm. This occurred first under the banner of colonialism and is now still occurring under the aegis of globalisation.³⁶ The primary reason is generally assumed to be Enlightenment thinkers' difficulty recognising and coming to terms with difference and heterogeneity, which is another way of saying their tendency to generalise from their own example. It is, therefore, essential to note what the seemingly universalist self-presentations and associated international ideals of our anonymous authors

obscure about their own particularity and subjectivity as social actors in addition to their proper names.

First of all, it is apparent (as it would have been in the eighteenth century as well) that for all their talk of their own simplicity, isolatedness, and lack of stature, the authors of these works were, in practice, all men of considerable social and economic privilege. As the critic Nancy Miller points out, only those who have a proper name and signature can ever play with not having it.³⁷ Moreover, in the late eighteenth century, only a very limited sector of Europe's population possessed either the education necessary to write in an elite, cosmopolitan language — standard French — or the contacts and means through which to go public in the culture of print, even (or especially) as a defender of humanity writ large. Similarly, despite these authors' insistence on not revealing their own and often their book's place of origin, their Western European locus, and bias, is everywhere apparent in their works. Indeed, the very blitheness with which these authors, in their plans for pacification and unification, switch without comment between writing of Europe, of all Christian states, and of the world as a whole is telling. The same applies to the slippage between men and humans. As turns out, not only is their conception of the individual deeply rooted in conformity to the particularism of the elite European male; their universal values are most often synonymous with enlightened French or Christian norms. The humanitarian cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century is, in the end, a distinctive kind of local situatedness and privilege chiefly revelatory of membership in the francophone Republic of Letters.

But in perusing these plans some 200 plus years later, the reader can also be struck by the fact that the authors themselves only rarely directly reject the importance of preserving local differences, either at a political or cultural level. Very few of these utopian plans describe a single world state replacing a collection of independent nation-states or other political units, and almost none detail strategies for eradicating differences in culture and lived experience in favor of a single model of *homme* (the great fear of opponents of cosmopolitanism, then and now). Certainly, both Enlightenment epistemology and Enlightenment political theory depended heavily upon the idea of a uniform human nature. But attachment to this idea in no way meant that variation among humans was seen as impossible or even undesirable. After all, the empiricism of the age also led to a fascination with the existence of cultural diversity — between nations (i.e. Montesquieu), within nations (i.e. Helvétius), among individuals (i.e. Diderot) — as well as repeated attempts to explain this heterogeneity based, variously, on history, geography, climate, language, moral factors, institutional questions, and politics.³⁸ And this acceptance of differences among peoples' experiences and beliefs, combined with a taste for expanded (though still limited) religious and intellectual toleration, shaped unofficial thinking about international relations as well. Polier de Saint-Germain, for example, argued strenuously in his *Nouvel essai sur le projet de la paix perpétuelle* against the advancement of a model of trans-European organisation based on that of the new United States, the United Provinces, or even the Swiss confederation, claiming that a republic which tried to unite and homogenise 'a multitude of rival nations, strangers one to the next, with opposing commercial, agricultural, manufacturing and military interests, with absolutely different manners and characters, speaking different languages, attached to different religions and different customs, living all under different laws' would only result in an increase in civil wars.³⁹ And many other titles of this moment — such as the anonymous *L'Ami de l'humanité, ou Conseils d'un bon citoyen à sa nation sur certains préjugés aussi nuisibles à la santé qu'à la société*

(Plaisance, 1778) — suggest that concern with the needs of humanity and a feeling of obligation to one's particular nation could be highly compatible ideals in the late eighteenth century, much as Kwame Anthony Appiah, Homi Bhabha, and other self-declared 'cosmopolitan patriots' and 'vernacular cosmopolitans' suggest that they could be today.⁴⁰

This is not, of course, an argument for ignoring the existence of offensive and even dangerous aspects of the historical vision present in these texts, including their often unquestioned francocentric assumptions about what progress towards modernity should entail. It is also not a brief for dismissing the odd voice, such as that of Resnier the freemason, who prophesied alarmingly: 'Soon equally enlightened, having the same passions, the same rights, the same duties, and cured of the national poison, all peoples will adopt the same religion, the same laws, [and] the same idiom to form one intimate family, whose legislation will be compatible with that which reason is here sketching with the aid of my pen.'⁴¹ But the more important point is that these texts, considered together, constitute early attempts to grapple with the difficult task of balancing universalism and difference or particularism in such a way as make possible *both* local attachments based on group membership (including belonging to an international body of writers) *and* transnational activism based on certain collective goals rooted in human rights. As such, they offer us an alternative way of conceptualising the roots of individual political engagement, a model tied exclusively neither to nation-state membership nor to the sentiment of national belonging.

Indeed, the appeal of such strategies only grew in the early years of the French Revolution, when the example of the cosmopolitan literary sphere, the Republic of Letters, was transposed onto the new political system established by the French and the rhetoric of universal fraternity and humanitarianism became the chief currency of revolutionary communication. In a famous session of 1792, the National Assembly even welcomed a delegation of foreign patriots or 'citizens of the world,' including Joseph Priestley, Jeremy Bentham, James Madison, and Thomas Paine, so as to make them symbolic citizens of France.⁴² The coming harmony among all peoples and the world-historical nature of events currently transpiring in France were constant themes from 1789 onwards. And, in this context, efforts to dismantle the existing international system and to imagine a European or world order that accounted for the inevitable spread of (French) revolutionary values and produced lasting peace among nations flourished as well.

At first, the idea of an alliance among constitutional monarchs, eager to recognise human rights and to form a loose, pacific confederation, continued to hold sway with progressive international theorists. But the culture of the Revolution soon led to the production of plans linked more specifically to the idea of the republic, understood as a form of government characterised by popular sovereignty, constitutional protections for the universal rights of man, and, in certain cases, free trade. What many international theorists, from Kant to Thomas Paine to Enrico Michele L'Aurora, imagined during the 1790s were federations of peoples or nations, divided into multiple, independent, sovereign republican states, and then legally linked by their common support not only for peace but also for certain non-nationally specific political principles, namely, natural (or human) rights. A few revolutionary thinkers even proposed plans for federations of individuals, considered as citizens of the world.⁴³

And at the same time, even with the formal end of the absolutist system of royal censorship in 1788 and the establishment of a constitutional protection for the principle of freedom of expression the following year, the employment of invented authorial

signatures—rather than birth names attaching individuals to real families and locales—expanded as well.⁴⁴ Hostility to the legally entrenched social hierarchy, which was an immediate and crucial feature of revolutionary political culture, produced a corresponding shedding of names that situated individuals in exclusively genealogical, which is to say private, familial, and historically rooted, terms. A growing antipathy to the established church and its teachings gradually made overtly Christian names and identities less desirable for many as well. What replaced them in the public sphere was frequently that old practice of adopting a descriptive moniker which emphasised only that individual's political values, as evidenced in print or deed, or his public actions. And as author's lives and author's texts became more and more closely identified, those who wanted to imagine new configurations of individuals beyond the national level continued to find it useful to adopt pseudonyms that linked them to transhistorical and transnational experiences rather than utilise something as arbitrary and misleading as a private, hidebound, and nationally or locally specific name.

One particularly extraordinary, if extreme, example of the enduring relationship between the need to remake and rename oneself outside of established social categories and the desire to alter the political configuration of the world presents itself in the case of the Prussian nobleman Baron von Klootz.⁴⁵ Not only did this wealthy and eccentric intellectual insist, in the name of cosmopolitanism, upon physically exiling himself from the local knowledge and circumstances associated with his place of birth. In the first years of the Revolution, the baron also transformed himself nominally, first by Frenchifying his name as Cloots, then by 'defeudalising' himself and rejecting the title baron, and finally by 'unbaptising' himself, as he put it, and refusing identification with his very Christian first name, Jean-Baptiste. In an effort at more accurate (and effective) self-representation as a political actor, he replaced all these confining indicators of his own, very specific connections to place and family and religion and genealogy with a name borrowed for symbolic purposes from ancient history: that of the ancient Sythian Anacharsis, who left his native land to travel to the most civilised of countries in search of broader knowledge. And after attaching to the new compound Anacharsis Cloots the epigraph 'orator of the human race,' he set out on a mission to transform the world in the same spirit and manner as he had recently remade himself. What this transplanted Prussian revolutionary espoused in a series of speeches, articles, and books produced in Paris between 1791 and 1793 was nothing less than a rejection of history and geography in favor of the establishment of a universal republic, a permanently peaceful, tolerant, and prosperous 'confederation of individuals,' with no borders, barriers, or distinctions of any kind. And since this plan required the refashioning of identity on a massive scale, Anacharsis Cloots proposed that the shift again begin in the realm of language. Nations, including France, needed to drop their historically fraught proper names; in a reversal of his own case, he argued that the centerpiece of the operation, the French people, should voluntarily agree 'to be called Germains [*sic*].'⁴⁶ In one sense, Cloots, with his act of rhetorical self-invention, can be said to have been trying to call attention to his radical singularity in the world. But by turning himself from his father's son into a transhistorical and transnational symbol and spokesman (literally *orateur*), he also established a new model, rooted in the mutable individual, for the transformation of the world as a whole—beginning with the unbounded self.

Cloots was not alone in the 1790s in wanting to be identified only by his public behavior and literary reputation (which were, to him, the same). As Michel Delon points out in an important article on revolutionary naming practices, many of the great figures of the French Revolution participated in similar acts of nominal self-invention

connected to their desire to break free of the specificity of their familial and local identity and to become public actors on behalf of humanity.⁴⁷ Marat encouraged an almost total association between himself and the title of his newspaper, *L'Ami du Peuple*. Gracchus Babeuf, who, like Cloots, first rejected his Christian name and adopted an antique one, insisted on repeatedly referring to himself as the 'tribune of the people.' And commentators across the political spectrum writing on subjects from the fate of Louis XVI to the international war often chose to associate themselves with larger values (whether the nation, humanity, truth, or peace) and broader horizons (whether cosmopolis or Tahiti) than those that would normally be attached to their individual person. By the time that a law of November 1793 proclaimed total liberty to choose or change one's name as one pleased, the act of signing one's writings 'a friend of justice and humanity' or 'an impartial citizen, friend of liberty, humanity, and peace' was not only or even mainly about protecting oneself from harm, even though new kinds of repressive censorship certainly made their presence felt that fateful year.⁴⁸ Rather, it was a way to emphasise that one was both an individual, a single person free to identify oneself at will, *and* a public servant, writing (which is to say acting) in the name of and for the sake of the good of humanity alone.⁴⁹

However, as we well know, the Revolution simultaneously unleashed another current that had a profound and lasting impact on all this rhetorical self-invention, bringing it finally to an end. The idea of republican virtue contained a deeply rooted suspicion of all sorts of masks and disguises, indeed, of all disjunctions between public or social selves and private, inner beings. This sense of danger quickly extended to naming practices too.⁵⁰ The revolutionary aspiration towards transparency produced a corresponding yearning for accountability, on the one hand, and for simplicity and order, on the other, in the form of a single, unembellished patronymic, patriarchal in origin, preceded by an egalitarian and public-spirited Citoyen or Citoyenne. And the desire for fixity and clarity in personal names endured beyond the Terror into the nineteenth century. Following Thermidor Year II (July 1794), the revolutionary law giving one the right to grant oneself a new name at will was quickly revoked, and new legislation was put into place that made it more difficult either to change one's appellation or to publish without revealing one's legal identity.

At the same time, the idea of the nation as a community of persons linked through history continued to grow in importance, leaving increasingly less room for the idea of humanity to exist as a larger or even coexistent value. Enemies of the revolutionary cause soon ceased to be included in this previously universal rhetorical category and, with the outbreak of the trans-European war in 1792, the foreigner and the national were increasingly distinguished from one another in terms of their potential to be true patriots.⁵¹ As boundaries between specific persons and status groups within the nation declined in importance, boundaries between nations and peoples were reinforced. When an anonymous author (generally thought to be Scipione Piattoli, an Italian writer best known for his warnings about the dangers of internment) published a peace plan based on transnational cooperation in 1795, he referred to himself in the title and text by the pseudonym 'the old cosmopolitan Syrach,' in good measure because his views had become decidedly out-of-date.⁵² It was the member of the now-sovereign, bounded nation, endowed with a state-sanctioned name, who was exclusively to join his — and, to a limited degree, her — identity with that of the citizen in the future. And it was national interest that would, except in isolated cases, trump older ideas of universal fraternity in public discourse.

So what interest then lies in this prehistory of the modern pairing of citizen and

national subject? Why might it matter that political identity as a private person could, in the eighteenth century, just as well depend upon the obfuscation of local identifiers in favor of an attachment to humanity as it could upon patriotism or local connections? One answer is strictly historical. These examples have the potential to help us see the teleological and often anachronistic ways in which historians of modern Europe have frequently described the coming-into-existence of the citizen out of a locally and then nationally rooted being. In fact, as it turns out, political engagement did not always follow directly from the development of national identity in the late eighteenth century, and cosmopolitanism did not always mean neutrality and distance. The model of the abstract human, stripped of any relationship to any particular form of identification but understood as an individual, also provided a foundation for the emergence of the public actor, at least in the realm of rhetoric, before the era of a triumphant bourgeois liberalism in Europe — a situation which suggests that the history of conceptual globalism needs, along with nationalism and localism, to be rethought.

But the act of historicising is only worthwhile if it makes us think differently about the present as well as the past. And this takes us back to the relationship between authors' names and identities, an issue that remains just as controversial in contemporary discourse as related questions about cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism. Since 1968, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and a host of disciples have argued that the author indeed has no natural authority over his or her work, that our sense of an authentic author, attached to a specific signature, is nothing more than a romantic fallacy. Consequently, they have encouraged us to read texts without concern for authorial intent or identity.⁵³ But feminist as well as post-colonial critics, while drawing on these insights, have answered that it really does matter who is speaking. Otherwise alternative or marginal subjectivities — those of women or subaltern peoples, for example — are rendered invisible and ignored in favor of a universal (which is to say European, male, and enlightened) conception of the author.⁵⁴

Perhaps, however, neither of these stances is sufficient. Certainly, we need to treat our modern conception of the author-as-spokesman, born of the cosmopolitan Enlightenment, as itself a kind of particularist vision, geographically, socially, and especially historically rooted despite its universalist trappings. This might be considered one facet of the larger and important task of 'provincialising' Europe (to borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty's useful phrase) from within as well as from without.⁵⁵ But as Chakrabarty also warns us, insisting on the authenticity or immediacy of the local, regardless of exact location, poses its own dangers. We might also be wary, as historians, of constantly tracing actions and words to proper names, indicative of historically determined corporate or familial identities, hoping to decode a real or authentic person underneath. Perhaps the key discovery of the authors of these odd peace plans of the late eighteenth century is that identity can be extremely fluid. After all, one can situate oneself not only locally or nationally but also cosmopolitically in multiple ways simply by manipulating that basic identifier that is one's name. And it is, in part, as a result of this possibility that private persons first began to imagine something like global citizenship.

Notes

1. On eighteenth century understandings of cosmopolitanism, see Pierre Hazard, 'Cosmopolite,' in *Mélanges d'histoire littéraire, générale et comparée offerts à Fernand Baldensperger* (Paris: H. Champion, 1930), vol. 1, pp. 354–364; Gerd van den Heuvel, 'Cosmopolite, Cosmopoli(t)isme,' in Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt (eds), *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680–1820* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1986), vol. 6, pp. 41–55; Raymond Trousson, 'Introduction,' in Fougaret de Monbron, *Le Cosmopolite ou le citoyen du monde* (Bordeaux: Ducros, 1970); and Thomas J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694–1790* (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). The above quotations are both taken from Gonthier Louis Fink, 'Cosmopolitanisme,' in Michel Delon (ed), *Dictionnaire européenne des Lumières* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), pp. 277–279.
2. Within the vast literature on nationalism and the history of the internalisation of a sense of national belonging, see especially the following influential works: Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991). On the more specific question of the interpenetration of the local and the national in the development of nationalism, see Alon Confino, *The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997) and the introduction to the present collection.
3. Cited in Michael W. McConnell, 'Don't Neglect the Little Platoons,' in Martha Nussbaum *et al.*, Joshua Cohen (ed), *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), p.79.
4. See Bruce Robbins, 'Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,' in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds), *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp.1–19. Robbins argues against such assumptions which, he claims, have shaped the politics of the left as well as the right throughout the twentieth century, from Gramsci to Fanon and beyond. Contemporary arguments for and against cosmopolitanism from multiple political perspectives are collected in Nussbaum *et al.*, *For Love of Country*.
5. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 53; and Anthony Smith, 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity,' *International Affairs*, 68/1, 1992, pp.55–76.
6. On the links between the modern conception of citizenship and earlier privileges granted to European city dwellers, see Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 40–42.
7. On the eighteenth century French-language Republic of Letters, see Louis Réau, *L'Europe française au siècle des Lumières* (Paris: A. Michel, 1951); and Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, *Grub Street Abroad: Aspects of the French Cosmopolitan Press from the Age of Louis XIV to the French Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), which demonstrates that a cohort of French and international writers (not to mention publishers, booksellers, smugglers, and readers) formed a vast French-language communication network across eighteenth century Europe and often used the language of citizenship and republicanism to refer to this relatively autonomous, transnational discursive community.
8. On the idea of humanity as it developed during the Enlightenment, see Nicole Arnold, 'Humanité et Révolution,' *Dictionnaire des usages socio-politiques (1770–1815)*, eds. Equipe '18ème et Révolution,' vol. 6 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1999), pp. 51–80; and Henri Duranton, 'Humanité,' in Rolf Reichardt and Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink (eds), *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680–1820* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000), vol.20, pp. 11–51.
9. See [Pierre André Gargas], *Concliateur de toutes les nations d'Europe, ou Projet de paix perpétuelle entre tous les souverains de l'Europe et leurs voisins* ([Passy]: n.p., 1782). This text, by a former galley slave, was initially published privately by Benjamin Franklin on his own press at Passy and subsequently republished in Toulon in the Year V (1796–1797) under the pseudonym 'Voltaire' and with the title *Contrat social surnomé Union francmaçone, 1776*.
10. Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, *Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'écriture sainte* [posthum. 1709], excerpted in translation in Keith Michael Baker (ed), *Readings in Western Civilization: 7, The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 9, 36.
11. For an overview of the regulation and control of publishing in eighteenth century Europe, including France, see Isser Woloch, *Eighteenth-Century Europe: Tradition and Progress, 1715–1789*

- (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 259–270. On conceptions of censorship more generally, see my article, ‘Writing the History of Censorship in the Age of Enlightenment,’ in Daniel Gordon (ed), *Postmodernism and the Enlightenment: New Perspectives in Eighteenth Century French Intellectual History* (New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 117–145.
12. For an overview of the practice and theory of foreign policy and war-making in eighteenth century Europe, see Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1600–1815* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
 13. On the invention of public opinion in the eighteenth century, see the classic work by Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). In the wake of this book, historians have devoted considerable attention to the study of the development of public opinion in England, in France, in Prussia, and in other European states. Much less work has, however, been done on transnational forms of public opinion in the eighteenth century.
 14. See, for example, F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); James Turner Johnson, *The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Elizabeth Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in 17th- and 18th-Century France* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1941), which summarises a slightly larger number of examples for the period under consideration here. The same examples are often considered in the literature on federative and confederative political models; see, for example, Murray Forsyth, *Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation* (Leicester: Leicester University Press; New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981).
 15. M. le Chevalier G*** [Ange Goudar], *La Paix de l’Europe ne peut s’établir qu’à la suite d’une longue trêve, ou Projet de pacification générale, combiné par une suspension d’armes de vingt ans, entre toutes les puissances politiques* (Amsterdam: Chatelain, 1757), p. 236.
 16. See Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, in Josué V. Harari (ed), *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structural Criticism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp.141–160, see 141. This claim has been further reinforced by such historical studies as Martha Woodmansee, ‘The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’,’ *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 17, 1984, pp. 425–448 (on Germany); Mark Rose, ‘The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship,’ *Representations*, 23, summer 1988, pp. 51–85 (on Great Britain); and Carla Hesse, ‘Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France, 1777–1793,’ *Representations*, 30, spring 1990, pp.109–137. However, there is disagreement as to whether this new conception of the author as individual is better understood as a creation of a new, bourgeois legal order (Woodmansee, Rose) or as a product of the absolutist state itself (Hesse).
 17. On the value and associations traditionally attached to proper names, see Eusebius [Eusèbe] Salverte (itself a pseudonym for Louis Randol!), *History of Names of Man, Nations, and Places. In their Connection with the Progress of Civilization* (London: John Russell Smith, 1864 [1st French ed., 1824, though this text was initially intended to be a part of his *De la Civilisation, depuis les premiers temps historiques jusqu’à la fin du dix-huitième siècle*, the introduction for which was published in 1813]). Salverte urges respect for proper names on the grounds that they are not only inseparable from the identity of individuals; they form the connecting link in families, perpetuate the memory of ancestors, provide a source of social stability by preventing the confusion of rank, encourage moral behavior, express the pride and character of nations, and constitute a marker of the degree of civilisation which a people has attained.
 18. Joan DeJean notes that in the late seventeenth century, an ‘anonymous’ publication meant that the name of the author was not known and a relationship of secrecy existed between the author and his or her public. It did not mean, as it does today, that no author’s name was made apparent on the title page, a relationship that has more to do with author and text. This is an important distinction since many works of literature were published in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries without listing an author’s name; however, the identity of the author was easily decoded by its intended audience, making for a kind of transparent namelessness. See DeJean, ‘Lafayette’s Ellipses: The Privileges of Anonymity,’ *PMLA*, 99/5, 1984, pp. 884–901, see p. 885.
 19. Beginning in the Middle Ages, French nobles often used a ‘de’ to add the name of their fief (or nom de terre) to their baptismal name, a tradition that gradually became official. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the bourgeoisie had begun to adopt this practice too, sometimes adding a locale instead of a domaine to their names, meaning that, for French elites

- of the early modern period, place of origin was often indicated as a part of one's legal name along with sex and family. On the history of French naming practices, see Albert Dauzet, *Les Noms de personnes, origine et évolution: prénoms-noms de famille-surnoms-pseudonymes* (Paris: Delagrave, 1934).
20. See [Jean Henri Maubert de Gouvest], *La Paix générale; ou, Considérations du docteur Man'lover d'Oxfordt. Mises en françois par mr. Maubert de Gouvest* ([Berlin]: Imprimerie du futur congrès, 1762); this work was also published in another version as *Manloveriana, pour servir de supplément à l'Europe ridicule*.
 21. [Goudar], *La Paix de l'Europe ne peut s'établir qu'à la suite d'une longue trêve*, pp. 236 and xv respectively.
 22. Thomas Keenan, 'Humanism without Borders: A Dossier on the Human, Humanitarianism and Human Rights', *Alphabet City*, no. 7, 2000, introduction, p.41.
 23. See Gustave Brunet, *Imprimeurs imaginaires et libraires supposés: étude bibliographique* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1962 [1866]). On the history of this practice, which was especially popular in eighteenth century France, see Archer Taylor and Fredric J. Mosher, *The Bibliographical History of Anonyma and Pseudonyma* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 203–205.
 24. [Polier de Saint-Germain], *Nouvel essai sur le projet de la paix perpétuelle* (En Suisse: n.p., 1788), p.29.
 25. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
 26. [André Guillaume Resnier], *République universelle, ou l'Humanité ailée, réunie sous l'Empire de la Raison* (n.p., [1788]).
 27. See Jean-Claude Perrot, 'Nouveautés: l'économie politique et ses livres,' in Roger Chartier and Henri-Jean Martin (eds), *Histoire de l'édition française* (Paris: Promodis, 1983), vol. 2, esp. pp. 254–255.
 28. See T. J. Carty, *A Dictionary of Literary Pseudonyms in the English Language* (London: Mansell, 1995), pp. 253–254.
 29. On the precarious social status of the writer in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Alain Viala, *La Naissance de l'écrivain: sociologie de la littérature à l'âge classique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1985); John Lough, *Writer and Public in France from the Middle Ages to the Present Day* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), esp. pp. 238–246; and Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
 30. There is much feminist literature on the question of the female signature and, in particular, the frequent recourse of French women writers to anonymity in the early modern period. See, for example, Joan DeJean, 'Lafayette's Ellipses: The Privileges of Anonymity'; Nancy Miller, *Subject to Change: Reading Feminist Writing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Erica Harth, *Cartesian Women: Versions and Subversions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Carla Hesse, 'Reading Signatures: Female Authorship and Revolutionary Law in France, 1750–1830', *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 22, spring 1989, pp. 469–487 (esp. pp.484–486).
 31. See Adrian Baillet, *Les Auteurs déguisez sous des noms étrangers, empruntez, supposez, feints à plaisir, chiffrez, renversez, retournez, ou changez d'une langue en une autre* (Paris: Antoine Dezallier, 1690), esp. pp. 86–218 ('Seconde partie: Des Motifs que les Auteurs ont eus, ou pu avoir, pour changer leurs noms, et pour se déguiser'), in which Baillet lays out 14 different motives for an author to change his or her name. On questions of identity and disguise in relation to the adoption of pseudonyms in general, see too Jean Starobinski, 'Pseudonymous Stendal,' in *The Living Eye*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989 [1961]); Maurice Laugaa, *La pensée du pseudonyme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986); and 'Introduction,' in Adrian Room, *Dictionary of Pseudonyms*, 3rd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 1998).
 32. [Goudar], *La Paix de l'Europe ne peut s'établir qu'à la suite d'une longue trêve*, p. x.
 33. On this illusion and its relationship to pseudonyms, see esp. Starobinski, 'Pseudonymous Stendal.'
 34. J.-P. Brissot de Warville, *De la vérité, ou Méditations sur les moyens de parvenir à la vérité dans toutes les connoissances humaines* (Neuchatel, 1782), p. 200, cited in Duranton, 'Humanité,' p. 31.
 35. [Goudar], *La Paix de l'Europe ne peut s'établir qu'à la suite d'une longue trêve*, p.183.
 36. For forceful statements of the position that human rights claims should be looked upon as ideological justifications for continued Western dominance, see Keenan (ed), 'Humanism Without Borders'.
 37. Miller, *Subject to Change*, p.75.

38. For a range of attempts to grapple with the tension between universalism and difference in Enlightenment thought, see Henry Vyverberg, *Human Nature, Cultural Diversity, and the French Enlightenment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) Stéphane Pujol, 'L'Humanisme et les Lumières,' *Dix-huitième siècle*, 30, 1998, pp. 271–279; Marc Crépon, *Les Géographies de l'esprit. Enquête sur la caractérisation des peuples de Leibniz à Hegel* (Paris: Payot et Rivages, 1996); and Tzvetan Todorov, *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
39. [Polier de Saint-Germain], *Nouvel essai sur le projet de la paix perpétuelle*, p. 22.
40. See Kwame Anthony Appiah's 'Cosmopolitan Patriots,' among other essays, in Cheah and Robbins (eds), *Cosmopolitics*.
41. [Resnier], *République universelle*, p.26.
42. On this episode, see Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought*, p.133.
43. Apart from the writings of Kant, the new theories of international relations and of international law advanced in the 1790s constitute a relatively neglected field of study. On cosmopolitan thought during the French Revolution, in particular, see Marc Belissa, *Fraternité universelle et intérêt national (1713–1795): les cosmopolitiques de droit des gens* (Paris: Editions Kimé, 1998); and the essays in Bernard Vincent (ed), *Thomas Paine, ou la République sans frontières* (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1983).
44. On the politics of names during the Revolution, see Michel Delon, 'Le Nom, la signature,' in Jean-Claude Bonnet (ed), *La Carmagnole des muses: l'homme de lettres et l'artiste dans la Révolution* (Paris: A. Colin, 1988), pp. 277–294. On changes in the law concerning naming during these years, see Marcel Garaud, *La Révolution française et la famille* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978), pp. 9–19.
45. On this revolutionary thinker, see the following works: Georges Avenel, *Anacharsis Cloots, l'orateur du genre humain: Paris, France, Unvers* (Paris: Ed. Champ Libre, 1976 [1865]); Roland Mortier, *Anacharsis Cloots, ou L'Utopie foudroyée* (Paris: Stock, 1995); and François Labbé, *Anacharsis Cloots la Prussien francophile: un philosophe au service de la Révolution française et universelle* (Paris: Harmattan, 1999).
46. Anacharsis Cloots, *Bases constitutionnelles de la République du genre humain* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1793), pp. 29–30. This text and all of Cloots's other writings of the revolutionary period have been reprinted in facsimile in vol. 3 of his *Oeuvres*, pref. Albert Soboul (Munich: Kraus Reprints, 1980).
47. Delon, 'Le Nom, la signature,' esp. pp. 281–287.
48. These two examples come, respectively, from *Une Fleur sur le tombeau de Louis XVI, ou Tableau véridique de son règne, de sa vie privée et de sa mort édifiante par un Ami de la justice et de l'humanité* (Berlin: n.p., 1793) and *La Fayette reconnu pour ce qu'il vaut, par un citoyen impartial, ami de la liberté, de l'humanité et de la paix* (Paris: Imprimerie patriote, 1791).
49. This finding is consistent with a point that Carla Hesse makes regarding the epistemological assumptions behind revolutionary copyright laws in 'Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship.'
50. Delon, 'Le Nom, la signature.'
51. On the changing status of the foreigner, see Albert Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers. Cosmopolitisme et défense nationale* (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1918); and Sophie Wach-nich, *L'Impossible citoyen: l'étranger dans le discours de la Révolution française* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1997). On the turn away from cosmopolitanism in international relations, see too Belissa, *Fraternité universelle et intérêt national*.
52. See the *Epître du vieux cosmopolite Syrach à la Convention nationale de France, contenant l'examen du discours prononcé à la séance du 2 pluviôse III par le citoyen Boissy-d'Anglas représentant du peuple sur les véritables intérêts de quelques unes des puissances coalisées et sur les bases d'une paix durable* (En Sarmatie [probably Paris], 1795). This text is generally attributed to Scipione Piattoli in its French version. However, the Polish version (*Stary Kosmopolita Syrach do Konwencyi Narodowej*) and the German version (*Sendschreiben des alten Weltbürger Syrach an Frankreichs national convent*), both also published in 1795 with the fictitious imprint of Sarmatia, have often been attributed to others.
53. See Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author' [1968] in Stephen Heath (ed and trans), *Image-Music-Text* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), pp.142–148; and Foucault, 'What is an Author?' [1969].
54. See, for example, Nancy K. Miller, 'The Text's Heroine: A Feminist Critic and Her Fictions', *Diacritics* 12/2, 1982, pp. 48–53.
55. Dipesh Chakrabarty explains his conception of this project in detail in *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Copyright of National Identities is the property of Carfax Publishing Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.